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One of the stimulating theoretical discussions of the last decade involves the 
concept of governance and its linkage to public policy. However, many 
substantive studies on covernance transformation and how it has affected policy- 
making processes have drawn on the experience of western developed countries, 
with little has been done in the context of developing societies. This research, 
therefore, responds to the need for a reater understanding of the increasing 9 4: ) 
complexity of contemporary governance and its nexus with policy-making in 
developing countries. It explores the nature of Thailand's governance 
configuration in the making and delivery of anti-poverty policy since the 1997 b 
crisis. The research also investigates this nexus in the context of globalisation ZZ) 
which the roles and influences of globalised agents are asserted. The research 
findings suggest some dynamic patterns in the relationship between various actors 
involved in the oovernance of anti-poverty policy since the crisis. Instead of the :D 
Thai state turning into a weak and less powerful actor in shaping policy and zn 
service delivery, the state was able to use different governing approaches and z::, 
strategies to maintain its power to steer society, to influence other actors, and 
ultimately to align all other domestic and international non-state actors with its 
purposes. The governance configuration of Thailand's anti-poverty policy 
appeared to shift from a society-guided, state-governed governance toward a 
state-guided, state-governed governance. This case supports a position arguing 
that the power of states is not yet diminished as promoted in the western literature; 
on the contrary, the state has readjusted itself in response to the dynamic, growing 
complexity of the contemporary governing process. The Thai state seeks coherent 
strategies for maintaining its influence over domestic policy-making and engaging 
itself with new policy conditions. 
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Chapter I Introduction 
1. Rationale of the study 
During the past two decades, states across the globe, especially in industrialised 
countries, have experienced some pressures that demanded a reorientation of their 
role and position in the governing process. During the 1980s, economic and fiscal 
constraints signalled a changing perspective of what states were expected to do 
(Damgaard et al., 1989). Many governments turned away from the ideology of the 
1960s and 1970s that valued a key role for the state in planning, redistributing, 
and providing basic human needs (Leftwich, 2000) and began to favour the neo- 
liberal policy that emphasised the role of market mechanisms. Optimism about the 
pivotal role and capacity of states to solve social problems began to decline, and 
this heightened the demand for a fundamental rethinking of governing 
arrangements (Pierre, 2000). It was argued that, rather than decisively intervening 
in the society, states should allow market mechanisms to govern the economy and 
to direct welfare distribution within society. The capacity of the state to make and 
implement policy, or in other words to ýsteer' society to achieve collective 
interests, was seriously challenged by the market as an alternative governing 
mechanism (Pierre and Peters, 2000). 
During the 1990s, globalisation emerged to become one of key themes in the 
analysis of the changing role of the state in policy-making (Holton, 1998; Hudson 
and Lowe, 2004). The globalisation process had a critical role in reconfiguring the 
nature of the state and its relations with other actors in the policy-making process. 
Pressures from international forces began to be viewed as threats to the 
sovereignty and political control of states over their domestic policy agendas 
(Camilleri and Falk, 1992; Deacon et al., 1997). In many countries, the capacity 
and power of governments to manage their society was dispersed upward to 
international institutions and downward to sub-national governments (Strange, 
1996). The influence and role of international and domestic non-state actors in the 
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process of policy-making and implementation increased noticeably (Held, 1991). 
Several emerging models of governance were introduced. They drew on new 
ideas about what ought to be the new forms and functions of the state in relation 
to society. Governing through community and networks received high attention as 
alternative governing approaches (Atkinson and Coleman, 1992; Tam, 1998). 
Both approaches viewed the state more as a differentiated entity (Rhodes, 1997) 
and just another component of the complex patterns of interaction in policy- 
making process. 
Principal questions have emerged from what has happened to the state over the 
past decades. These questions have centred around the extent to which the state 
continues to have an unrivalled position in society and has been able to maintain 
its position as the key locus of political power and authority in the making and 
delivery of policy; or whether the state has become increasingly dependent on 
other actors in directing society towards desired ends. One critical area of 
examination that could help to answer these questions is the investigation of the 
shift in perspective towards state-society relationships in the governing process 
(Pierre and Peters, 2005). Some scholars argue that the state has reoriented its role 
among an increasing range of institutions and actors involved in the policy- 
I making process 
(Jessop, 2002; Waters, 2001). Other authors contend that the 
power of the state is not diminished, but is being readjusted and reconstituted to 
displace traditional conceptions of statehood as an absolute, indivisible, 
territorially exclusive, and zero-sum form of power in response to the growing 
complexity of society in a more interconnected world (Held, 1991; Held et al., 
1991; Rosenau, 1997). The central concerns of these scholars remain focused on 
the changing role of the state and its capacity to pursue collective interests under 
dynamic external and internal conditions. To them, the pressures being imposing 
on the state do not necessarily lead to the end or decline of the state, but instead 
the transformation and adaptation of the state to the society in which it is 
embedded (Pierre and Peter, 2000). 
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However, most of the literature has drawn on the experience of industrialised 
societies and is largely based on the Anglo-centric interpretation of the changing 
role of the state. A question that remains important probes the extent to which the 
argument of state reorientation/transformation is relevant to what has been 
happening in other parts of the world, especially in developing countries. 
Researching this issue in the context of non-western and developing countries as 
well as those societies in transition is still less explored. This dissertation 
therefore aims to investigate the case of Thailand, a developing country in Asia, to 
discover if any change in the role, power, capacity, and strategy of the Thai state 
vis-A-vis non-state actors in the governing process could be observed on the same 
basis as the literature has proposed. Has there been any change with regard to 
state-society relationships and dependencies in response to the demands and 
pressures imposed by internal and external forces? Thus, this case study of a 
developing country in a non-western context has the potential to provide a fresh 
contribution to academic debates on the nexus of globalisation, governance, and 
policy-making. 
2. Purpose of the study and research approach 
The Thai state has experienced critical challenges pressured by the financial crisis 
and globalisation since the late 1980s. The pressure became more intense in the 
1990s and especially after the 1997 financial crisis. The crisis initiated many 
critical changes to Thailand's socio-political milieu, governance, and policy- 
making. Domestic political arrangements were shaken by the crisis, new political 
forces arose, and non-state actors began to gain a more important role in policy- 
making (Hewison, 1997,2000,2001). At the same time, issues of the appropriate 
role and relationship between state and society, suitable public policies, and 
institutional reform for national recovery from crisis were the major topics of 
wide public discussions and debate. Governance reform and building a 'good' 
governing- process have become prime policy agendas since then (Orlandini, 
2003). Furthermore, a new constitution was promulgated in 1997 with specific 
aims to shift Thailand from a highly centralised state whose politics had often 
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been dominated by a narrow set of political, bureaucratic, and economic elites to a 
decentralised structure in which government institutions at all levels would 
operate in a more participatory, transparent, accountable, and responsive fashion 
(Klein, 1998; Niyom, 2003). In 2001, a significant change in Thai governance 
arrangements and policy directions occurred when a new government came to 
power. New policies based on a pro-poor, pro-rural, and pro-Thailand platform 
were introduced to realign the state with coherent governing strategies in the post- 
crisis milieu. 
These changes continue to transform Thai governance and policy-making, but the 
changes have left ambiguity and confusion concerning the present configuration 
of governance in Thailand. Specific study is needed to gain a better perspective of 
the Thai governance. This dissertation therefore aims to explore the configuration 
of Thai governance by examining the roles and interactions of key state actors vis- 
d-vis domestic and international non-state actors involved in the governing 
process. It is necessary that the investigation be grounded on a specific policy area 
so that the roles and interactions of all actors could be empirically examined. 
Anti-poverty policy is selected for reasons explained in Chapter 2. So this 
research further explores how this governance configuration affects the making 
and delivery of anti-poverty policy and considers if there are any significant 
changes in governance to be observed. If so, in which way have these changes 
developed? Who has shaped these changes and how? The issue of power 
relations, the politics of policy formulation, and the implementation processes are 
also considered. Underling themes of this research are concerned with the 
evolving interactions between state and societal actors in the governing process of 
anti-poverty policy and the extent to which the Thai state has reoriented its roles 
to remain engaged in steering society on the same basis as what has been 
described in the Anglo-governance literature. 
This research draws mainly upon the theoretical frameworks of governance, 
power, and institutionalism. It uses these frameworks to guide a theoretically 
informed analysis of the case being investigated. The governance framework 
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seeks to explain a whole series of arrangements of state-society relationships and 
offers a range of exploratory perspectives to promote an understanding of 
governance configuration. The framework embraces not only the actions of 
government or state apparatus but also includes a wide range of institutions/actors 
and practices of these actors in the governing processes. So it facilitates an 
attempt to examine the ways in which key relationships between government, 
domestic non-state sectors, and international organisations are evolving and being 
reshaped. 
A qualitative case study approach is employed in this research with a single case 
design focused on poverty alleviation policy in Thailand. This approach offers 
rich, detailed information about actors involved in the governing activities and the 
development of policy within a specific context. The research is based on various 
sources including documentary sources, semi-structured interviews, and 
observation. The infon-nation was analysed thematically using some key 
properties drawn from the theoretical frameworks. Empirical findings are 
presented in a historical narrative form. 
3. Structure of the dissertation 
This research is presented in two main parts (Figure 1). Following the 
Introduction, the first part of this dissertation addresses the theme of research 
inquiry, the theoretically informed frameworks used to facilitate the case study 
analysis, and the methodological approach adopted to direct the investigation. The 
second part provides insight into the background of the case study, its empirical 
findings, its analysis, and a discussion. Due to the enormous contextual details of 
this case,, findings are divided into three main chapters for clarity of analysis and 
presented in a narrative form with key themes highlighted. Chapters 5 and 6 
consider the interactions between the Thai state and societal actors in the process 
of governing. Chapter 7 examines the interactions between the Thai state and 
globalised forces with particular emphasis on the World Bank. Discussions and 
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analyses are integrated into the presentation of each chapter. Brief descriptions of 
the chapters are presented below. 
Chapter 2 sets out the themes of the study in the context of development and the 
challenges of governance transition in Thailand. These are linked to the debates 
about governance and policy-making in the global policy milieu. This chapter also 
considers the limitations of current studies on Thai governance and policy-making 
before addressing the rationale for selecting anti-poverty policy for investigation. 
It also introduces the conceptual frameworks being employed to guide this 
theoretically informed research. 
Chapter 3 provides a rationale for adopting a case study research approach. It 
considers methodological issues, research validity and reliability, and processes of 
data collection and analysis for this study. 
Chapter 4 sets the background for the case study with reference to the relationship 
between state, societal actors, and globalised forces prior to the 1997 crisis. It then 
goes on to consider the impacts of the crisis and emerging governance challenges. 
It finally provides an explanation for the emergence of anti-poverty policy. 
Chapters 5 and 6 present key empirical findings and discussions obtained from 
fieldwork based on in-depth analysis of interactions between state and domestic 
societal actors involved in anti-poverty policy. The chapters are divided 
historically, with 2001 representing a turning point when considerable changes in 
the governance configuration were observed. 
Chapter 7 discusses key empirical findings and analyses of the development and 
the change in the relationship between the Thai state and globalised forces. The 
World Bank's engagement in anti-poverty policy is examined for the period 
before and after the new government came to power in 200 1. 
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Chapter 8 concludes the research with discussion and analysis of the major 
findings about the Thai governance emerging in previous chapters. These are also b 
discussed with reference to the debates about globalisation, governance, and 
policy-making. 
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Figure 1: Summary of the dissertation structure 
Chapter I Gives an overview of the study encompassing the rationale of the study, purpose of 
the study, and structure of the dissertation. 
Chapter 2 Reviews the debates on the subject, explains the theoretically informed framework 
to be employed in the study, and the themes and focus of the research. 
V 
Chapter 3 Details the research approach and methodology utilised to explore the case. 
W-0 PIRM 
Cbapter 4 Sets the background of the case encompassing a landscape of state-society 
interactions in Thailand's policy governance; the 1997 crisis; and Thailand's anti- 
poverty policy agenda. 
V 
Chapter 5 Presents in-depth analysis of interactions between state and societal actors in the 
process of anti-poverty policy governing after the crisis until 200 1. 
V 
Chapter 6 Presents in-depth analysis about interactions between state and domestic societal 
actors in the process of anti-poverty policy governing in the era of the TRT 
government. 
V 
Chapter 7 Discusses key empirically findings of the relationship between the Thai state and 
the World Bank in anti-poverty policy before and after the TRT government came 
into power. 
V 
Chapter 8 Concludes with discussions of the major findings in light of existing framework 
and current debates. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the stimulating theoretical discussions of the last decade involves the 
concept of governance and its linkage to public policy. The governance notion 
offers a perspective with regard to state-society relationships and dependencies. 
The notion suggests that the state evolves from an actor who controls some 
powers to enforce public policy, to become an actor who is increasingly 
dependent on other societal actors in the governing process. Further, the political 
milieu has indeed become increasingly complex because of the influence 
globalised forces and some changes they impose on the domestic governing 
institutions. Although there are now some substantive studies on governance 
transformation and how it has affected policy processes, little has been done in the 
context of developing countries, especially countries in Asia and Thailand in 
particular. This research, therefore, explores the nature of governance and social 
policy-making in Thailand with reference to recent anti-poverty policy in order to 
respond to the need for a greater understanding of the increasing complexity of 
contemporary governance and policy arena in developing countries. Moreover, 
governance study is a highly relevant issue in the study of globalisation that is not 
only closely associated with the exchanges of international trade, finance, and 
information but also encompasses profound social and political transformation. 
This chapter presents the research agenda and analytical framework exercised 
thematically throughout this research. The first section outlines the themes to be 
studied pertaining to the debates about governance transition and policy-making 
in Thailand. It also discusses some limitations of existing studies before 
addressing the rationale for selecting anti-poverty policy as a focus. Another 
section presents the conceptual frameworks being utilised to guide this 
theoretically informed research. 
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2. Research inquiry 
2.1 Themes of study 
Some scholars view the relationship between Thai society and the Thai state as 
static. They hold that the modem Thai state has remained strong and highly 
influential over society since the Thai nation-state was instituted a hundred years 
ago, and they expect this condition to remain into the future (Baker and Pasuk, 
2005). The majority of academics, however, see the relationship between state and 
society in Thailand as dynamic and interactive. Seksan (1995) argues that during 
its pre-modern (or ancient) period, the Thai state had a very limited role in public 
policy-making and was well integrated in society. Once the modern (bureaucratic) 
state was developed in response to the pressure of colonisation, however, it began 
to set itself above society and to exercise downward pressure upon society, 
enforcing changes through various kinds of policies (Seksan, 2005). But this 
relationship later inverted when societal forces were able to lobby for state 
transformation. 
Eventually, the development of societal forces, such as labour, business, and 
interest groups, began to challenge the power of the state beginning in the late 
1970s. These forces were able to influence policy development in relevant areas 
of interest from the early 1980s (Anek, 1992; Bidhya, 1997; Girling, 1981; 
Patcharee, 1985). Up to the beginning of the 1990s, scholars observed a situation 
in which NGOs expanded and became actively involved in the process of policy- 
making (Amara, 2002; Jaturong and Gawin, 1995; Juree, 2003,2003a). During 
the early 1990s, many analysts argued that the state had receded from its prime 
role in policy-making and saw the development of other societal forces that 
challenged the state's power over the governing process. Thirayuth predicted that 
Thailand would experience 'a transfer of power and legitimacy from the state to 
society ... 
from bureaucrats to businessmen, technocrats, and the middle 
class ... Society would change 
from narrow nationalism to greater acceptance of 
internationalism... ' (1993: 56). Chai-Anan also argued: 
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... Globalisation and internationalisation of capital have made the state a less important actor in the world where spatial and temporal dimensions had 
shrunk... the nation-state was being bypassed by the potent forces of 
information and communications... The Thai state was finding its authority 
being unden-nined by several significant developments in society and in the 
region... (1997: 54) 
A few years later, he even argued that there was a likelihood that the Thai state 
would transform into a 'market-based state' (Chai-Anan, 2001). 
Economic crisis in 1997 gave political urgency to introducing governance reform 
and reframing the roles of state and society in the policy-making process. The 
state was criticised for leading the country into crisis. Serious debates on the 
appropriate role and interaction of the state, the private sector, and civil society 
reached the peak of attention in Thailand from the beginning of the crisis 
onwards, as well as the debates about public policies and institutional reforms to 
further national development. Civil society and community-based developments 
were promoted as alternative paradigms to state-led, economic-oriented 
development and were a part of a localist and populist reaction to the increasingly 
globalised economy (McCargo, 2001). A special emphasis was placed on 
changing state-society relations, which were leaning towards greater participation 
and more liberal politics (Ukrist, 2001). Interest in community-led governance, 
based on the ideas of community empowerment, became one of the foci for 
reform. The state's power was attacked as being too overbearing, while societal 
actors proclaimed their need for greater influence over the policy-making process 
to balance the state's power. 
These developments reflected a shift in the way the Thai state was increasingly 
involved in more complex interactions with other players in recent decades. This 
dynamism seems to fit recent observations made by western academia on the 
changing nature of the state and governing process. During the past few years, 
issues related to the transformation of governance have gained increased attention 
from academics, development practitioners, and policy-makers in the developed 
worlds. The number of academic articles on governance produced over the last 
few years has exceeded those produced in the preceding decade (Kjaer, 2004). A 
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key reason for the recent popularity of this concept is probably 'its capacity - 
unlike that of the narrow term government - to cover the whole range of 
institutions and relations involved in the process of governing' (Pierre and Peters, 
2000: 1). Many international organisations have invested considerable effort in 
promoting good governance and hold it as a critical determinant for solving social 
issues such as sustainable development, poverty reduction, social injustice, etc. 
(for example DFID, 2006; UNDP, 1997; World Bank, 1992). 
However, most of the debates on governance have drawn on a rather western- 
centric or even Anglo-centric experience or interpretation of the state and the 
changing relations between state and society (Marinetto, 2003). Thus, this :D 
research inquiry not only examines the nature of governance configuration in the 
policy-making process, but it also examines the extent to which the concept of 
governance developed in the western world provides an appropriate theoretical 
framework for interpreting or explaining the emerging dynamic relationship 
between the state and other actors in the policy-making process in developing 
societies. The research employs the concept of governance and its various 
theoretical approaches to analyse the nature of Thai governance. It examines 
Thailand's governance by situating state-society interactions within one specific 
social policy context. 
Further, within the context of globalisation and the international isation of policy, 
one main argument highlights the nexus between globalised forces and domestic 
institutions. Some argue that globalisation becomes a vital context in which all 
policy processes must be read (Hudson and Lowe, 2004). Another argument 
claims that public policies are no longer confined to the domestic sphere or to 
governmental mandates; instead, it asserts that public policy is engaged to a 
greater extent with transnational conditions (Yeates, 2001). Globalisation can be 
read from a variety of perspectives, but one way to interpret it is to consider the 
role that international actors play globally and locally (Howlett and Ramesh, 
2003). Some authors argue that not only has the number of domestic players 
participating in policy development multiplied, but the role of international policy 
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actors has also increased significantly in shaping domestic policy (Deacon et al., 
1997; Yeates, 2001). Deacon et al. (1997) comment that social policies of a 
country are no longer entirely shaped by the politics of one national government. 
They are increasingly shaped by implicit and explicit social policies of numerous 
supranational agencies ranging from global institutions (such as the World Bank 
and the IMF), supranational bodies (such as the OECD), and international non- 
government agencies (Oxfam for example). These global players have done more 
than contribute to discussions about social policy; they have played an active role 
in social regulation and provision in domestic affairs of a country, both directly 
and indirectly. 
In Thailand, international development agencies, particularly the World Bank, 
have been actively involved in the Thai policy-making process since the 
beginning of the development era which began in the 1960s. In fact, the Bank was 
the key initiator of Thailand's first national development plan, launched in 1961. 
Subsequent plans caused the country to become more intensively engaged with 
the global economy as governments generally accepted the Bank's growth 
strategies (Rangsan, 1996). Although the involvement of international agencies in 
domestic policy began to decline during the 'boom' period of the late 1980s, their 
involvement became prominent again when Thailand was hit by economic crisis 
in 1997. The 1997 Asian crisis initiated significant challenges to Thailand's socio- 
political milieu, governance, and policy-making. As discussed in later chapters, 
the crisis raised the issue of poverty as the top priority of the government's policy 
agenda. Between 1997 and 2001, the Thai government worked closely with 
international organisations to tackle poverty. 
After reading through such developments, some might agree with Strange (1996) 
who suggests there has been a dramatic shift in structural power and authority 
away from the state towards non-state agencies and from national political 
systems to global systems. In other words, traditional functions and policy 
competencies have been redistributed upward to the supranational level, 
downward to lower-level state institutions, and sideward to other non-state actors 
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such as civil society. States are gradually 'hollowing out' of their locus in an age 
of globalisation or are in decline because local and international players provide 
an alternative focus for political commitment and tend to deny the legitimacy of 
the state as the focus of political action (Horseman and Marshall, 1994; Ohmae, 
1990 and 1995; Reich, 1992). States are viewed as having retreated, their power 
eroded. 
Nonetheless, when studying developing countries, such as Thailand in which a 
strong state has evolved historically and traditionally, these views need to be 
critically re-examined. Although one would agree that public policy is no longer 
confined to the domestic sphere and government mandates alone, it is an 
overestimation to argue that the capacity of these governments to manage their 
economy and society has been 'hollowed out' by the dispersion of their powers to 
international markets and institutions. Globalisation debates tend to focus on the 
broad macro-level context in which policy is made. However, there is a danger of 
applying only this broad level of analysis, relying on it for answers, and assuming 
the logic of convergence for every country. A number of studies indicate that 
many states have followed a different path of development (Henderson, 1999; 
Hirst and Thompson, 1996; Weiss, 1998). Perhaps, an important question to be 
asked is whether states in developing countries are losing their influence and 
authority to globalised forces? To what extent is their power dissipating upwards 
to supranational bodies, downwards to sub-national institutions, or sidewards to 
civil society causing developing nation states to 'hollow out'? Or do these states 
still have considerable autonomy in how they interpret the constraints placed on 
them by so-called globalised forces? 
Another argument claims that global capital cannot operate without state 
regulation and state capacity for social reproduction (Holton, 1998). International 
organisations do not have local presence to implement agreements, so they indeed 
depend on cooperation and partnership with national and local governments to 
implement policies and agreements. They also depend on NGOs to monitor and 
supply information on the delivery of such agreements. Would this structural 
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dependence of international players on states and non-state actors inevitably leave 
room for manoeuvring by domestic politics to mediate global policy objectives? 
The relationship between supranational and national institutions in the setting of 
policy agendas is worth examining and a case study of Thailand shall contribute 
to the debate by focusing on the context of developing countries. This research, 
thus, investigates the dynamics of the relationship between the Thai state and 
international players in the process of anti-poverty policy-making. It further 
examines the extent to which the Thai state can still manoeuvre, operate, and 
negotiate its place in the globalised milieu and the emerging new conditions of 
governance. It attempts to add a critical contribution to debates on globalisation, 
governance, and social policy studies; areas which are under-researched in the 
contexts of East and Southeast Asian countries in particular (Ramesh, 2004). 
2.2 Limitations of current studies on governance and policy-making in 
Thailand 
In setting up such themes of inquiry, some limitations of current policy and 
governance studies on Thailand are considered. This section considers issues of 
the actors being investigated, the level of analysis, the approaches being 
employed, the policy areas being studied, and the period of study. 
Although some studies have recently analysed some aspects of governance change 
after the 1997 crisis, most of them focus on the Prime Minister as the key actor 
and treat him as a representative of the state actor (McCargo, 2002; McCargo and 
Ukrist, 2005; Pasuk and Baker, 2004; Bidhya, 2004; Ukrist, 1998). This stance 
may have resulted from the premier's obvious characteristics, personality, 
leadership style, and especially his management orthodoxy. This emphasis could 
be true as he was the ultimate decision-maker in many policies. But using him as a 
representative of the state could distort analysis and neglect other actors in the 
policy realm. This research seeks alternatives to such analyses and offers different 
interpretation of Thailand's governance configuration by critically examining a 
comprehensive range of institutions and actors involved in the governing process 
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as well as the relationships amongst them. It centres on one particular policy as a 
platform for empirical examination. This is an attempt to fill the gap of current 
literature that focuses on macro level analysis as opposed to policy level analysis. 
Research on Thai policy issues in domestic literature has usually taken the form of 
investigative journalism based on single-issue policy scandals, most of it having 
the primary objective of exposing corruption or fraud on the part of individual 
politicians or government officials. Few studies, however, have provided 
systematic or theoretical analysis of the broader framework of Thailand's policy- 
making (Walaya, 2003). In contrast, this research examines the governing 
arrangement of public policy-making process by focusing on the changing role of 
the state vis-A-vis society. Therefore, this approach of examination should 
contribute to the existing literature on public policy studies which mostly focuses 
on micro-themes such as organisational analysis, and leads to a tendency to gloss 
over broader themes of the changing nature of power of state and society in an era 
of new governance (Richards and Smith, 2002). On the other hand, studies 
focusing on macro-level analysis, such as international political studies, tend to 
explain all phenomena within their purview with a more general analysis (Ray, 
2001) and might not be instrumental in reflecting new nature of governing 
practised by the state nor the changing relationships with society. In this study, 
therefore, the focus is at the middle level - the level of policy-making - as this is 
the level at which larger forces operate through actual institutions and decisions 
(Howlett and Ramesh, 2003). It is also the level at which actor interplay occurs 
and power is negotiated (Hudson and Lowe, 2004). 
Existing research on policy studies in Thailand have been carried out by drawing 
on various theories and frameworks. The predominant explanations in English 
literature have employed mainstream theoretical frameworks - such as 
bureaucratic polity (Riggs, 1966; Siffin, 1966), pluralism (Girling, 1981; 
Prudhisan, 1974), corporatism (Anek, 1992; Montri, 1979), formal political 
institutions (Hicken, 2002; Kuhonta, 2003; Samrit, 1999; Siriwan, 2001), or even 
the recently developed 'multiple streams' model (Dayley, 1997; Srisombat, 2003) 
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- to analyse the Thai governance and its policy-making processes. Furthermore, 
this literature seems to give little attention to trans- and supra-national actors. 
These studies do not consider external forces such as international organisations, 
multinational corporations, or international non-governmental organisations that 
exert influence on the policies of developing countries, including Thailand, nor 
the interactions between international and domestic actors in the policy-making 
process. Since we realise the impact that external forces have on the contemporary 
policy milieu, if we use these approaches to analyse the Thai case, it is likely we 
would be unable to capture the full ramifications of the contemporary Thai 
governance and policy-making process. 
Although some recent policy studies on Thailand have placed attention on trans- 
and supra-national actors such as international organisations (Busakorn, 2002). 
multinational companies (Patcharee, 1985), and international NGOs (Jak, 2000), 
none have comprehended the socio-political changes that have occurred in 
Thailand since the 1997 crisis. The crisis draws our attention to the 
reconfiguration of governance in Thailand with reference to impact of the crisis 
on the policy-making process, and the way the Thai state has reoriented itself to 
the new domestic and international milieux. After the crisis began, some 
institutional change was demanded. The idea of governance reform and good 
governance began to be debated, a constitution that aimed to reframe the state- 
society relationship was promulgated, and the Eight and Ninth NESDPs that 
promoted partnership between state and society and empowered communities 
were issued. It seemed that the pressure of globalised forces had reshaped the 
relationship between the Thai state and society - from the state as the dominant 
actor towards the state in more of a partnership form of governance. We can 
observe that the language of partnership - joined-up, participation, community 
empowerment, and so on - has been included in all major policy documents since 
the crisis (Bidhya, 2002). This implies a change in state-society relationships in 
Thailand. However, policy studies covering the period after the crisis remain 
seriously under-explored. Thus, there is a need for comprehending the 
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contemporary policy-making process in Thailand from 1997 onwards. The scope 
of this research encompasses the period from the crisis to 2005 
2.3 Why anti-poverty policy? 
Poverty eradication policy is selected to accommodate a more specific 
examination for many reasons. First, the literature on policy studies in Thailand 
has been mainly dominated by studies in the area of economic policy-making 
(Anek, 1992; Chai-Anan, 1990; Christensen et. al, 1993; Lauridsen, 2000; Medhi, 
1997; Schmidt, 1994). Social policy is under-re searched, and there is certainly a 
need for more contribution to the field. 
Second, since the beginning of the 1997 crisis, the languages of poverty 
alleviation and empowerment for the poor began to enter the political lexicon, 
causing state, civil society, and international organisations to place poverty 
alleviation at the top of their policy agendas. Each actor has pursued different 
approaches to the poverty agenda and employed different means of interlacing the 
poor into its strategies to influence policy-making. This research considers this 
pursuit as the intentional strategic orientation of each actor and it worth exploring 
further. 
Third, poverty policy has been the prime policy agenda of all governments since 
the crisis. Although all governments have adopted community-oriented policy 
initiatives and instrumentally established new agencies to implement policy, each 
government has pursued different policy parameters to poverty alleviation, from 
which we can observe significant impacts of the new parameters on the Thai 
governance. Thus, it is interesting to examine such changes in policy parameters 
and the impact they have produced upon the state-society relationship in this 
policy area. 
Fourth, the role and involvement of international organisations in the governing 
process could be clearly observed in this policy area. International agencies had 
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been significantly involved in shaping policy content, and its implementation 
process in response to the crisis. The role of the IMF in the policy-making process 
has been studied critically elsewhere (Phitthaya, 1997), but this falls into the 
category of economic policy. In contrast, this research concentrates on the role of 
the World Bank in social policy-making. The World Bank has collaborated 
closely with the NESDB in supporting the implementation of a poverty reduction 
strategy. Partnership governance under the CDP-PAM programme marked a 
prominent role of the Bank over other international agencies in this anti-poverty 
policy. CDP-PAM was expected by the Bank to become an important venue 
through which the Bank can be involved in domestic policy-making through a 
series of policy reform initiatives. Thus, this is a good opportunity to examine the 
response of the state to pressures influenced by international organisations in 
social policy-making. Furthermore, the role of the World Bank in the social policy 
process has been under-researched in Thailand's case. 
In sum. ) the main focus of this research is to examine the nature of Thailand's 
governance configuration in the making and delivery of anti-poverty policy 
between 1997 and 2005. This research does not include the evaluation of policy 
outcomes or impacts, nor does it include a detailed investigation of the 
appropriateness of anti-poverty policy in solving Thailand's poverty. However, it 
does employ anti-poverty policy as a case to investigate the nature of governance 
in Thailand. The research also investigates this nexus in the context of 
globalisation by pondering upon the roles and influences of globalised agents. 
Given to the limited space of the dissertation and the defined scope of the project, 
it focuses only on the globalised agents involved in the poverty alleviation policy 
during the stated period. The next section reviews some useful frameworks that 
help in finding the answers. 
3. Framework for analysis 
This research focuses on the governance at the level of policy-making -a middle 
range or meso-level of analysis - because it deals with 'how policies come to be 
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made, who puts them on the policy agenda, and the structure of the institutional 
arrangements in which policy is defined and eventually implemented' (Hudson 
and Lowe, 2004: 9). At this level, we can actually investigate interactions between 
the various actors involved. Several social science concepts and analytical 
frameworks can be applied to governance studies at the policy level. Some 
relevant literature is reviewed in this section, including that on governance, 
power, and institutions. These concepts and frameworks are used in a sense as 
frames to organise ideas and understanding to help construct a boundary around 
the matter of inquiry. 
3.1 Governance 
The term 'governance' is a descriptive label used to explain the role and 
relationships of the whole range of institutions involved in the governing process 
(Pierre and Peters, 2000). In particular, it sensitises us to the ever-increasing 
variety of actors involved in the process of policy-making (Richards and Smith, 
2002). The adoption of governance concept leads to a better understanding of the 
role that state and non-state actors play in producing policy outcomes. Rhodes 
(2000) explains that concept of governance does not offer causal explanations that 
evoke physically necessary relationships between phenomena; instead it provides 
a language for re-describing the world and to challenge the dominant state-society 
relationship narrative of the 1980s. The value of this notion lies in its capacity to 
organise and provide a 'map' or framework of the changing process of governing. 
It applies a 'simplifying lens to a complex reality' (Stoker, 1998: 26). It identifies 
key trends and developments in the nature of the relationship between state and 
society. Furthermore, Pierre argues that the governance concept 'has tremendous 
potential in opening up alternative ways of looking at political institutions, 
domestic-global linkages, trans-national co-operation, and different forms of 
public-private exchange' (2000a: 241). Thus, the notion of governance contributes 
to the development of an analytical framework for studying the changing nature of 
the state and its relations with society in the policy-making process, which is a 
key focus of this research. 
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Nevertheless, there are a variety of ways in which the state-society interactions in 
the governing process are interpreted (see Hirst, 2000; Pierre and Peters, 2000; 
Rhodes, 1997). 1 The governance framework that could be applied to this research 
should facilitate analyses at the policy level. One analytical framework proposed 
by Pierre and Peters is based on a presumption that state-society interactions are 
embedded in the governing process. In other words, to understand governance is 
ýa matter of understanding the nature of state-society relationships in the pursuit 
of collective interests' (2005: 6). To understand the nature of state-society 
relationships, this research is framed by three key parameters: actors, processes, 
and modes of governing. 
3.1.1 Actors 
One of key propositions of governance theory is that governance refers to a set of 
institutions and actors that are drawn from but also extend beyond government 
(Stoker, 1998). The principal actors in governance thus could be classified as state 
or social actors (Pierre and Peters, 2000). This research considers both sets of 
actors pertaining to anti-poverty policy in Thailand. 
There is a tendency to treat the state as a unified actor and to view it as a single 
entity. Government is often equated with state, which is a misunderstanding. The 
notion of government implies that there is only one centre of power in a unitary 
state, but in reality there are many centres and diverse links between many 
government agencies at local, regional, national, and supranational levels (Stoker, 
' Interpretations of governance include: 1) Neir Public Management (NPM) (Hood, 1991; Lane, 
2000), 2) corporate governance (Charkham, 1994; Tricker, 1994; Williamson, 1996), 3) good 
governance (ADB, 1999a; IMF, 1997; Leftwich, 1994; Peters, 1998; UNDP, 1997; World Bank, 
1992), 4) global governance (Hewson and Sinclair, 1999; Rosenau, 2000; Rosenau and Czempiel, 
1992), 5) institutionalised governance (Campbell et al., 1991; Hollingsworth et al., 1994; Gamble, 
2000; Lindberg et al., 1991), 6) interactive governance ftamework (Kooiman, 1993,2000,2003), 
7) self-organising networks governance (Atkinson and Coleman, 1992; Marsh, 1998; Rhodes, 
1997), and 8) governance as a rhetoric (Stoker, 1998). Kooiman (1999) points out that various 
definitions and applications of governance are more appropriate and useful under different 
circumstances. He gives an example: corporate governance appears to be more relevant at the 
organisational level, good governance is more relevant at the national level, and global governance 
is more related to the international level analysis. 
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1998). Thus, it is more appropriate to think of the state in a disaggregated manner. 
The state should encompass the government (in the narrow sense of the cabinet), 
the public bureaucracy, the legislature (including political parties and 
parliamentarians), the judiciary, q uasi-govern mental agencies, the legal system, 
coercive forces, and the incumbents of these institutions (Collier and Collier, 
2002). This research concerns all state actors involved in the Thai anti-poverty 
policy and disaggregates them as appropriate. 
A more diversified view of the societal or non-state actors must be taken. In fact, 
there are a series of actors who compete with each other to achieve their own 
interests. Policy is perceived as the product of the interactions between state and 
societal actors and among societal actors themselves. To understand these societal 
actors, there is a need to specify how they operate and the manner in which these 
actors play or participate in policy decision-making (Pierre and Peter, 2005). 
Bovaird and Loffler (2003) suggest that governance is likely to involve the 
following key societal actors: citizens, community organisations, non-profit and 
voluntary organisations, business, and the media. The perspective that a 
multiplication of non-state actors are involved in governance challenges the 
conventional assumption that government is the key player in process of 
governing. It also acknowledges that the formerly almost exclusive 
responsibilities of government are now being shared by societal actors, especially 
third-sector agencieS2 (Stoker, 1998). The actors who are most important in any 
policy issue vary depending on the policy area. In this research, the key societal 
actors in the anti-poverty policy are identified and critically examined. 
International governmental and non-governmental agencies, viewed as one of 
globalised forces, are an important set of actors who has been neglected and need 
to be included in the governance analysis (Cerny, 2000; Scholte, 2004) and public 
policy studies (Cerny, 2002; Howlett and Ramesh, 2003; Yeates, 2001). There is a 
rationale for the inclusion of these international actors from the viewpoint of 
2 They may be diversely labelled as voluntary groups, non-profits, non-governmental 
organisations, community enterprises, co-ops, or community-based organisations. 
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social policy scholars. Deacon el al. (1997) argue that the social policy's 
analytical frameworks have developed from work on the advanced welfare states 
and tend to downplay the importance of international organisations like the IMF 
and World Bank. Ramesh (2004) comments that the discipline of social policy 
should pay attention to an analytical and political project that focuses on the 
globalisation of social policy. The studies should embrace the intervention of 
supranational agencies/bodies in national social policy. These studies suggest that 
supranational actors need to be given more attention in explanations of domestic 
social policy (Yeates, 2001). In Asia, including in Thailand, international 
organisations played significant roles during the few years after the financial crisis 
and maintained their influence over domestic policy for some years (Beeson, 
2001). Thus, the role of this set of actors demands some attention in this study. 
Deacon et al. (1997) suggest that international actors have been involved in (1) 
influencing the shaping of national social policies, (2) engaging in transnational 
social distribution and regulation, and (3) occasionally providing for citizens or at 
least empowering citizens when states fail them. In other words, they contribute to 
the shaping of national policy by establishing policy conditions on governments 
for the receipt of financial assistance, by redistributing resources between 
governments, or by establishing conventions and offering technical advice and 
assistance as steps towards legal social regulation. Their interventions have been 
done via, for example, structural adjustment funds and various social development 
assistance programmes. In addition, Burden (1998) observes that policy dialogue 
constitutes an important means by which international agencies attempt to foster a 
political climate conducive to their own interests and intervene in the domestic 
policy process. They use diverse channels of intervention including sponsoring 
research, reports and conferences; auditing government compliance to 
international standards; and giving criticism when domestic policies are judged to 
fall short of international standards (Burden, 1998). This research shall evaluate 
whether international agencies have performed as the literature indicates and their 
influence upon domestic policy-making. 
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3.1.2 Processes 
Governance is also about the process of governing. In other words, it is concerned 
with the manner of interactions among the whole range of actors. In a governance 
relationship, the governing process is always an interactive process because no 
single actor has the knowledge and resources to tackle problems unilaterally 
although each actor influences the process to an unequal degree (Amin and 
Hausner, 1997). Such interactions produce outputs, so this research regards 
policy-making as one of the outputs that governance delivers. The process of 
delivering outputs includes several components: goal selection, decision-making, 
resource allocation, and instrument implementation (Pierre and Peters, 2005). 
Goal selection is similar to the process of identifying the problem and setting an 
agenda on the issue that is pursued by all actors. The research examines the efforts 
of each actor to influence anti-poverty policy. Next, the decision-making 
component involves the selection of instruments and the determination of a mix of 
public and private actions deemed most appropriate for reaching the defined 
agenda. Once a particular set of instruments has been adopted, necessary 
resources to make them work need to be identified and mobilised. Not only are 
financial resources important, but personnel and legitimacy are also important 
elements for governing. 
Given the 'strong state' tradition in Thailand and the recent emergence of 
significant roles of societal actors, two ideal types presented by Pierre and Peters 
(2005) are given attention and used to guide the assessment governing process of 
Thailand's anti-poverty policy. Key properties from each model are critically 
applied to evaluate the case of governance in Thailand. 
First, in the state-centric governance model (Peters, 2000; Pierre and Peters, 
2000), state and its apparatus remain at the centre of the process, but the state 
institutional ises its relationships with other actors. Thus various forms of 
corporatism and formalised state-society relationships are implemented. The 
corporatist perspective as described by Schmitter (1974) is applied. In this model, 
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goal selection remains very much in the hands of the state. Other actors may have 
input into the process of goal selection, but the decisions are primarily those of the 
state. The state has substantial powers to select other actors and to permit them to 
have influence. In this way, state actors gain a legitimate role in the policy 
decision from the involvement of other actors. However, the state is not able to 
make decisions entirely on its own as it needs to consider some demands of the 
other actors. Some forms of negotiation are thus required, and this also allows 
some room for manoeuvring and bargaining among the actors. Instruments are 
also exercised on a negotiated basis, and coercive instruments are less commonly 
used. Organised interests are often co-opted at the implementation stage, playing 
an important role in the street-level implementation (Pierre and Peters, 2005). 
The second model is the society-centric governance (Peters, 2000). 3 This model 
depends heavily upon the role of social networks in governing, with the state 
merely being one among many actors involved in the process. In this model, 
society may be the more powerful actor given its capacity to organise itself and to 
evade the power of the state. State decisions and actions reflect the interests of 
other actors to a greater extent, and the state apparatus is less insulated from 
external pressures. Functions of the state are more dependent on the support of 
other actors for goal setting and implementation (Kooiman, 1993). This implies 
some level of growing interdependence between state and non-state actors. 
However, it does not mean this model advocates 'governance without 
government' (Rhodes, 1997) While networks and public-private partnerships are 
defining features of this model, the state retains its role to some extent in 
establishing priorities, defining goals, and mobilising resources (Pierre and 
Peters, 
2000). The state plays a significant role in steering and coordinating actions 
toward the goals and leaves the decision on how such goals are best attained to the 
operational levels, which are exercised by other actors. However, 
during the 
implementation stage, there tends to be cooperative arrangements involving 
both 
state and societal actors in self-regulating networks. The 
interdependence among 
3 Pierre and Peters (2005) use the term 'Dutch governance school' 
in their models as it is 
advocated by the Dutch scholars, such as Kickert (1997) and 
Kooiman (1993,2000,2003), but I 
prefer to use the term 'society-centric' (Peters, 2000) to ease understanding 
in the comparison. 
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these actors. creates new forms of action, negotiation, and cooperation. Such 
patterns of interactions abound, for example co-regulation or public-private 
partnerships (Kooiman, 2000,20003). 
3.1.3 Modes of governing 
Various modes of governing operate differently in these two models. Five 
common modes of governance are briefly summarised here (Gamble, 2000; 
Heywood, 2000; Hollingsworth and Linberg, 1985; Hollingsworth et al., 1994; 
Thompson et al., 199 1). 
First, te hierarchical mode is characterised by constitutional rules over the 
government and bureaucracy that operate through top-down authority systems. 
This is essentially governance by law, and the control mechanism is carried out by 
using hierarchy and rules (Jorgensen, 1993). This mode of governing perceives 
state as the representative of the collective interest; thus, it is distinctly separated 
from the rest of society but governs society by the imposition of law and other 
forms of regulation. Other institutions in society enjoy some degree of autonomy, 
but the state never surrenders its legal authority over these institutions. 4 
Second., the market mode governs the voluntary exchange activities of multiple 
parties though price mechanisms that function as coordination devices in society 
(Thompson et al., 1991). The market is believed to be the most efficient and just 
mechanism for allocating resources because it empowers citizens when they 
exercise their power of choice. It does not allow for politics to allocate resources 
in inefficient ways. Instead of having elected politicians make decisions about 
what goods and services the state should provide and at what price, market 
mechanisms allow people to choose the things they want on their own, and the 
mechanism is believed to distribute and use resources in an efficient way. 
4 This model still plays a major role in the political and institutional organisation of a large number 
of national and institutional contexts, even in advanced democracies, such as those in Britain, 
Gen-nany, Japan, and Scandinavian countries (Derlien, 1995; Goldsmith and Newton, 1993; Pierre, 
1995). 
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Third, the networks mode is the way that cooperation and trust are formed and 
sustained within networks. A network is characterised by informal relationships 
between essentially equal agents or social agencies. It coordinates through less 
formal, more egalitarian, and more cooperative means (Thompson et al., 1991). 
Networks facilitate the coordination of public and private interests and resources; 
thus, in this respect, they enhance efficient implementation of public policy. 
Rhodes (2000) points out that these networks are characterised, first, by 
interdependence between organisations. Second, there are continuing interactions 
between network members, caused by the need to exchange resources and 
negotiate shared purposes. Last, networks have a significant degree of autonomy 
from the state. Some networks are said to be so sufficiently concerted and 
cohesive that they can resist or take over some government's activities (Stoker, 
1998), or even challenge state powers (Rhodes, 1997). The relationship between 
these networks and the state could be described as one of mutual dependence 
(Kooiman, 2000). 
Fourth, the governance in a partnership mode is a semi-autonomous 
organisational vehicle through which governmental, private, voluntary, and 
community sector actors engage in the process of deliberating and delivering 
public policy (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002). It is possible to classify the 
partnership arrangement into three types (Stoker, 1998). The principal-agent form 
relies on one party (the principal) to hire or contract another (the agent) in order to 
undertake a particular task (Broadbent et aL, 1996). The inter-organisational 
negotiation form involves organisations that negotiate joint projects. By blending 
their capacities during this process, they are better able to meet their own 
objectives. The systematic coordination form establishes mutual understanding, a 
shared vision,, and a joint-working capacity that leads to the establishment of a 
continuous mechanism/organisation. 
Finally, comm unitarianism literature (Etzioni, 1998; Tam, 1998) and deliberative 
democracy literature (Bohman and Rehg, 1997) recently produced the same claim 
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about the capacity of people and communities to identify their own needs and to 
govern themselves more autonomously. In a broad perspective, the 
communitarian mode builds on a consensual image of the community and 
includes the positive involvement of the members in collective matters in a way 
that allows them to resolve their common problems with a minimum of state 
involvement (Etzioni, 1994,1995). According to this mode, the state is believed 
to be too big and too bureaucratic to deal with their issues. Moreover, 
communitarians think that the state generates at least as many problems as it 
resolves. The communitarian mode seems to resolve common problems and foster 
a civic spirit in the community without breeding large public bureaucracies. 
This framework of actors, processes, and modes of governing provides a deeper 
understanding of the nature and configuration of governance and enables us to 
identify key variables to be used in the analysis of governance in Thailand. This 
research focuses on the role of the state and examines how it interacts with other 
actors and affects the configuration of governance. It views transfonnations in the 
role of state as a key issue in the study of governance (Pierre, 2000). In less 
positivist language, this research looks at the state as an independent variable 
(Pierre and Peters, 2000) and analyses its influence on society and policy-making. 
Although the governance framework is arguably a useful perspective when 
studying the changing contemporary relationships between state and society (such 
as Kooiman, 2003; Richards and Smith, 2002; Rhodes, 1997), the reader should 
be aware that that the literature of governance has drawn largely from the 
experience of developed countries and is inevitably based on the Anglo-centric 
interpretation of the changing state-society relationship. To what extent the 
governance theories promoted in western literature have taken into account the 
different political and economic development trajectories found in the Third 
World remains under explored. Some assumptions of the western governance 
framework may prove to be limited and not applicable to the studies of state- 
society relations in other contexts, especially those in developing countries 
in 
which the development of non-state sector is still in its infancy and the 
legacy of 
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strong authoritarian state remains. This research considers this concern. Also, the 
applicability of Anglo-centric governance perspectives to other contexts is 
discussed in the Conclusion. 
3.2 Power 
According to the previous section, at the heart of the debate on governance and 
policy-making today involves a much more pluralistic conceptual isation of power 
than when the debate initially started (Hudson and Lowe, 2004). Governing from 
a governance perspective is always an interactive process because no single actor, 
public or private, has the knowledge and resource capacity to independently 
govern society and economy on its own (Kooiman, 1993; Loffler, 2003). As a 
result, governance literature identifies the power dependence involved in the 
relationships between institutions involved in collective action (Stoker, 1998). 
Power dependence implies that each actor has to exchange resources and negotiate 
rules of the exchange with other actors to accomplish the means to achieve their 
goals. Similar to policy literature, if policy involves the capacity to decide, to act, 
or to have others act on one's behalf as well as the capacity to influence the 
behaviour of others to achieve a desired end, then policy is always an exercise of 
power (Considine, 2005). Analysing power relationships must be central to an 
adequate understanding of governance. 
Power can be broadly defined as the ability to achieve a desired outcome. 
Sometimes it is referred to in terms of the power to do something. Heywood has 
suggested that power is *usually thought of as a relationship; that is as the ability 
to influence the behaviour of others in a manner not of their choosing. It is defined 
as having power over others' (2000: 35). Power thus exists when someone can get 
others to do what they would not necessarily otherwise do. However, power can 
be exerted in various ways. This has resulted in the emergence of different 
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First, power is understood as decision-making with conscious judgment that in 
some way shapes actions or 'Influences decisions. The decision is observable and 
results from free competition between ideas and interests. This kind of analysis is 
based on the concept of classical pluralism (Dahl, 1961,1967). 
Nevertheless, power. is not simply the control of observable behaviour and 
decisions, Bachrach and Baratz (1962,1963) argue that power also extends into 
the non-observable realm of 'non-decisions, ' and this becomes the second face of 
power. Non-decision-making suggests that policy-makers exercise covert use of 
power outside the public arena to keep specific issues off the public policy 
agenda. Many interests are excluded from the decision-making process by this 
'-non-decision' mechanism. This capacity is also a function of the power and 
influence behind new issues. Thus, this second dimension of power may take the 
form of agenda setting: the ability to prevent decisions from being made. This 
involves the ability to prevent issues or proposals from being aired. 
The third dimension of power argues that it is not people's observable behaviour 
that is important, but how power is exercised over them through the capture of 
their thought processes that is more significant. This third face of power takes the 
form of thought control: the ability to influence another by shaping what he or she 
thinks, wants, or needs. This is portrayed as the 'hidden' face of power (Lukes, 
1974) or 'deep theory' (Parson, 1995) because it exposes processes of cultural and 
psychological control within society and, more generally, it highlights the impact 
of ideology. Power can be exercised though the control of infon-nation, the 
manipulation of mass media, the process of socialisation, or even the 
manipulation of myths and beliefs. 
These three dimensions of power are useful concepts in analysing governance in 
Thailand. The framework essentially enables us to analyse the process of 
governing, especially in policy agenda setting and decision-making. The second 
dimension of power helps to explain why some proposals put forward by societal 
actors have not reached the policy agenda and therefore were not adopted 
into 
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anti-poverty policy. Although the third dimension is relatively difficult to observe 
directly as it is not explicit, evidence of its existence was observed when the idea 
of community empowerment was mainstreamed into the national development 
plan and this idea captured the mindset of key NESDB officials. 
Power can also be understood through a discourse. A discourse in this sense is a 
larger narrative used to control *what is said and what is understood about what is 
said' (Considine, 2005: 54). Action is a linguistic property and only obtained 
meaning by being understood as part of the structured meanings encoded in 
language. Power is therefore understood as the capacity to act within and on 
behalf of the established framework of signs and values. This relates to the 
argumentative approach of policy studies which focuses on decoding how 
discourse shapes the way we make sense of the social problems and policy 
solutions (Fischer and Forester, 1993). From this perspective, analysing public 
policy involves exploring the way which 'policy discourse' frames the arguments 
that form the frameworks within which problems and agendas are constructed 
(Parsons, 1995). The argumentative approach to policy studies, therefore, 
addresses what is going on when an issue is set in a particular language or 
discourse in which a problem is framed. In this sense, the exercise of power is an 
attempt for setting the discourse in which a problem is framed (Majone, 1989). 
The language of policy would begin with a set of terms which first define what 
can be called a policy and what is excluded from this realm. This endeavour 
is 
associated with the second dimension of power. Considine (2005) argues that, 
according to this approach, power cannot be separated from the local syntax as 
well as knowledge cannot be independent of the powerful rationales which 
organise thinking and acting. For example, disbursing state welfare 
benefits to the 
unemployed and disabled is not simply an matter of determining the type and 
amount of payments made to those in need. Rather it is about the 
basic conditions 
or criteria employed by those in power to define the entitlement. 
Questions 
include: Who are deemed worthy of support and who are excluded? 
What social 
characteristics are portrayed as virtuous for both the recipients and 
the 
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programmes? These questions are related to the issue of categorising and naming, 
which are ways that actors construct policy. Naming policy problems is a critical 
means through which actors shape and prioritise problems. By labelling a 
problem, policy-makers signal the value attached to any given issue or problem 
while omitting other possibilities. This perspective directly relates to Thailand's 
case when the Poverty Registration Programme was initiated and the definition of 
the 'poor' and meaning of 'poverty' were redefined. This clearly confirms 
Edelman's argument (1977) that the name given to a problem immediately elicits 
expectations about the causes of the problem and the conditions which can be 
altered to bring about change. 
Finally, Considine (2005) has provided a list of useful questions to be asked to 
identify power relationships. The questions are: Who controls the definition of 
policy objectives? What is the problem being named? What is omitted from this 
formulation? For whom is the problem becoming a problem? Which interests 
benefit from the prevailing definition of problems? Which actors are presumed to 
be part of this problem? How are the names and categories being used to direct 
attention to solutions? How are exclusions being explained? Which actors play the 
key roles in controlling service agencies? These questions shall be used to guide 
the analysis of power relationships in the Thailand's anti-poverty policy. 
3.3 Institutions 
In fact, policy-making takes place in the institutional context. Public policy is the 
achievement of actors making use of institutions and being shaped by them. 
Several authors argue that the impact of institutional arrangements cannot be 
ignored in understanding the process of policy-making because they constrain 
how decision-makers behave (Hall, 1986; Skocpol, 1985; Weaver and Rockman, 
1993). Institutions divide powers and responsibilities between state organisations, 
they confer rights on individuals and groups, they impose obligations on state 
officials to consult and deliberate, and they can include and exclude other non- 
state actors in the decision-making process (John, 2002). March and Olsen 
(1989) 
page 32 
Chapter 2 The Research Agenda and Frameworks 
suggest that an explanation of how and why a given policy emerged in relation to 
a social problem requires an analysis of the structure, historical development, 
personal networks, and decisions over time of the involved institutions. 
Institutions also play a crucial role in shaping policy before decisions are made. 
Hudson and Lowe (2004) suggest that institutions set up the rules of the game that 
limit the range of possibilities open to policy-makers at the outset. They also 
suggest that institutions block off some paths of policy development before 
debates have even begun. Thailand's 1997 constitution and its national 
development plans are considered key institutions in Thailand worth examining as 
to how they affect governance and policy-making. 
Furthermore, political institutions play a significant role in filtering pressures, 
such as globalisation, and force states to respond to such changes in distinctive 
and divergent ways (March and Olsen, 1989). Although policy is increasingly 
constructed in international and global terrns, the power of decision-making and 
the capacity and will to implement policy still remain, to some extent, within the 
jurisdiction of nation states; thus, it is also necessary to analyse policy-making 
and governance within the context of the political institutions of nation states 
(Parsons, 1995). Hudson and Lowe (2004) argue that institutions filter change 
because they sit at the meso-level, operating between macro-level forces such as 
globalisation and micro-level forces such as individuals who make or implement 
policy decisions. In this sense, the institutional approach is highly relevant to this 
research as it enables us to deliberately consider the influence of globalised forces 
over domestic policy. 
Institutions could be defined as the formal and informal rules, procedures, 
routines, norms, operating practices, and conventions that structure the 
relationship between individuals in various units of the polity (Hall, 1986; Hall 
and Taylor, 1996). Hall (1996) argues that institutions do not exist in isolation 
from the wider relationship of state and society and must take account of specific 
historical experiences. Much of the recent institutional research has been focused 
around a body of work dubbed the new institutionalism. This approach is 'new' 
in 
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the sense that it tries to account for both agency (human actions) and structure (the 
role of institutions), pointing in particular to the role of institutions in structuring 
interaction between political actors (Lowndes, 2002). Several frameworks have 
been identified, 5 but this research focuses on the historical institutionalism strand. 
Hall and Taylor (1996) comment that historical institutionalism rejects the 
traditional postulate that the same operative forces will generate the same results 
everywhere in favour of the view that the effect of such forces will be mediated by 
the contextual features of a given situation, which are often inherited from the 
past. This means that because the past has a strong impact on the present, the role 
of history in shaping present governance needs to be strongly considered. Parsons 
(1995) suggests that policy-making takes place within the parameters of past 
policies and choices as well as inherited institutional arrangements. Policies that 
worked well in the past would be likely continue to be acceptable in the future and 
would be difficult to terminate. The argument is that once the decision to take 
policy down a particular route had been taken, the benefits of moving forward 
along the existing route tend to increase, so the costs of switching to an alternative 
route are likely to be politically controversial (Pierson, 1994). This argument links 
with the idea of path dependency, which holds that choices made in the past 
systematically constrain the choices open in the future (Hall and Taylor, 1996; 
Hudson and Lowe, 2004). This kind of development fosters stability, biases policy 
towards the status quo, and encourages changes that are generally incremental and 
largely inert in nature (Lindblom 1959). In this sense, this framework enable us to 
examine how the policies adopted in Thailand just after the beginning of the 1997 
crisis set the agenda for its 2001 government and provided the discourse within 
which poverty problems were constructed. 
According to the methodological approach, historical institutionalism guides the 
analysis to focus on the role that institutions have played in shaping policy over 
the long term (Krasner, 1988). To understand the ways which policies have 
' They are historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism 
(Hall and Taylor, 1996), normative institutionalism, empirical institutionalism, 
international 
institutionalism, sociological institutionalism, and network institutionalism (Peters, 1999). 
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developed over time, case study approach is used to explore the complex ways 
which institutions have shaped the processes of policy development. Another key 
feature is the prominent role that asymmetrical power relations have played in the 
operation and development of institutions (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Historical 
institutionalism has been especially attentive to the ways in which institutions 
have distributed power unevenly across social groups. This approach is more 
likely to assume that institutions give some groups disproportionate access to the 
decision-making process, and it tends to stress how some groups lose while others 
gain. This institutional focus could be applied to governance studies, particularly 
when analysing the processes and modes of governing. Kiser and Ostrom (1982) 
suggest a number of factors that need to be explored when analysing institutions, 
such as the number of actors involved; who can/cannot participate; what agencies, 
officials, departments and political institutions can be involved; what resources 
they have; how institutions and actors relate to one another; and how rules and 
constitutional arrangements influence the strategies of actors. 
Table I summarises key properties drawn from this review section that will be 
used to assess governance in Thailand. 
4. Conclusion 
Although the body of research on the themes of governan I ce and policy-making 
within the globalised context is growing worldwide, especially in developed 
nations, little has been done in relation to the developing world, especially in 
regards to Thailand. The picture of Thai governance and its policy-making lacks 
continuity and is rather scattered. This research attempts to fill this gap by 
investigating the nature of governance in anti-poverty policy-making in Thailand 
between 1997 and 2005. Findings about recent changes in Thai governance, 
particularly after the 1997 financial crisis, could contribute significantly to the 
debates and theoretical development of globalisation, governance, and policy- 
making, in the context of developing countries, especially in an Asian context. 
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This chapter has highlighted the themes of study and reviewed some significant 
concepts and theoretical frameworks, providing a good -basis for the research. 
These frameworks of analysis are inter-related and are linked to the changing role 
of the state within new policy conditions. The next chapter briefly discusses the 
methodological stance and methods being employed in the research. Up to this 
point, one may be aware that, to attain a better understanding of state-society 
relationships in Thailand, perhaps we should go beyond the argument of whether 
or not states have lost their sovereignty to globalisation, and instead take another 
focus: we could consider whether governance regimes have changed, that is 
whether states reconfigured their place and power in the new conditions. 
Table 1: Key properties of state-centric and society-centric governance 
Proprieties State-centric Society-centric 
Structure of Many groups in competition but * Many groups organised into 
polity unequal access to decisions and clusters of interests. 
resources. 0 Social networks become powerful 
State remains powerful. and autonomous. 
Institutionalised structure of 
relationships managed by the state. 
Goal selection * Remains primarily in the hands of State sets priorities and defines 
the state. goals. 
0 Inputs from other actors. 
Decision-making Negotiation. 0 Negotiation. 
0 Operations left to non-state 
actors. 




* More participative, less coercive. 
- Co-optation. 
0 Steering and coordination. 
0 Public-private partnerships. 
Modes of 0 Hierarchy. 0 Market. 
governing 0 Partnership. 0 Network. 
0 Communitarianism. 
0 Partnership. 
Power * Relatively open but biased in favour - No concentration of power. 
of insider groups through internal Power interdependence. 
control. 
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1. Introduction 
The quality of research is determined by the results it produces. A good research 
methodology is a kely component of research strategies that yield valid and 
reliable findings. Coherence between research questions and methods in the 
design of research will generate data that can achieve credible findings. Thus, it is 
important to choose the most appropriate research method to address the specific 
research questions. This chapter outlines the methodological approach that is 
appropriate to accurately address the research inquiry established in the previous 
Chapter as well as to complement the analytical framework. 
2. Research approach 
Qualitative research consists of a set of interpretive practices that make the world 
comprehensible. These practices transform the world into a series of 
representations such as field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, 
recording, memos. and so on. This means that researchers study things in their 
natural settings and attempt to make sense ofor to interpret phenomena in terms 
of the meanings people bring to them (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). Qualitative 
research is a naturalistic, interpretive approach concerned with the understanding 
of meanings that people attach to phenomena within their social world. It is an ýin- 
depth and interpreted understanding of the social world of research participants by 
learning about their social and material circumstances, their experiences 
perspectives and histories' (Snape and Spencer, 2003: 3). 
Studying governance, the main aim of this research, is about examining the 
patterns of interaction among the actors involved in Thailand's anti-poverty 
policy-making. This study investigates the way power is exercised by each actor. 
Further, it is concerned with the way decisions are made and resources allocated. 
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In sum, it searches for the meaning given by actors through their practices in the 
process of policy-making, something which can be understood by direct 
interaction and dialogue with key informants. A qualitative approach allows us to 
investigate such reality in greater depth and with more meaning than by 
measuring frequency, amount, or intensity. 
The case study strategy is the most suitable design for this research for several 
reasons. First, the key research inquiry is concerned with the 'what' and *how' 
questions. 'Whait is the nature of governance in anti-poverty policy-making? ' is 
the initial exploratory question which requires a conduct of exploratory research. 
An exploratory case study appropriately fits this inquiry. Another related question 
*How has the state responded to the demands of domestic societal actors and to 
the interventions and pressures of globalised forces such as international 
organisationsT is also exploratory in nature and points towards the case study as a 
preferred research strategy. Further, both questions also need a research strategy 
that allows the researcher to trace development over time rather than mere 
occurrences or incidental snapshots. The case study design also meets this need. 
Second, the research inquiry emphasises an understanding of governance and 
policy within its wider context, and the case study approach can provide much 
insight into the causal processes surrounding a particular phenomenon (Yin, 
2003). As mentioned, Thailand's financial crisis, its national development plans, 
and its 1997 constitution serve as contexts for post-1997 Thai governance. These 
three factors have pointed toward the changing nature of Thai state-society 
relations and policy-making. It is difficult to separate an analysis of the 
configuration of governance in Thailand (along with its implications on policy- 
making) from such a context. Case study allows us to account for such conditions 
and discover Thailand's governance configuration within such contexts. Another 
contextual consideration is the historical development of state-society relations in 
Thailand. It is necessary to understand the ways in which actors act, their 
relationships have developed, and policies have changed over time. Case study 
enables us to extensively explore such complexities. 
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A common objective of case study approaches is to consider what can be learnt 
from a case, rather than simply considering the extent of replication and 
generalisation (Stake, 1995). The aim of case study is to expand and generalise 
theoretical propositions (analytical generalisation) and not to enumerate 
frequencies (statistical generalisation) of populations (Yin, 2003). Instead of 
asking what a study tells us about the wider population or other cases, the case 
strategy asks what this case tells us about a specific theory. The case design helps 
develop, refine, or test theories. Thus, the case study approach meets an aim of 
this research that is to evaluate the extent to which a theoretical framework 
developed in the West could be used to explain what is happening in developing 
countries. Findings from this study contribute to debates on governance by 
exploring the experiences of developing countries. 
The next consideration is the number of cases to be studied. A single case is 
appropriate because it offers a richness of information that is enough to test or 
refine the theoretical propositions employed in this study. Moreover, a multiple- 
case study to compare other policy areas would require extensive resources and 
time beyond researcher's capacity, something that is unlikely to take place. Due to 
constraints of time, financial support, and access to informants, the cross-policy or 
cross-country comparative study is not possible for this research. 
Finally, this study relies on 'multiple sources of evidence needed to converge in a 
triangulating fashion' (Yin, 2003: 14). Although case study can be based on any 
mix of qualitative and quantitative evidence (de Vaus, 2001), this research uses 
much qualitative evidence. This case study is unique in using multiple qualitative 
evidence because the case study provides 'detailed descriptions of situations, 
events, people, interactions, observed behaviours; direct quotations from people 
about their experiences, attitudes, beliefs and thoughts; and excerpts or entire 
passages from documents, correspondence, records and case histories' (Patton, 
1980: 22). When it is based on multiple sources of evidence, the case study 
reveals meanings that people assign to their context or, in other words, to their 
social life. In this way, social phenomena can be understood by examining 
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people's selection and interpretation of events and actions (May, 2001). The 
researcher's focus is therefore upon the informants' understandings and 
interpretations of their involvement in the governing process and their interaction 
with other actors. 
3. Research validity and reliability 
Validity and reliability need to be maximised to attain a bias-free research result. 
Both validity and reliability can be achieved through the selection of appropriate 
methodology concerns (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
Internal validity concerns the extent to which the research design enables the 
researcher to draw unambiguous findings from the research results (de Vaus, 
2001). Factors related to internal validity include accuracy of the questions to be 
asked., data to be collected, and explanations to be offered (Denscombe, 2002). By 
asking the right questions and using appropriate conceptual frameworks to capture 
the different aspects of the phenomenon, content validity is established (de Vaus, 
2001). Research inquiry is formulated on the grounds that the relevant literature is 
extensively reviewed. Also, a comprehensive discussion with scholars and 
practitioners on the subject of governance and poverty alleviation policy helps the 
researcher to refine and justify the research inquiries. 
A single source of evidence is likely to produce less reflection of reality. In order 
to achieve accuracy in research findings, triangulation tactics play a significant 
role in leveraging the degree of construct validity. The combination of multiple 
methodological practices, empirical materials, and perspectives in a single study is 
best understood as a strategy that adds rigor, breadth, complexity, richness, and 
depth to any inquiry (Flick, 2002). Denzin (1989) distinguishes four types of 
triangulation to strengthen the construct validity, I and this research employs 
' They are 1) data triangulation (to use a variety of data sources), 2) investigator triangulation (to 
use several different researchers or evaluators), 3) theory triangulation (to use multiple 
perspectives to interpret a single set of data), and 4) methodological triangulation (to use multiple 
methods to study a single problem). 
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several of them. Data triangulation is applied to the rich and insightful information 
derived from various data sources: interview transcriptions, extensive field notes 
and general observations, and analysis of relevant documents and official 
publications. Direct observation in the meetings and interviews is employed to 
obtain information from multiple key informants from different but relevant 
agencies. It allows the researcher to investigate diverse aspects of governance 
issues and policy-making process to a greater depth. This also ascertains 
methodological triangulation. For theory triangulation, an extensive review of 
analytical frameworks drawn from multiple theories and concepts has set a solid 
basis of research inquirý and has allowed the researcher to gain a better 
understanding of some important concepts of governance, policy studies, power, 
and institutions. 
Reliability refers to 'the degree to which alternative forms of the same measure 
produce same or similar results' (Cooper and Schindler, 1998: 171). In other 
words, it is concerned with the fact that data collection procedures can be repeated 
and yield same results. Yin (2003) suggests that the use of the case study protocol 
and a case study database could strengthen the reliability of a piece of research. 
The researcher has documented the research protocol that contains the research 
inquiry, a brief summary of the theoretical frameworks for reference, the names of 
sites to visit and contact persons, the data collection plan, any preparation needed 
prior to field visits, and the interview question guidelines tailored to each 
informant. A logbook of interviews and meetings in which the researcher was 
attended has been developed and completed in detail. 
4. Data collection and sources 
This research attempts to build a comprehensive understanding of the governing 
process of Thailand's anti-poverty policy within its complex settings. Because this 
case consists of multiple components, a full understanding would be obtained if 
this research included information collected from a wide range of constituent 
elements. This is also to ensure construct validity. The insights gained from all 
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these elements might differ, but if they are taken into consideration together, they 
provide a more complete understanding of the whole than would a perspective 
provided by any particular element alone 
The field research was conducted between 7 th July 2004 and 14 th October 2004 
and between 9th December 2004 and 17 th February 2005. It terminated a few days 
after the 2005 general election. During both periods, the researcher visited 26 
institutions (see Table 2) to collect data. Various sources of data from both printed 
and on-line sources were investigated and collated. Types of documents (both in 
Thai and English) included official records and publications, policy documents, 
government plans and projects, minutes of meetings, speeches and interviews of 
key policy-makers, research papers, conference proceedings, academic journals, 
statistical data, news reports, newspaper articles, magazine articles, and other 
related reliable publications. 
Table 2: Names of the 26 institutions visited for data collection 
" Chulalongkorn University Library 
" Muang District Office (the City of Nakorm Pathom) 
" Tharnmasat University Library 
The Assets Capitalization Bureau 
The Centre for Philanthropy and Civil Society (at the National Institute of Development 
Administration) 
The Community Development Department (Ministry of Interior) 
The Community Organizations Development Institute and its library 
" The Community Resource Development Institute 
" The Government Spokesman Bureau 
" The Institute for Local Knowledge Management Promotion 
The King Prajadhipok Institute Library 
The Local Development Institute 
The National Institute of Development Administration Library 
The National Centre for Poverty Eradication in the Ministry of Interior 
" The National Centre for Poverty Eradication 
" The Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDP) 
" The Office of the National Village and Urban Revolving Fund Commission 
" The Office of the National Village and Urban Revolving Fund 
The Office of the Prime Minister , The Office of the Public Sector Development Commission 
The Political Economy Centre (at Chulalongkorn University) 
The Senate 
The Thailand Research Fund and its library 
The United Nations Development Piogram (Thailand National Office) 
The Villager Volunteer Association of Thailand 
The World Bank (Thailand Office) and its library 
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Table 3: Summary of meetings and seminars attended 
Meetings/seminars Date 
The Promotion of a Participatory Network and Power Decentralization. A 18 Jul, 2004 
workshop organised by KPI in collaboration with the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), Bangkok. 
The Trajectory of NGOs: Perspectives and experiences from the past to the 19 Jul, 2004 
present. A seminar organised by the Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat 
University, Bangkok. 
Meeting of the Centre of Civil Society Coordination and Support for Poverty 13 Aug, 2004 
Eradication. Organised and hosted by CODI. 
Social Capital Development in the midst of globalisation. A seminar organised 19 Aug, 2004 
by Department of Economics, Sukhothai Thammathirat Open University 
Meeting of the National Centre for Poverty Eradication (9th meeting in 2004) 23 Aug, 2004 
Meeting of the National Centre for Poverty Eradication (I I th meeting in 2004) 20 Sep, 2004 
Direction of community development in Thailand over the next decade and 27-29 Sep, 2004 
integrated poverty and social solutions. A seminar organised by the Community 
Development Department, Ministry of Interior (about 60 local leaders from 
every region of the country were invited to attend). 
Meeting of the Standing Committee on Labour and Social Welfare of the Senate 29 Sep, 2004 
(representatives from the National Poverty Eradication Centre were requested to 
give reports and to answer enquiries). 
Meeting of the National Centre for Poverty Eradication (17 th meeting in 2004) 20 Dec, 2004 
Meeting of the Civil Society Coordination and Support Subcommittee for 24 Dec, 2004 
Poverty Eradication. Organised by CODI, hosted by the Bank of Agriculture 
and Agricultural Cooperatives. 
Meeting of the National Centre for Poverty Eradication (18" meeting in 2004) 27 Dec, 2004 
Meeting of the National Centre for Poverty Eradication (I't meeting in 2005) 17 Jan, 2004 
Meeting of the Civil Society Coordination and Support Subcommittee for 28 Jan, 2005 
Poverty Eradication. Organised by CODI, hosted by Community Development 
Department, Ministry of Interior. 
Meeting of the National Centre for Poverty Eradication (last meeting before the 2 Feb, 2005 
general election in February 2005). 
For the primary sources, the researcher conducted 32 interviews, participated in 
14 meetings and seminars, and conducted direct observation in one District 
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Office. Details are summarised in Table 3. Observation and participation are 
effective ways to supplement, support, or reject data obtained from documentary 
sources or verbal information. Field notes were taken regularly during these 
activities on a wide range of information such as visual or verbal actions and 
reactions of participants. Spontaneous reactions, including unsolicited statements, 
were observed during these activities and such accounts provided useful insights. 
Semi-structured interviews were used because they enabled the researcher to gain 
'communicative validation' (Robson, 2003) and to follow some divergent themes 
emerging from the interviews (Mason, 2002). This method is useful as it helps 'to 
know the experience of the participants through their stories... to learn from 
hearing and studying what the participants say' (Seidman, 1991: 91). This method 
was used to motivate respondents to openly supply information that they saw as 
appropriate, to allow a greater flexibility for the researcher to further probe 
respondents, and to give the researcher opportunities to observe all non-verbal 
expressions of the interviewees (Punch, 1998). The content of the questions was 
basically expanded from the themes of inquiry but slightly modified in terms of 
the language to cater to each group of interviewees. The researcher refined and 
tailored some of the questions as the interview progressed in response to any 
emerging issues or to cross-validate information with other interviewees. Notably, 
the researcher was able to interview one former cabinet minister and several 
senior policy-makers who were involved in anti-poverty policy development and 
decision-making processes. Perspectives of other policy-makers were accessed via 
other documentary or archival sources. 
The most appropriate and feasible sampling method for this research is neither 
probability sampling nor convenience sampling, but a third category, 'purposive 
2 
sampling' (Punch, 1998). This strategy allows the researcher to investigate 
particular settings, persons, or events related to the research inquiry by 
deliberately selecting the persons who can provide important information that 
cannot be adequately acquired from other sources. The initial sampling framework 
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was developed on the advice of a NESDB Senior Policy Analyst who was 
involved in the development of Eight NESDP and poverty alleviation agendas 
since the 1997 crisis; thus, he knew the evolution of the policy and could identify 
some key informants who were expected to provide insight and inside information 
from their experience and involvement in the anti-poverty policy process. At the 
beginning, the targeted informants fell into three groups: 
(i) Government officials responsible for poverty alleviation policy 
from each of the related government agencies, 
Parliamentarians who had longstanding experience with anti- 
poverty policy, and 
Key practitioners in phi lanthropic/non-governmental organisations 
who had been involved in the poverty alleviation agenda. 
A fourth group was added to acquire a different perspective from those who had 
expertise in anti-poverty policy; these people were outside of any direct or indirect 
benefit from the policy. This group included experts or academics with expertise 
in Thailand's poverty who had been involved in the anti-poverty policy. They 
were also selected to give their views. The last group, officials in international 
organisations, was selected to assess the role and influence of international 
organisations in the policy-making process. 
A snowball sampling method was employed by asking the initial set of selected 
informants to identify other persons who could provide further insightful 
information and critical perspectives. All informants are listed in Table 4. A 
majority of the informants from the list might appear to be from the elite and 
Bangkok-centric due to the fact that anti-poverty policy was created by senior 
members of related state and non-state agencies in Bangkok. Extensive 
exploration of rural people and non-elite accounts would be useful but not feasible 
for this research given the limited time resources and scope of the project. 
However, additional interviews with some NGO leaders and academia were taken 
to balance the elite viewpoints. One visit to a District Office in Nakorn Pathom 
It is also called by other titles like 'purposeful sampling' (Patton, 1990) and 'criterion-based 
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Province could also provide some non-Bangkok and non-elite interpretations of 
the policy, although these views could not be applied as generalizations in other 
areas. The researcher had a chance to talk to several local community leaders at a 
seminar organised by the Community Development Department of the Ministry of 
Interior in 2004. However, their names are not included in this list for reasons of 
confidentiality. 
5. Data analysis 
Because the case study design aims at achieving both descriptions and 
explanations from intensive analysis of many variables within the case, it employs 
various components of analysis. All recorded tapes from the interviews were 
transcribed verbatim in their original language (Thai). Each tape and transcription 
was given a code number to substitute the interviewee's name, thereby preserving 
confidentiality. The transcriptions were compared with data from archival records, 
other documents, or publications to validate any differences and similarities from 
the interviews. Transcriptions were reviewed and verified until correctness was 
ensured. Field notes taken from interviews and meeting participation were 
reviewed in the same fashion. 
Next, several codes were set up according to the themes of inquiry and the 
analytical framework defined in Chapter 2. The data from all collected 
documentary resources and transcriptions were labelled, sorted, compiled, and 
synthesised in a thematic manner as guided by the theoretical propositions and 
knowledge gained from existing literature in order to generate a set of themes and 
concepts. The evidence then was categorised into a manageable coding system. 
New themes emerging from the interviews were noted and included as new 
categories when needed. Such a system underpins the analysis which encompasses 
the functions of identifying, coding, categorising, classifying, and labelling the 
pre-eminent patterns in the contents of the interviews, thereby enabling the 
researcher to determine their substantive significance (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). 
selection' (LeCompte and Preissle, 1993). 
page 46 
Chapter 3 Methodology 
Field notes were ordered and organised in the same pattern, and any content that 
fell into a similar category was grouped together. These codes served as templates 
for data analysis. Data was analysed thematically by integrating the themes, which 
were guided by the research frameworks and extracted from the case study. The 
interview guides used for the semi-structured interviews assisted in the 
categorisation and analysis processes. 
All interviews as well as all meetings in which the researcher participated were 
conducted in Thai. Since Thai is the researcher's first language, there was no 
problem with comprehension. However, since English is the- researcher's second 
language, some limitations were expected. Possible inaccuracy in translating from 
Thai into English (for necessary quotations) remained a problematic issue in some 
places, especially in situations where the nuances, subtexts, and cultural ly-loaded 
meanings were difficult to comprehend and translate into English. The researcher 
attempted to minimise this limitation by consulting with English linguistic experts 
whoý are proficient in both Thai and English. The researcher tried to maintain the 
original meaning given by the informants as much as possible. 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter presents the choice of research strategies and methods employed in 
this study. This research is qualitative in nature, it is based on the case study 
design, and it consists of documentary and archival sources, semi-structured 
interviews, and observation methods. These were selected to capture context-rich 
data and to ensure the validity and reliability of the research. The case study 
approach was selected because it allowed the researcher to obtain meaningful 
insights into the investigated issues. The research maintained several types of 
triangulation to strengthen the validity and reliability of the findings. The data was 
coded and organised systematically and the findings are presented in the 
Second 
Part of this research. Before moving on to the findings, it is necessary 
for the 
readers to gain some background knowledge of the development of governance 
in 
Thailand before the crisis as well as an understanding of some contextual 
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Chapter 4 Background 
1. Introduction 
This chapter sets out the background of the case study. It discusses the 
relationships between the Thai state, societal actors, and globalised forces before 
and shortly after the 1997 financial crisis. The first two sections synthesise 
literature from various sources and portray a broad landscape of interactions 
between the Thai state and non-state actors involved in policy governance. Non- 
state actors in this research refer to international organisations and domestic 
societal actors. The third section presents the impacts of the 1997 financial crisis 
and related governance challenges within Thailand. The final section focuses on 
the evolution of poverty alleviation policy before and after the crisis. This chapter 
provides a context for further discussions on the dynamics of governance changes 
in Thai anti-poverty policy after the crisis. 
2. State and societal actors 
Writing in late 1960s, Riggs (1966), Siffin (1966), and Wilson (1962) proposed :nt:, 
the notion of 'bureaucratic polity' in their analysis of Thai governance. The heart 
of this notion was the weakness of extra-bureaucratic forces - whether state actors 
(such as the legislature and judiciary) or non-state actors (such as the business 
sector and NGOs) - that had little influence over the political system. Bureaucrats 
(civil servants and military) gained total control over politics with a small number 
of elites dominating an apolitical mass. During this time, Thai politics was 
monopolised by successive military governments or by elected governments that 
relied heavily on the support of the armed forces. Most premiers and cabinet 
members were either active or retired military or civilian bureaucrats. Major 
policy decisions were made by the military-bureaucratic elites who occupied 
political and administrative positions in government and who directed policy 
almost without input from non-bureaucratic groups (Girling, 1981; Likhit, 1978). 
Policies became pawns in the struggles among bureaucratic factions who b 
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manoeuvred for the highest offices and for control over extra-bureaucratic groups; 
all in the effort to ensure that all the benefits of development served the interests 
of the military and the bureaucracy. Riggs (1966) attributes this type of governing 
process to differing development paces; while differentiation within the 
bureaucracy had been rapid, development outside had been much slower. This 
resulted in a lack of political space for other non-bureaucratic forces to initiate 
changes in politics and participate in policy-making. 
The bureaucratic polity notion might best explain Thai governance from 1932' to 
the early 1970s. By the late 1970s, scholars had come to regard the bureaucratic 
polity as an inappropriate description of state-society relationships in the Thai 
policy-making process (Anek, 1992; Bidhya, 1997; Patcharee, 1985). The 
common features of alternative views included an emerging emphasis on the role 
of interest groups. The rise of a powerful and increasingly independent business 
class and various interest groups as well as the concomitant decline of military 
power contradicted the bureaucratic polity model. An alternative approach that 
offered a potential explanation for the Thailand's state-society relationship was 
2 pluralism . In Thailand's case, pluralists tended to consider the 1973 'student 
coup d'dtat' as a turning point in Thai politics towards pluralism (Girling, 1981, 
1981a; Zimmerman, 1974). Between 1973 and 1976, groups of students, labour 
unions, fan-ners. ) and 
business people played active roles in the political and policy 
arenas on issues that concerned them. However, a counter approach argued that 
this pluralist analysis was challenged by the 1976 military coup d'6tat and the 
reign of 'semi-democratic' (Chai-Anan, 1989) or 'dem i -democratic' (Likhit, 
1992) governments from 1980 to 1988. Despite the existence of such a counter 
argument, the power of state over society gradually diminished in the 1980s. 
' This is the year when Thailand changed from being an absolute monarchy to being a democratic 
constitutional monarchy. 
2 The pluralist model of state-society interaction explains a minimal government role 
in 
encouraging or restricting the formation of societal groups, or in structuring the relations within 
society, or in monitoring between government and societal groups. Interest groups, usually 
organised into an unspecified number of voluntary, non-hierarchically ordered categories, compete 
for desired public policies or legislative measures as the government seldom recognises or assists 
any particular groups. For details, see Dahl (196 1). 
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Starting in the early 1980s, organised businesses became an autonomous, effective 
extra- bureaucratic policy player with increased power over economic policies 
(Anek, 1992). The creation of the Joint Public and Private Sector Consultative 
Committees (JPPCC) became the centre point of govemment-business 
interactions. This mechanism enabled organised business to initiate, transform, or 
block major policies and legislative measures put forward by the government. 
Business associations called for even more official recognition and permanent 
advisory places in government agencies so they could play a substantial role in 
initiating or resisting policies and legislative measures. Sometimes they lobbied 
the decision-makers in cabinet and joined sides with technocrats in government 
agencies who shared the same agenda to press for policies they needed. 3 In other 
words, bureaucratic polity and business had developed a new form of policy 
governance, in which non-state actors shared power over the policy-making 
process with the state. However, for some observers (such as Lauridsen, 2000), 
the JPPCC began to decline in its influence starting in 1988 because the state had 
not provided consistent incentives for business to engage systematically and 
collectively with the state. 
From the late 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s, analysts witnessed a 
transformation in which the role of civil society expanded significantly and the 
change in state-society relationship was considerable (Jaturong and Gawin, 1995). 
The major role of civil society groups grew to represent divergent interests and 
voices of concerned stakeholders in the policy and decision-making process. 
Although NGOs had grown immensely, their role and power were uneven and 
varied. Various non-governmental groups played significant roles in challenging 
some government policies, identifying corruption and power abuse. Some played 
a crucial role in executing government policies and were seen as significant 
partners of state agencies in philanthropic activities. 
3 To some analysts, the dominance of these businesses rests on their 
dense network of personal and 
commercial relationships, as well as their political linkages (Hewison, 
1989). 
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During the Sixth NESDP (1986-1991), the government recognised the role of 
NGOs, and the NGO Co-ordinating Committee for Development (NGO-COD) 
was established to function as a coordinating unit among NGOs. In 1994 the 
National Committee of Social Welfare was established, with the Minister of 
Labour and Social Welfare functioning as the chair. Notably, ten of the eighteen 
members were from NGOs (Amara, 2002). While the NGO-COD operated at the 
sub-regional level through its members in the civil society sector, the National 
Committee on Social Welfare worked at the national and provincial level through 
provincial governors. Provincial committees were formed in each province, and 
the provincial governors were the chairs of the provincial committees. At least 
three representatives in each provincial committee were from local NGOs. These 
two entities signified that NGOs gained a greater role in the policy process. 
The 'Black May' political crisis in 1992 marked the end of the military era and 
the opening up of political space for non-state actors. Following this crisis. a shift 
in the political system from authoritarianism to a more democratic rule weakened 
the political power of the military and strengthened the activities of civil society, 
which contributed to policy changes in many areas. Pasuk and Baker (2002) 
observed that through the 1990s a multiplication of more progressive daily 
newspapers, new media, radical publications, public seminars, and publicly vocal 
intellectuals created an expanding public space for societal actors. Rural protests 
tapped the services of NGOs, journalists, and public intellectuals to mobilise their 
campaigns, articulate their demands, and bring their agenda to public attention. 
NGOs were active in articulating their interests whilst communicating their 
agendas to the authorities and policy-makers (Gohlert, 1990; Pisanu, 2003). 
Notably, during this period, the development of localism or communitarian 
advocates was highlighted (Connors, 2001; Hewison, 1999a; Reynolds, 2001). 
These proponents argued for a drastic decentralisation of power away from the 
central state and onto local communities. They wanted to rescue and enhance rural 
society in the belief that it enshrined social values which could serve as a 
counterweight to those of urban capitalism. They urged communities and 
local 
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economies to be more self-reliant rather than rushing to be absorbed or dominated 
by globalisation and capitalism. 
Kasian (1995) characterised the standpoints of those he called the 
'communitarians' by comparing them with the 'globalisers' (see also Reynolds, 
200 1 ). They both argued against the role of the state. The globalisers aggressively 
advocated the international i sing of the economy and claimed that the inefficient 
bureaucratic state lacked direction and was an obstacle to the globalising process. 
They wanted to see a reduction in the state power and a deregulated market that 
was directed by the private sector as much as possible. The communitarians 
agreed on the need to reduce state power but proposed a different agenda for 
reforming state-society relations. They wanted the state to reduce its power and 
empower communities by ensuring the inalienable right of communities to govern 
and manage their own resources themselves. They strongly believed that 
empowering communities would enable communities to make decisions regarding 
their problems on their own. They believed that the bureaucracy should take a 
supporting role. 
It must be noted that the NGO movement developed into two streams (UNDP, 
2003). The first assisted people's movements and coordinated networks and 
protests. The second sought to become involved in the 'inside' political realm and 
influence government decision-making from a centre position. Although both 
streams pursued different strategies, they adopted the same thinking: local 
communities needed to be empowered. Under the context of the wider political 
space and the proliferation of societal organisations, pro-community NGOs and 
the communitarian movements gained access and were involved in the policy- 
making process to influence the development agenda. Their agenda started to be 
written into policy documents such as the 1997 Constitution, the Eight NESDP, 
and decentralisation proposals. Recently, they integrated their agenda with the 
anti-poverty policy and argued for community empowerment as a solution 
for 
poverty. Terms such as civic assembly, community plan, community 
finances, and 
community enterprises have now entered the national policy 
discourse. 
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The next section explores developments in the relationship between the Thai state 
and international agencies with a focus on the role and influence of the World 
Bank. 
3. State and international agencieS4 
Thailand was the 47 th country to sign the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development Articles of Agreement on 3 rd May, 1949. The World Bank's 
first mission to Thailand took place in December 1949, and the first loan of US$ 
25 million was approved in October 1950. Following the first mission, a report 
entitled A Public Development Programme for Thailand (World Bank, 1959) was 
published. It advocated a systematic, state-led programme of economic 
development using the National Economic Development Board 5 as a central 
planning agency and a series of five-year-term national development plans (the 
NESDP) were instrumented starting in 1966. The first three plans were virtually 
written or guided by consultants from the Bank and focused on expenditure for 
basic economic and social infrastructures (roads, highways, dams, public health 
and educational facilities), mostly financed by grant aid and loans from the Bank, 
the US,, and the governments of other developed countries (Pasuk and Isara, 
2000). The Bank continued to provide funds for Thailand throughout the 
following decades. 6 
The Thai government has had a long and supportive relationship with the Bank 
since 1949. Governments generally accepted the Bank's growth strategies, 
particularly on both import substitution industrialisation during the 1960s and 
4 The reason this research focuses only on the World Bank, while in fact there are other 
international agencies have been working in Thailand, is explained in Chapter 7. 
Later it became the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB). 
6 From October 1950 to 1999, the Bank has extended 127 loans and credits amounting to about 
US$ 8.4 billion, predominantly for infrastructure projects, including railways, ports, power 
stations, telecommunications, and highways (World Bank, 1999). The first education loan (US$6 
million) came in 1966, the first rural development loan (US$21 million) in 1976, and the first 
structural adjustment loan (US$150 million) in 1982 (World Bank, 2002a). 
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1970s and on export-oriented industrial isation since the mid-1980s (Rangsan, 
1996; Hewison, 2002). The World Bank's advice laid the foundation for 
Thailand's development policy on growth strategy and began decades of Bank 
influence over Thailand's development paradigm. Development policy in 
Thailand began with im port- substitution industrial isation strategy in the 1960s. 
Basically, the government implemented policies to protect infant industries and to 
tap domestic demand. This strategy was clearly represented in the first plan 
(1961-1966) and in subsequent plans up unti I the fourth plan ( 1977-198 1 ). 
The early 1980s saw a major flurry in the Bank's role, including a major role in 
the formulation of the fifth plan (1982-1986) (Rangsan, 1996). The 1979-1980 oil 
crises caused Thailand to ask assistance from the Bank (Pasuk and Baker, 2002). 
The Bank extended two Structural Adjustment Loans to Thailand: one in March 
1982 and the other one year later (OED, 2000). Thailand borrowed US$ 542 
million from the Bank to cover the deterioration in its balance of payments. The 
loans were conditional on reforms in fiscal policy, tariffs, investment incentives, 
and institutional arrangements designed to direct the Thai economy towards an 
export-oriented strategy. The new economic orthodoxy argued for market 
liberalisation that would remove constraints on growth built into earlier models of 
state-protected, import substitution development. The Bank worked with Thai 
technocrats to plan the transition to an export-oriented strategy (World Bank, 
1993). In mid-1980s the export-oriented strategy was established and remained 
the dominant strategy until the late 1990s (Hewison, 2001). 
By the late 1980s, Thailand had deepened its drive towards international isation 
through foreign direct investment (FDI); export promotion and diversification; 
and tight budget, monetary, and fiscal discipline. The shift from import- 
substitution industrialisation to export-oriented industrial isation was accompanied 
by a move away from regulated to deregulated and from a state-dominated to a 
market-oriented economy in the early 1990s. In order for a country to capitalise 
on its comparative advantage, markets needed to be allowed to work efficiently to 
provide correct price signals that would guide the allocation of scare resources 
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towards areas in which the country had a high level of international 
competitiveness. This involved dismantling trade barriers, liberalising financial 
markets, removing distortions in the price system, and making labour markets 
more competitive (Pasuk and Baker, 2002; Tan, 2000). Thus, by the early 1990s, 
controls over interest rates and capital accounts were removed, leading to 
increased competition, internationalisation, and heavy dependence on foreign 
capital inflows (Hamilton-Hart, 2000). The state seemed to lose its prime role in 
the economic management of the globalised economy and market forces. 
This development was followed by an economic 'boom' that began in the late 
1980s (Pasuk and Baker, 1996). The real rate of GDP growth rose to 13.3 percent 
in 1988 and maintained double-digit rates until the end of decade (Jansen, 1997). 
Economic growth averaged 7.6 percent over the two decades between 1977 and 
1996 (Ammar, 2005). During the ten years between 1987 and 1996, the Thai 
economy was the fastest growing in the world with 9.2 real GDP growth on 
average (Warr, 2005). Even more remarkable than the rate of growth was the 
stability of its growth; not a single year of negative growth of real output per head 
of population was experienced over the four decades between 1958 and 1996 
(Warr, 2005). Thailand's spectacular development performance until the mid- 
1990s was praised by the Bank as one of the 'high performing Asian economies' 
(World Bank, 1993). Thailand was proclaimed a case where the Bank's export- 
oriented industrialisation and liberalisation had been successfully implemented 
and economic hyper-growth was claimed as the result. 
One prime policy agenda at that time was financial liberalisation. Thailand's 
financial system was relatively closed until 1990; financial capital movements 
into and out of Thailand had been subject to extensive controls (Pasuk and Isara, 
2000; Warr and Bhanupong, 1996). The baht currency was subject to exchange 
controls,, and the domestic banking industry was relatively protected from foreign 
competition. The IMF advised Thailand to develop its financial system by making 
the baht freely convertible, by developing a stock market, and by opening up 
banking to free competition (Pasuk and Baker, 2000). The Bank and IMF 
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rationalised that mobility of capital - by financial deregulation and the elimination 
of capital controls - would maximise welfare benefits on a global scale. This idea 
resonated with economists and technocrats inside Thailand who later became 
influential in policy-making positions (Rangsan, 1996). 
After accepting the obligations of IMF's Article VIII in 1990, subsequent 
governments pursued the path of financial liberalisation by lifting all controls on 
all foreign-exchange transactions on the current account (Ammar, 2005): the baht 
was made freely convertible, restrictions on foreign exchange were removed, 
tariffs were reduced, taxes reformed, and banks allowed to manage a broader 
range of financial instruments (Jansen, 1997). In 1993, the BIBF was established 
to enable offshore banks to lend to the domestic financial market. Liberalisation 
aimed to give more flexibility to financial institutions coping with economic 
globalisation and to develop Thailand's ability to serve as a regional financial hub 
(Pasuk and Baker, 2002). The liberalisation process opened up short-term 
financial markets though the multiplication of domestic credit institutions and 
gave domestic borrowers direct access to overseas financial markets. 
Unfortunately, a large capital inflow delivered unexpected consequences. The 
boom period came to a crash-landing in the 1997 economic cris is .7 The crisis has 
been linked to the liberalisation policies which the Bank urged Thailand to adopt. 
Further, the crisis also marked a turning point in the Bank's relationship with 
Thailand,, as discussed in the next section and Chapter 7. 
4. Financial crisis and governance reform 
The flood of money released by financial liberalisation impelled financial firms to 
behave in a risky fashion. Much of Thailand's financing was poorly planned and 
invested redundantly, resulting in a rising over-capacity in certain sectors and a 
dramatic rise in property prices. However, export growth began to falter and the 
7 Details and debates about the development and assumptions of the crisis from different 
perspectives have been extensively discussed elsewhere: see Ammar (2005); Apichat (2002); 
Bello 
et al. (1998); Bhanupong (1999); Hewison (2000,2001); Hill (1999); Jorno (1998); 
Maclntyre 
(1999); Medhi, 2001; Nussara(1998); Ouatara(1998), Pasukand Baker(2000); Warr(1999). 
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current account deficit began to peak as high as 7.1 percent in 1995. This indicator 
signalled to international financial speculators an attack on the baht, something 
which happened starting in late 1996 and continuing into early 1997. Because 
policy-makers failed to manage the macro economic policy, they compounded the 
crisis by sacrificing Thailand's financial reserves in a futile attempt to defend the 
currency value from hedge funds. The devaluation on 2 nd jUly, 1997 marked the 
end of the 'boom' and the beginning of the 'burst'. The globalised forces had led 
Thailand into the most severe crisis she had ever experienced in history. The case 
of Thailand was quoted as an example of the downsides of globalisation (Kanya, 
1997; Medhi, 2002; Phitthaya, 1998). The crisis was inevitably linked to the 
liberalisation policies promoted by the Bank (Warr, 1999). The crisis induced 
many changes in Thai governance and institutions. 
After the crisis hit Thailand and its impacts spread out to other countries in the 
region, the issue of domestic governance reform emerged as the most pressing 
challenge confronting the region. Countries in Asia were struggling to enhance the 
transparency and independence of regulatory regimes, to improve corporate 
governance, and to establish predictable legal frameworks. Questions of 
strengthening accountability and reducing corruption were examples of critical 
issues raised. In other words, the issues of governance reform and building a 
better governing regime have become the prime reform agenda in the region since 
then. Issues of corruption and poor institutional performance shouldered much of 
the blame for the crisis (Ouatara, 1998). Institutional capacity to effectively 
deliver resources or services to people was linked to broader governance 
concerns. In Thailand, serious debates on the appropriate role and interaction 
among the state, the private sector, and the civil society were held. Scholars also 
debated the public policies and institutional reforms that would most suitably 
further the nation's development. The argument was that Thailand could only 
recover from the crisis by refon-ning her governance and governing process. 
Regular seminars and workshops were organised throughout the country on the 
issue of improving governance. The cabinet adopted governance reform as a 
national agenda in May 1999, requiring all government agencies to establish a 
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plan to improve their work procedures according to the six 'good governance' 
principles defined by the Prime Minister's Office (Office of the Prime Minister, 
1999). 
Just a year before the crisis hit Thailand, the process of drafting a new 
Constitution had begun and the issue of governance reform had been a prominent 
dimension of the proposed Constitution. The 1997 crisis was a prominent force 
that pressured the promulgation of the 1997 Constitution on II th October, 1997, 
within the context of cries for governance reform. Experts have hailed this 
Constitution has a significant landmark in governance reform in Thailand's 
history (ADB, 1999; Niyom, 2003). The Drafting Assembly wanted to clean up 
the undesirable impacts of money politics and to foster a new type of politics by 
instituting effective curbs on state power. It even aimed at rearranging the very 
mechanisms of state operation by strengthening the legislature and by making the 
country's political-administrative system more accountable, transparent, and 
stable. The list of such measures is various, and the details of such improvements 
have already been thoroughly discussed elsewhere. 8 
A point to make here is that the Constitution became the prime legal architecture 
of governance reform because one of its mandates was to establish key functions 
for promoting public participation in the policy-making process (Klein, 1998). 
Prior to 1997, the role of the societal sector in the public policy process was 
limited. When civic sector organisations attempted to initiate policy or to propose 
legislation themselves, they often met with resistance from the bureaucracy, 
which rigorously guarded its virtual monopoly over policy-making and the 
drafting of legislation. But in this Constitution, for the first time in Thai 
constitutional history, civic participation in public policy-making was mandated. 
Citizens were given the right to participate much more in public policy issues, 
particularly at the local level. In the Constitution, public participation was laid 
down as a fundamental principle in the making of public policy on political issues 
' See ADB (1999), Chambers (2002), Klein (1998), and Niyom (2003). For a radical observation, 
see Connors (2002) and McCargo (1998). 
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and in the preparation of economic, social, and political development plans. 9 In 
sum, the concept of governance, as understood in the Constitution, is more than 
government. The Constitution was specifically designed to demote the power of 
the state while promoting the power of the societal sector and facilitate a more 
open, participatory, and accountable governing process (Chambers, 2002). 
The crisis not only raised the issue of governance reform to the top agenda 
position, it also harshly impacted the poor and brought poverty to the attention of 
the government and NGOs. The next section gives a brief account of this 
development. 
5. Poverty and policy 
The development of poverty alleviation policies in Thailand can be traced back to 
its series of five-year NESDPs. The first set of five plans were drafted and 
implemented with a general focus on overall economic growth, more or less 
following standard trickle-down theories. However, anti-poverty policy was 
explicitly included for the first time in the fifth NESDP (1982-1986). The 
government identified rural development as a primary sector in which to target 
poverty. The plan gave priority to income distribution and regional development 
with a particular focus on poverty alleviation in the rural areas of 37 provinces. 
The National Rural Development Committee (NRDC) was set up to oversee the 
formulation and implement of anti-poverty policy. In the sixth NESDP, poverty 
reduction policy addressed income distribution and the development of rural 
areas. In the seventh NESDP, poverty issues were incorporated into the plan with 
a focus on enhancing the quality of life. During this plan, the cabinet approved the 
first nationwide poverty alleviation project in 1993 under the supervision of the 
Department of Community Development, Ministry of the Interior. The project 
9 It is clearly defined in Article 76 that 'the State shall promote and encourage public participation 
in laying down policies, making decisions on political issues, preparing economic, social and 
political development plans, and inspecting the use of State power at all levels'. Within this frame, 
civil society is expected to have gained greater recognition and voice and will be becoming a more 
powerful participant in the policy debate. 
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was allocated a total budget of 3.47 billion baht between 1993 and 1996 and 
encompassed 11,608 poor villages across the country. Its major activity was to 
lend money to the poor as an endowment for their existing businesses or 
initiatives. 
Although we can observe that some of the issues in the anti-poverty proposal were 
incorporated into previous NESDPs, the anti-poverty agenda was suppressed 
because of the dominance of the economic development priority. Poverty 
alleviation did not become the prime agenda of the national plans and policies of 
government ministries until the financial crisis hit Thailand. 













The financial crisis of 1997 halted the long-term trend of economic growth and 
caused a considerable negative impact on the economy. Short-term capital began 
to fly away, the financial sector shrunk, and domestic consumption seriously 
declined. GDP growth dropped from 5.9 percent in 1996 to -1.4 in 1997 and - 
10.5 in 1998 (Figure 2). Many conglomerates established during the boom were 
destroyed and many were transferred to foreign ownerships (Brimble and 
Sherman, 1999). The business collapse raised unemployment from 0.68 million 
(2.1 percent of the total labour force) in 1997 to 1.48 million (4.6 percent) in 1998 
while the May 1999 labour force survey reported a total unemployment of 
1.76 
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million (5.33 percent) (World Bank, 1-999a). The average income of Thai citizens 
decreased in the first half of 1998 by 19.2 percent over the previous year. Per 
capita real income in the first and second half of 1998 was 2,633 and 2,402 baht 
per month, which compared to 2,930 in 1997 (Somsak, 1998). The poverty 
incidence, which had fallen rapidly since the mid 1980s to 11.4 percent in 1996, 
increased markedly to 12.9 percent in 1998, reached 15.9 percent in 1999, and 
slightly fell to 14.2 percent in 2000 (Figure 3 and Table 5). Some estimated that 
about I million people fell below the poverty line during the year after the crash. 
The absolute number of poor rose from 6.8 million in 1996 to 8.8 million in 2000 
(Pasuk and Isara, 2000). Within one year, the crisis reversed all gains in income 
distribution made over the boom years. 
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Table 5: Poverty in Thailand, 1962-2002 
Year Poverty incidence* 







88.3 96.4 78.5 N/A 
_1969 
63.1 69.6 53.7 N/A 
_1975 
48.6 57.2 25.8 N/A 
1981 35.5 43.1 15.5 N/A 
_1986 
44.9 56.3 12.1 N/A 
_1988 
32.6 40.3 12.6 473 
1990 27.2 33.8 1.6 522 
_1992 
23.2 29.7 6.6 600 
_1994 
16.3 21.2 4.8 636 
_1996 
11.4 14.9 3.0 737 
_1998 
12.9 17.2 3.4 878 
1999 15.9 21.5 3.1 886 
2000 14.2 19.1 3.6 882 
_ 2001 13.0 16.6 5.1 916 
_ 2002 9.8 12.6 3.8 922 









Source: Development Evaluation Division, NESDB'O; data from 1962-1986 are summarised in 
Medhi (1993); and the last two rows are calculated by Warr (2005). 
Poverty incidence means the number of poor within a reference population group. It is expressed 
as a proportion of the total population of the group. Headcount measure of aggregate poverty 
incidence is the percentage of the total population whose incomes fall below the poverty line 
and held constant over time in real tenns. Rural poverty is the percentage of the rural 
population whose incomes fall below a poverty line and held constant over time in real terrns. 
This row indicates the number of poor within a reference population group. It is expressed as a 
proportion of the total number of poor within the whole population. 
*** This row indicates the population of a reference group expressed as a proportion as a 
proportion of the total population of that group. 
The social impact of the crisis was highlighted and demanded state intervention. 
The government attempted to modify its macro plans to mitigate the impact of the 
crisis. In May 1998, a major policy change was to implement expansionary fiscal 
policy: to allow a budget deficit between 3 to 5 percent GDP in 1998-99. By this 
policy the government reversed its previous deflationary stringency into a policy 
of mild Keynesian stimulus. Monetary policy was changed to reduce 
interest 
rates. Plans to liberalise an intemationalisation of the financial sector were rolled 
10 NESDB calculated the figures based upon household income data collected 
in the Socio- 
economic Survey (SES). SES is the only data available covering an extended 




back in favour of a balance between foreign, state, and domestic business. In late 
1998, the Japanese government announced the US$30 billion Miyazawa Scheme 
for promoting recovery in the Asian countries. The scheme for Thailand was 
announced in March 1999. It had a very definite focus on providing a fiscal 
stimulus and alleviating social stress. The scheme contributed 53 billion baht for 
stimulus spending. It was designed to pump money into the local economies on 
the grounds that this would bring about the most rapid multiplier effect through 
increased consumption (Bangkok Post, April 1,1999). However, this attempt by 
the government was not very successful and, in the end, the government failed in 
the 2001 election. 
At the same time, NGOs gained a stronger role in advocating and implementing 
policies related to poverty alleviation. The National Social Policy Committee 
(NSPC) was founded in July 1998 in response to the social impacts of the crisis 
and the public demand for increased coordination of social policy. NSPC was 
guided by a majority of members from the NGO sector. Further, the Urban 
Community Development Office (UCDO) was the only quasi-government 
organisation involved in poverty alleviation projects at that time. Its task was to 
generate jobs and extend credit to the urban poor, enabling them to run their own 
enterprises and elevate their standard of living. The effects produced by UCDO 
over the crisis period were considerable in the sense that the majority of newly 
poor were white-collar workers living in Bangkok and other urban areas. Later, 
UCDO evolved to become the Community Organisations Development Institute 
(CODI). CODI became a major pedestal for NGOs in the post-crisis period. 
Moreover, Social Investment Project (SIP) was initiated by the Bank, but it was 
managed by NGO people and the funds were channelled to fund local 
communities. All details are discussed in the following chapters. 
Another turning point came in January 2001, when the first new government 
elected under the 1997 Constitution came into power with a landslide victory. One 
important factor contributing to the victory was the new policy campaign based on 
pro-poor, pro-rural, and pro-nationalism policies. The new government attempted 
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to introduce a different platform of policy agendas from the previous government. 
The profile of 'fighting poverty' and populist policies were raised to the forefront 
of the election campaign. The policy package was based on an unprecedented 
platform of specific policy pledges to promote domestic-led growth and poverty 
alleviation from the grassroots level upward (Thaksin, 2001). The government 
also embarked upon the policy paradigm called a dual track plus development 
policy -a two-pronged approach that aimed to promote exports and foreign direct 
investment in parallel with enhancing domestic consumption (Pansak, 2003). The 
first track emphasised mass manufacturing stemming mainly from FDI, while the 
second track employed a neo-Keynesian paradigm that emphasised strengthening 
the domestic economy and grassroots momentum. The distinctive feature of this 
initiative, often dubbed Thaksinomics, was its emphasis on the second track in a 
manner that gradually shifted the Thai economy from export dependence to 
greater reliance on the more controllable domestic economy (Looney, 2004; 
Pasuk, 2004b). 
Among the seven urgent policies that the Prime Minister delivered to the National 
Assembly in his inaugural address on 26 Ih February 2001 (Thaksin, 2001), " two 
" They were as follows: first, the three-year debt moratorium, in which the government granted 
a grace period for both interest and principal payments for 3 years to individual small farmers in 
order to relieve their debt burden. This was part of a comprehensive reform of the traditional farm 
economy, aiming at making it more viable and self sustaining in the long term. Second, the 
government established the Village and Urban Revolving Fund (VURF) to disburse one million 
baht to each village across the country as a loan facility available for individuals and households of 
each community to borrow for local investment and supplementary vocations. It aimed to promote 
the capacity of local communities to build fund management, to stimulate the grassroots economy, 
and to empower rural and urban communities. Third, the government promoted the One Tambon 
[sub-districti One Product (OTOP) project to enable each community to develop and market its 
own local product or products based on traditional indigenous expertise and local know-how. The 
government provided additional assistance in terms of appropriate modem technology and new 
marketing management techniques to market such local products from the villages to domestic and 
international outlets through a national or international retail network. Fourth, government 
established a People's Bank to ensure better and improved access to banking facilities and 
resources for low income citizens. The aim of this bank was to enhance their financial capacity and 
increase their income from self employment. Fifth, the government provided a universal health 
care plan with a low 30-baht charge per treatment at public hospitals with a view to aid people 
acquire healthcare services. Sixth, the Bank for Small- and Medium-sized Enterprise (SMES 
Bank) was set up. The collapse of the banking conglomerates and the destruction of government- 
protected monopolies created more open space for the growth of a new wave of SMEs. Thus, the 
SMEs Bank worked to promote these groups of companies by encouraging them to concentrate on 
activities in which Thailand has some competitive advantage. This project followed the Tuscan- 
Italian model and aimed to reach certain market niches with high adjustment capacity. Last, the 
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policies were aimed mainly at attacking poverty in rural areas - the debt 
moratorium and the Village and Urban Revolving Fund (VURF) - but only VURF 
had some implications for the realignment of state-community relationship. This 
was the first time poverty alleviation had become a main urgent government 
policy declared to the Assembly. Moreover, the policy parameter was changed in 
a way that strengthened local village communities. The ideas of community 
empowerment and state-society partnership were linked to poverty alleviation. 
This new policy parameter brought changes and reframed the relationship 
between the state and society to some extent. Notably, the government also 
proposed governance reform in several official policy statements that were 
clothed in fashionable language under the themes of good governance and new 
public management for example 'smaller government that does less', 'a facilitator 
and not a direct service provider', 'accountability', 'transparency', 'open 
government', and so on (Bidhya, 2002). But one concern was whether the state 
had actually been realigned towards such claims. Answers are given in the 
following three chapters. 
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the development of state-society relationships in Thailand before 
the crisis is outlined. Changes included the decline of the bureaucratic state in the 
light of the growth of non-state power. This gave civil society groups and NGOs 
greater access to and influence over policy-making. Since the beginning of the 
1990s, the discourse of community empowerment and the idea of 
comm unitarianism had been mainstreamed into main policy documents and the 
Constitution. At the same time, we see that the state had been passively influenced 
by the agendas of globalised forces as proposed by the World Bank. In particular, 
the Bank directed Thailand to embrace globalisation and a globalised economy. 
Accordingly, market mechanisms replaced the state-directed mode of economic 
development. The achievement of economic growth had been honourably 
Thai Asset Management Corporation (TAMC) was established to restructure the financial 
positions of debtors and improve their business viability. TAMC used 10-year 
bonds to purchase 
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acknowledged until the crisis hit the country and led it into deep trouble. The 
1997 crisis brought about several changes and challenges to Thailand. 
In particular, the crisis forced governance reform with the aim of reframing state- 
society relationships in the governing process. Parliament was pressured to pass a 
new Constitution in 1997 which claimed to achieve this objective. The issue of 
poverty was brought back onto the main policy agenda when a massive number of 
people fell into severe poverty conditions. Social issues now took equal priority 
with economic development issues. The crisis also opened a 'window of 
opportunity' for societal actors to incorporate their agenda with current poverty 
issues and press their ideas in government policy decisions. The idea of 
community empowerment was offered as an alternative development agenda and 
governing approach. The incoming government in 2001 tapped into this idea and 
promoted local development by emphasising the communitarian approach. The 
World Bank also reoriented its attention to the poverty issue and became keenly 
involved in the implementation of this idea. All these changes are critically 
examined in the following three chapters. 
loans from financial institutions at book value. 
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1. Introduction 
The development trajectory of Thailand between the 1960s and early 1990s could 
be characterised as growth -oriented, top-down, industry-led, and urban-biased 
development (Dixon, 1999). Policy was centrally governed - it was formulated by 
the central government and implemented though state apparatuses down to the 
local level. Priority was given to the urban development of each region with the 
assumption that the results of development would 'trickle down' to rural and local 
areas surrounding targeted cities (Parnwall, 1996). Policy management was 
mainly handled by government agencies with very little input and participation by 
the public (Saneh, 1993). Local communities were much more the 'object' of 
development and relied on the government's direction and support (Prawase, 
1997). Such direction was blamed for making communities more dependent on 
external forces as communities began to lose their power, values, and knowledge 
in managing their own lives (Anan, 200 1; Chatthip, 199 1). 
Once the economic crisis hit Thailand, the nature of this state-controlled policy- 
making and governing structure was seriously challenged. The crisis opened a 
ýwindow of opportunity' for communitarian supporters to press home the idea of 
governing by community through the theme of community empowerment as it 
was tied to poverty alleviation. The agenda of community empowerment became 
the national policy and led government agencies to reorient their directions to 
support this agenda. Such a shift in development orientation reframed the 
relationship between state and society to some extent. This chapter explains such 
an evolution and change in the governance of anti-poverty policy after the crisis 
until the year 2001. The first section identifies key policy actors involved in the 
anti-poverty policy-making process. The next section discusses the reorientation 
of the national agenda towards the promotion of community empowerment and 
the roles of societal actors in shaping it. Further, the chapter investigates the 
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attempt of societal actors to reframe the state-society relationship and pursue a 
new form of governance. Finally, an attempt by societal actors to promote the 
poverty issue as the national poverty reduction strategy just before the 2001 
election is briefly introduced. 
2. Identifying key state and societal actors in poverty alleviation 
policy 
The research found that only a few state actors have played a crucial role in the 
anti-poverty policy-making process after the crisis. The NESDB was obviously a 
prominent actor in policy formation. In fact some units/departments within the 
NESDB, as well as some figures in senior management positions who supported 
the social-centred approach to development as opposed to the economic-centred 
orthodoxy, were key players working with NGOs to promote the community 
empowerment agenda for poverty alleviation. The Ministry of Interior was a 
critical actor in implementing the policy since it controlled all provincial 
governors as well as maintained some degree of oversight over local governments. 
However, after 200 1, the TRT government decided to establish several new quasi- 
governmental agencies under the Prime Minister's Office to implement its urgent 
policies. These agencies included the Village and Urban Revolving Fund Office 
and the National Centre for Poverty Eradication. This is discussed in more detail 
in the next chapter. 
Parliamentarians played a minimal role in initiating policy. Since the TRT party 
gained an absolute majority in the Lower House, controlling 365 of the total of 
500 seats, many promises given to the electorate during the electioneering were 
easily put into effect, especially its pro-poor policies (see Chapter 4). The Senate 
did not have any mandate in policy formulation but was somewhat involved in 
policy monitoring. One legislator commented that 
In the Thai parliamentary system, what matters to political success is the 
vote. The TRT controls over 70 Percent of the total seats, so the 
government can pass any law it wishes. What we can do is just to 
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monitor the implementation process and give comments to the Assembly, 
but in fact our comments do not have m uch influence. (I nterview LI) 
Business did not take part in the anti-poverty policy-making process even though 
some businesses had been invited to participate in national committees. Some of 
them had participated at the beginning but soon thereafter began to withdraw their 
involvement. One reason could be 'because they had no interest in this kind of 
policy. Poverty dealt mainly with the poor which neither yielded bene t nor 
threatened their business. Why should they get involved? ' (Interview Ac3). 
There was a camp of development activists and NGOs who refused to cooperate 
with the government and sometimes protested against government projects. They 
worked mainly in issues of debt, access to natural resources, and the impact of 
government development projects (Jaturong, 2003). An example of this was the 
Assembly of the Poor (Baker, 2000; Prapart, 1998). This group did not participate 
in the anti-poverty policy process. In addition, there was another camp that 
attempted to work with and influence decision-making at the core level of policy- 
making of either the bureaucracy or the government. Established figures in this 
group whose names were frequently mentioned in interviews as key players in 
anti-poverty policy included Prawase Wasi, Paiboon Wattanasiritham, Anek 
Nakabutr,. and Poldej Pinprateep. 
Prawase was a senior figure, who was probably the most influential proponent of 
the community empowerment strand. Because of his longstanding professional 
experience, he was able to build up formal and infonnal networks with some 
groups of NGOs, doctors, and international donor agencies (Bamber, 1997). At 
the same time, he worked well with various governmental agencies and 
bureaucrats. Thus, he was appointed to be on numerous government committees, 
especially on the Board of NESDB. Such positions gave him access to various 
levels of bureaucracy and many government agencies. 
Paiboon has held many positions in almost twenty non-governmental 
organisations and government committees. He was highly respected 
by 
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bureaucrats and worked well with government agencies. He was the first 
Chairman of CODI, the first public autonomous organisation established to 
strengthen community organisations. Also, he was the Director of the Government 
Savings Bank (GSB) at the time when the crisis began. 
Poldej has been the Secretary General of the Local Development Institute (LDI) 
since 1998. LDI had played a critical instrumental role in advancing the 
community empowerment agenda. Prawase was one of its founding executives 
and served as the President of its board. LDI was founded to be actively involved 
in government policy formulation and implementation. Its core belief was that 
'the strength of local communities was the basis for sustainable development' 
(Pimjai, 2001: 12). 
Anek was a longstanding social activist. He was the Secretary General of NGO- 
COD, the Coordinator of the Local Development Assistance Programme during 
1984-1988 (former name of LDI), the LDI Secretary General (1996-1998), a 
member of the LDI Executive Committee (1997-present), and the Director of the 
Social Investment Fund (SIF). 
Although these actors worked in different agencies, they became connected in a 
manner of informal alliance bound by a very similar agenda and were thus able to 
support each other. They adopted a common stance that local communities should 
be empowered; thus, they were somewhat able to influence and shape the content 
and delivery process of anti-poverty policy after the crisis. Some were allied with 
pro-community senior officials in the NESDB with the goal of mainstreaming the 
community empowerment discourse into the national development policy agenda. 
The alliance was able to successfully grasp this 'window of opportunity' that 
came with the crisis and pushed the community empowerment agenda 
from 
Z-: ) 
discourse into practice at the national policy-making level. 
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3. Mainstreaming the agenda 
The NESDP has been instrumental in promoting Thailand's development since 
1959. NESDP provided broad guidelines which government agencies translated 
into implementation plans. The Bureau of Budget allocated a budget to ministry 
implementation plans based on their consistency with the NESDP. However, the 
process of planning was dominated by the top-down approach with little input 
from the civil sector. The participatory process promoted by the NESDB mostly 
involved only bureaucrats, academics, and business because the plans were 
oriented to pro-economic development. A critical change came in the process of 
drafting the Eighth NESDP (1997-2001), in which societal actors began to 
influence the national policy agenda and to encourage a new approach for state- 
society collaboration. 
This process of planning started just two years before the crisis. Changes in the 
planning approach and core concepts of the Eighth NESDP were partly due to the 
internal reorientation of the NESDB and the participation of the alliance. A senior 
NESDB official involved in the planning process reflected: 
At the time we were preparing for the Eighth Plan, economic success 
was well recognised but social problems were seen to have increased, 
and we were seriously concerned about the sustainability of our 
previous achievements. An important turning point was initiated by the 
Secretary-General of the NESDB at that time, Dr Sumet, who greatly 
valued the idea of people-centred development with more emphasis 
given to the balance of economic, social, and environmental aspects of 
development... We think people participation was necessary to get 
inputs on the social concerns of people at the micro level instead of it 
being we the bureaucrats who drafted it according to our own 
specialisation. The participatory process was incorporated as a 
key 
element of the drafting process. He [Dr Sumet] then promoted and 
supported pro-localism senior bureaucrats to play a pivotal role 
in the 
drafting process. Our Community Economic Development and Income 
Distribution Office was the key player in the drafting process. (Interview 
Gol 1) 
The NESDB aimed to draft the plan via a consultation process in which thousands 
of participants from all walks of life and hundreds of 
NGOs could provide input 
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and voice their concerns. When the NESDB searched for some organisations to 
help organise participatory meetings, Prawaes, as a member of the NESDB Board, 
introduced Poldej and LDI to the NESDB management (interview Go1O). This 
was the first time societal actors could access the core of a policy-making agency. 
The NESDB teamed up with LDI to hold nine regional seminars inviting a wide 
range of local NGOs, community leaders, social activists, development workers, 
academics, businessmen, bureaucrats, monks, and many other groups of people in 
each location, and the results were summed up in the last national seminar (Nipon 
et al., 2002). LDI played a vital part in organising these seminars and assisting in 
the process of consolidating views for the draft (Pimjai, 2001). This involvement 
offered a great chance for the alliance to incorporate and mainstream its agenda, 
as an LDI official recalled that 'since we organised all seminars, most 
participants came from our wide network in local communities. Yes, it was 
selective but in this way we could easily voice our concern and scale up our 
agenda to the policy-makers' (Interview Ng9). 
Finally, it is observed that the agenda of promoting local communities was 
satisfactorily incorporated into the Eighth NESDP. A chapter in the plan was 
devoted to the promotion of popular participation and upgrading capabilities of 
communities to play active roles in local development and poverty alleviation 
(NESDB, 1997). It included proposals to initiate community budgets, promote 
community management of natural resources, create funding for NGOs to devise 
community-based social protection, and promote fiscal incentives for businesses 
to support the community. Unfortunately, the Plan was launched in 1997, the year 
when Thailand fell into crisis. As a result, much of the short-term policy priority 
was devoted to fulfilling the loan conditions of the IMF to assist in the recovery of 
Thailand. The crisis caused serious budget cuts across all government departments 
and diverted resources away from many ambitions in the Plan. The crisis induced 
impacts that the state was unable to handle. The government decided to devalue 
the baht currency, causing the business sector to fall into serious trouble because 
of the tremendous increase in its foreign debts. So the situation forced the state to 
seek and accept support from the societal sector. It gave an opportunity 
for the 
page 74 
Chapter 5 State and Societal Actors before 2001 
alliance to push its agenda forward with further institutional isation. The alliance 
reinterpreted the problem and tightly linked the community empowerment issue 
with poverty alleviation. 
When the crisis occurred in Thailand, the government was incapable of handling 
the aftermath and asked assistance from the IMF in November 1997. The 
government embraced a commitment to liberalisation, smaller government, and 
free market as proposed by the IMF. In other words, it decided to pursue a neo- 
liberal development pathway on an outward-oriented, foreign capital-funded, 
export-driven, and modern- sector-based growth regime, with the agricultural and 
public sectors playing a marginal role (Choi, 2004). Such a development model 
reinforced the argument that the crisis weakened state capacity to guide society 
and neo-liberal policy restricted the Thai state from taking a decisive role in 
steering the economy. When the crisis raised many social problems, particularly 
poverty, the government decided to co-operate with societal actors by establishing 
the National Social Policy Committee (NSPC). This advanced an opportunity for 
societal actors to influence policy-making. 
In 1998, government endorsed a revised Eighth NESDP to better respond to the 
crisis by focusing on its social impacts (World Bank, 1998a). Following a 
consultative meeting with key figures in civil society in March 1998, the Prime 
Minister emphasised the need for new policies to cope with increasing poverty 
and social problems. This resulted in the creation of the NSPC, chaired by the 
Prime Minister., in July 1998 (Spokesman Bureau, 1998). In fact, the alliance 
moved behind the scenes to promote this establishment according to one senior 
LDI official's recollection. 
I and some social activists thought that impacts of the crisis were so 
critical. We needed a national committee to oversee andfind ways to 
lessen them. But what was different was that 80% of the committee had 
to comefrom the societal sector in order to voice different perspectives 
ftom the bureaucrats. Prawase came to see me one week before the 
meeting... we also consulted several seniorfigures to draft the plan... 
we proposed the plan and the Prime Minister accepted it... then the 
NSPC was set up... (Interview Ng8) 
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The NSPC intended to develop social reform policies to meet the newly revised 
Eighth NESDP and respond to mounting concerns about social impact upon 
vulnerable groups and the poor. The NESDB was its secretariat while LDI 
became a part of the Committee (Pimjai, 2001). Prawase, with three other key 
figures from the societal sector, was on its advisory panel. The 37 members of the 
NSPC were government ministers responsible for social issues, NGO 
representatives, leaders of civic organisations, businessmen, academics, and 
religious leaders. It probably was the first national committee on which 
representatives from the non-governmental sector outnumbered bureaucrats. The 
NSPC became another channel that societal actors used to propel its agenda, as 
was evident in the policies proposed by the Committee. 
In late 1998, the Committee organised a workshop aimed at developing a clear 
policy framework as well as a strategy and action plan for the NSPC. The civil 
society and NGO people advocated a greater focus on community empowerment 
and government reform to strengthen the decision-making capacities of local 
communities in solving social problems and alleviating poverty (UN Thailand, 
1998). One member of NSPC recalled: 
We [societal actors] tried to convince the government that during the 
crisis, while the business sector had collapsed, the rural communities 
across the country were still able to absorb those laid-off people who 
had returned back home. This helped mitigate the consequences of the 
crisis. Therefore, we proposed that community empowerment must not 
only be seen as an important way to mitigate the social and economic 
impacts on the poor but also as a key social reform strategy. (Interview 
Ng8) 
Following this workshop, the NSPC announced two major strategies (Rodriguez, 
1999). The short-term strategy aimed to address the social impacts of the crisis on 
vulnerable groups and the poor. The long-term one focused on public sector 
reforms to soften the power of the state and make it more enabling and facilitating 
to people. Accompanying this was a wide range of reforms addressing community 
level governance and legislative frameworks. This proved that societal actors 
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could reinterpret problems of the poor and poverty to serve the community 
empowerment agenda and made it a means for alleviating poverty. 
The NSPC later drew up the Community Empowerment Response to Crisis 
Action Plan to help communities identify and prioritise issues arising from the 
crisis and to develop their own responses (Rodriguez, 1999). This national 
initiative entrusted communities with the responsibility and resources to deal with 
impacts of the crisis. It helped to improve communities' ability to identify 
appropriate solutions to their problems on their own initiative. This prompted the 
next step of operational ising their agenda, which provided a stepping stone toward 
an institutional isation of the community empowerment agenda. This also helped 
to reframe the state-society relationship, as discussed in the next section. 
The later NESDP (2002-2006) was prepared by a process of consultation, though 
less extensive than its predecessor, and LDI was again requested to help with 
organising the meetings (Interview Go 11). The Ninth NESDP mainly focused on 
restoring the country after the crisis, and community empowerment became a core 
element of the recovery strategies, particularly in the proposals to alleviate 
poverty, improve environmental management, and generate sustainable rural 
development (NESDB, 2002). This NESDP stressed the importance of developing 
the capacity of local communities to manage their own economic and social 
development in partnership with the public and private sectors. It aimed to support 
community enterprises, to strengthen communities' capacity to manage revolving 
funds and small credit schemes,, to foster participative community planning, and 
to expand networking between community organisations. This signified an 
important change in the thinking of the core planning agency, as well as the 
influence of societal actors,, as observed in the views of some key NESDB 
officials: 
We were convinced that a poverty alleviation strategy must be taken 
more broadly thanjust an effort to increase the income of the poor. Lack 
ofpower, capability, andfreedom in managing their own lives became 
essential roots of their poverty. Empowerment of the poor should be 
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gi ven a priority and supporting them as a collective entity in the 
community had to be emphasised. (Interview Go8) 
We learned many things from the consultation and many successful 
cases of communities that became stronger when they were given 
opportunities and support. We realised the power of the poor and 
communities. Not only the way to measure poverty needed to change but 
also the approach to poverty alleviation. Community had to become 
central instead of having the state manage everything for them. 
(Interview GO) 
4. The refraining of state-society relations in the governing 
process 
Not only did the alliance influence the content of the national plans, it attempted 
to push forward its agenda into practice by rearranging the state-society 
relationship in the anti-poverty policy governing process. This section considers 
some evidence for this assertion. First, the alliance put effort into institutional is ing 
agencies that promoted community empowerment under the rubric of poverty 
alleviation. It utilised the social fund provided by the World Bank and the 
establishment of CODI for this purpose. Second, the alliance proposed a 
partnership structure between state and society to reframe the policy governing 
process. 
After the crisis, the Bank partly reoriented its policy position to focus on the 
social impact of the crisis. It decided to implement the social investment concept 
in Thailand (see Chapter 7). The Bank drew upon evidence from reforms in Latin 
America and made its loan conditional on the government giving more choices 
and voices to communities (Manuelyan and Walton, 1998). There was more 
evidence that the funds performed best when there was genuine participation of 
local communities because measures to foster the genuine participation of 
communities in the choice, design, implementation, and evaluation of projects 
would guarantee the success of crisis mitigation (Narayan and Kattrinka, 1997). 
SIF, an initiative proposed by the Bank, was designed to strengthen communities 
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and grassroots level cooperation and networks in order to alleviate poverty and 
hardship in the long-term. It was created as a long-term social safety net 
mechanism to empower the grassroots. The Bank's project document stated that 
SIF aimed to 'improve the access of the poor and unemployed to basic social and 
economic infrastructure, services, and employment opportunities' (World Bank, 
1998: 7). 
The alliance had been extensively involved in the development of SIF. Before it 
was officially launched in 1998, the Bank had consulted policy-makers in the 
government, the NESDB, the Ministry of Finance, and some senior figures in civil 
society for advice about the formulation of the Fund. Prawase, Paiboon, and Anek 
closely participated at this stage and also were later intensively involved with the 
SIF appraisal team of the World Bank (Anek, 2002). Ammar Siamwalla, the 
Chairperson of SIF's Executive Committee, noted: 
At the beginning, the Bank wanted to disburse funds to boost 
employment in the rural areas while representatives from civil society 
saw this fund as a significant channel to foster community strength and 
strengthen social capital in the country at the grassroots level. (SOFO, 
20002a: 24) 
Civil society representatives held several negotiations with the Bank decision- 
makers to convince the Bank to channel the fund direct to communities (Interview 
Ngl). In the end, it became the first fund that bypassed the bureaucracy and was 
channelled directly to the poor in their communities. A commitment for four-year 
loans by the Bank ensured the continuity of SIF. 
Once the Fund had been set up, Anek was appointed Executive Director of SIF. 
The fund was managed by the Social Fund Office (SOFO) under the responsibility 
of the GSB. Paiboon was the Director of GSB at that time, although later he 
resigned from the GSB and was appointed as the Chairperson of CODI but 
remained on the SIF's Executive Committee. The Bank reported that the GSB had 
been selected because of 'its relative independence, management capacities, 
experience in financial intermediation, and new mandate to serve as the people's 
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bank' (World Bank, 1998: 9). But in fact, it was a proposal put forward by the 
alliance because Paiboon was the Director of the GSB. This was done because the 
alliance thought it would ease cooperation in fund disbursement and ensured that 
they would have some degree of control over its operations (interview, Ngl). In 
so doing, Paiboon and Anek became prime architects and implementers of SIF 
(Juree, 2003). 
Some evidence showed that SIF was an NGO-dominated organisation. Its 
Executive Committee was designed to have five community leaders from various 
regions of Thailand as members in addition to two later-appointed senior staff of 
CODI. The rest of the sixteen members consisted of two people from the GSB, 
one from the media, and the other four from relevant government agencies. ' Staff 
members who worked on approving local projects were representatives of NGOs 
rather than government officials (Interview Ngl). Community projects under SIF 
were proposed and prepared by local community organisations under the 
guidelines provided by SOFO, classified into five menus. 2 The guiding principle 
of such menus was that SIF would facilitate the provision of public goods by 
allowing the communities to take the initiative (Ammar and Srawooth, 2000). 
Communities learned to identify their needs and develop solutions rather than 
allowing government agencies to direct them as had happened in the past. 
' The other members were 1) the Chairperson of the Committee; 2) the Director of the GSB as a 
Vice-Chairperson; 3) the Chairperson of CODI as a Vice-Chairperson; 4) the Deputy Director of 
the GSB; 6) the Manager of CODI; 7) a representative from the media; 8) a representative from the 
Bureau of Public Debt Management, Ministry of Finance (MoF); 9) a representative from the 
Bureau of Fiscal Management, MoF; 10) representatives from the Local Administration 
Department and the Community Development Department, Ministry of Interior; and 11) the 
Executive Director of SOFO. 
2 They were: (1) capacity and learning development in community occupation and community 
economic development; (2) community social welfare and safety; (3) restoration, protection, 
management, and promotion of culture, environment, and natural resources; and (4) community 
capacity in building and networking. The fifth menu, immediate community welfare for vulnerable 
groups accessed through community organisation networks, was introduced later in May 1999. 
While Menu I to IV emphasised investments to enhance the capability of community 
organisations, Menu V was designed to enhance the capability of community organisation 
networks in order to transfer the payment and to provide welfare for vulnerable groups, such as 
AIDS patients, tribal peoples, slum dwellers, the elderly, and the disabled. 
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The impact of SIF was considerable. It supported 7,874 subprojects and reached 
about 10 percent of villages throughout the country, it created employment for 
59,284 individuals, and it benefited over 13 million people, including the poor, 
unemployed, children, the elderly, and the disabled (World Bank, 2005). It 
enhanced the capacities of over 300 community network organisations, helped 
communities develop skills in project planning and management, and mobilised 
thousands of volunteers to help those affected by the crisis. One former SIF 
officer took the view that *SIF became a major resource to propel the community 
empowerment agenda and develop a large number of social activists who learned 
how to manage a large fund and build locally-based networks' (Interview Ng 1). 
SIF became a good learning experience for all parties concerned, and especially a 
training platform for many social activists who later moved to work with CODI or 
the VURF scheme (SOFO, 2002). 
Further, lessons learned from SIF have been incorporated into policy initiatives, 
particularly in the Ninth NESDP and TRT's policies (Anek, 2002). Many 
community enterprise projects under Menu I were successful and provided a good 
input into the One-Sub-district-One-Product Scheme. Many communities 
benefiting from the fund allocated a portion of their profits to the establishment of 
community welfare funds. Community network organisations continued to 
operate revolving funds with monies disbursed originally through Menu 5. SOFO 
supported the NESDB in the drafting process of the Ninth NESDP and 
incorporated its experience in promoting the development of community master 
plans in 2,000 sub-districts across the country into this Plan. This idea of the 
community master plan has been continued by the NCPE (see Chapter 6). 
Although SIF was a very important instrument that the alliance used to propel its 
agenda, SIF had a limited project life and finally ended in October 
2002. The 
alliance expected to guarantee the continuity of community empowerment 
momentum by institutional ising a more pennanent organisation. 
CODI was the 
achievement of this attempt. In fact, an attempt of setting up an organisation 
that 
was managed by NGO people and continually supported community 
development 
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was initiated in 1994 (CODI, 2002). Between 1995 and 2000, eight regional and 
national seminars/workshops were orltyanised with participants from government, 
rural and urban communities, NGOs, academics, and experts to discuss a proposal 
to set up a public organisation to promote and to support community development 
and finance in both rural and urban areas. Paiboon led the committee that 
organised the meetings (interview Ng4). Finally, the cabinet approved a merger 
between the Urban Community Development Office and the Rural Development 
Fund to become CODI in 2000. CODI has its own legal entity as a public 
organisation, something which provided CODI with greater flexibility, wider 
linkages, and new possibilities for supporting collaboration between rural and 
urban communities (Somsook, 2003). 
Beyond supporting community organisations, one of the main objectives of CODI 
was to coordinate efforts of civil society groups and their partners (CODI, 2002). 
CODI was expected to be a key institution bridging the gap between government 
and civil society organisations. CODI's Board included representatives from 
government and community organisations. The eleven members of the Board 
included the Chairperson, four representatives from government agencies related 
to rural and urban development, three community organisation representatives, 
two specialists, and the Director of CODI. The influence of the alliance was 
strengthened when Paiboon resigned from GSB and became the first Chairperson 
of CODI, and many community leaders who had emerged from SIF became parts 
of CODI's network at the local level. It was likely that the 'establishment of 
CODI became a ke instrument of the alliance in building up a stronger civic Y 
sector and empowering the community in the long run' (Interview Ng7). CODI's 
annual reports clearly indicate that CODI has closely cooperated with LDI and 
SIF in many activities (CODI, 2002). For example, it worked with SIF in 
promoting a pilot project for pracharat (see below) in four provinces in the 
Southern part of Thailand. It collaborated with both the SIF and LDI in thepalang 
pandin movement (see below) by proposing policies to political parties 
during the 
2001 national election campaigning. Following the closure of SIF, CODI tried to 
build on the momentum of SIF. It set up a network of community-level activists to 
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develop regional plans and to provide help to weaker communities in their 
dealings with government and other agencies. Many members of the operational 
staff from S IF joined CODI after SI F was terminated (Interview Ng 1). 
The alliance not only used anti-poverty policy to institutional ise its agenda, it also 
attempted to reframe the relationship between the state and society in the 
governing process. Alliance advocates did not think that either the state or 
business was in opposition to the community development. Prawase (1997) 
believed that the state and business should cooperate in solving social problems, 
including poverty. He initiated a structure for deliberation that brought various 
g groups under the rubric of what he termed benjaphaki or a partnership of five 
parties including state officials, NGOs, the private sector, academics, and people's 
organisations. A significant practice of this idea was the establishment of 
prachakom 3 (provincial level public assemblies) in many provinces during the 
Eighth NESDP drafting process. They were so successful that many of these 
continued to be promoted after the completion of the process. Prachakom can be 
described as an assembly with the purpose of formulating development plans for 
the province (NESDB, 1997). This structure aimed to institutional i se an initiative 
platform for state-civil dialogue and collaboration, in which each party discussed 
the development issues related to their local conditions and searched for solutions. 
This concept was later explained by an NESDB policy officer: 
Prawase attempted to institutionalise state-civil partnership mechanisms 
at the local level though his prachakom initiative. Moreover, he moved 
to the policy level by connecting with several high-level bureaucrats, 
especially pro-community senior officials in the NESDB, and convinced 
them to support the community empowerment agenda. He also linked us 
[the NESDB] with LDI through this prachakom structure. (Interview 
Go8) 
' in general, prachakom is an assembly through which representatives of 
local residents can 
monitor and make proposals to provincial administrations. However, it remains 
informal entity. Its 
status and membership requirements are not defined by law. There were created through 
the desire 
of local people to directly influence the local administration's decision-making process 
through 
channels outside of the elected provincial assemblies. 
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LD1 advanced this state-civil partnership mechanism. Poldej said that 'LDI can 
work with any government, any political party, or any group because we do not 
take sides. If the job fits our mandate, we will cooperate' (PimJai, 2001: 29). This 
position allowed some degree of collaboration with government agencies to 
promote community empowerment. It enabled LDI to reach extensive networks of 
civil society and grassroots organisations while maintaining good relationships 
with policy-makers in the bureaucracy. Further, LDI secured a number of 
contracts from government agencies and channelled funds to assist the 
mobilisation of popular input to shape policy direction more towards community 
empowerment. LDI described itself as achieving a significant role assisting the 
NESDB in mobilising knowledge and experience from communities to the 
development of NESDP (LDI, 1997). LDI applied the prachakom structure when 
it helped the NESDB organise consultation meetings for the Eighth NESDP 
drafting process. Since then, LDI has received more funding from government 
agencies to implement projects aimed at strengthening provincial, sub-district 
civic, and community organisations (PimJai, 2001 )4. 
The discourse of state-society collaboration was also evident during the SIF 
period. Juree (2003) argued that SIF represented a successful case of state-society 
cooperation. It typified multi-party partnership with co-operation between 
villagers, state officials, NGOs, local leaders, and academics. The scheme in fact 
was designed, managed, and operationalised by social activists and NGO people 
with the cooperation and endorsement of government officials. The project 
proposals were solicited directly from communities and funding was dispersed 
directly to communities. In the final stage, the management of SIF tried to 
promote state-society collaboration through an idea dubbed pracharat (civil-state) 
(SOFO, 2003; Anek, 2002). The concept ofpracharat indicated a collaboration of 
4 In 1998, the NESDB contracted LDI to pilot prachakom at the district level in two provinces. In 
1999, it received another contract to develop provincial civic and community assemblies in 14 
provinces. Later in 2000, it was contracted to develop prachakom in four provinces in the southern 
part of Thailand. Further, NSPC contracted LDI to conduct pilot projects supporting local 
communities establishing prachakom in every province (World Bank, 2001). In 2001, the NESDB 
produced an evaluation of the Eighth NESDP with particular attention to the progress of 
prachakom formation and found a positive assessment of the instrumentality that it achieved 
(NESDB, 2000). 
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representatives from the politics sector, the bureaucracy, civil society, and 
communities, all who work together in a committee structure at all levels, from 
national to provincial and from district to village (SOFO, 2002a). Pracharat 
provided communities with 'social space' to negotiate and collaborate with the 
state on issues related to their own lives. Pracharat became an extended version 
ofprchakom, in a broader structure. 
In 2000, Prawase and LDI, by linking up with other NGOs and senior figures in 
society, began to launch a social campaign called palang pandin (literally means 
forces of the land) -a joining of different social forces to solve the country's 
problems - to mobilise public concern and convince the government to pay 
serious attention to social reforms, particularly the poverty reduction agenda 
(Nipon et. al, 2002). The timing of the launch was critical because the NESDB 
was about to start a drafting process for the Ninth NESDP and more importantly, 
year 2001 was the time when a general election would take place. The alliance 
wanted the new government to take poverty alleviation seriously and to 
vigorously implement it. Prawase propagated the idea that state and society 
needed to cooperate to mobilise palang pandin and work together to solve the 
poverty problem. He argued that collaboration between different partners needed 
to be fostered in order to coordinate the strengths and compensate for the 
weaknesses of each one in areas beyond the reach of any one partner (Prawase, 
1998). His proposal of palang pandin was 'nothing other than the extension of 
institutional ised state-society partnership' (Connors, 2001: 21). LDI repeated the 
idea in workshops and seminars it organised across the country to 'mobilise 
popular support that state and society needed to team up as pracharat to 
strengthen each other in alleviating poverty' (LDI, 2000: 5). In fact, this strategy 
aimed to open a possibility that the new government would form a national 
poverty reduction strategy and institutional ise state-society partnership in 
implementing such anti-poverty policy. 
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The idea attracted the TRT party during the electioneering period. The TRT 
appeared receptive to the palang pandin campaign and pledged many poverty 
alleviation programmes. A LDI senior official said: 
Some members of our executive committee were invited to take part in 
policy discussions with the TRT, and Prawase occasionally spoke at 
TRT seminars. It was a good sign of societal sector and political party 
linkage which we hoped it would be developed to become a true state- 
civil partnership. Some LDI staff, especially Poldej, had been intensively 
involved in pioneering and managing the VURFpolicy. (Interview Ng8) 
In fact, prior to the election, the TRT held numerous meetings with NGOs and 
interest groups and developed significant links with them both on the basis of 
electoral pledges and personal linkages (Connors, 2001). When the TRT came 
into power, a unit called Pracharat Network Coordination Unit (PNCU) was 
established under the VURF Office. The unit aimed to coordinate state and civil 
partnership to promote community development at the local level. It was believed 
that this structure would encourage smooth cooperation between the state and 
society in an equal manner (SOFO, 2002). The unit was initiated by Poldej, and 
he acted as the Head of the unit for two years. 
5. Conclusion 
During the period between 1997 and 2001, we have observed that the idea of 
community governance and partnership was notably influential in the Thailand's 
anti-poverty policy-making process. The discourse of community empowerment 
came to shape development policy and led to an emerging new form of state- 
society partnership. We saw that societal actors played a crucial role in 
influencing and shaping a national policy agenda grounded on poverty alleviation 
issues. The alliance, mostly influential social activists informally organised in a 
network to advocate for the community governance agenda, had access to core 
national policy-making mechanisms and influenced key policy-makers to support 
and assist their project. 
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The crisis weakened the business sector's interests that had dominated the 
development agenda during the boom period. In this aspect, the crisis drove away 
other competing interests from accessing policy-making and made more room for 
societal actors to enter into and play an influential role in this policy arena. At the 
same time. ) the crisis weakened the state's capacity to handle the social impacts of 
the crisis. While the crisis demanded the state tackle the problems, the state lacked 
the capacity to do it alone. This necessitated that it to seek more cooperation with 
societal actors and adopt a different policy agenda. In other words, the state was 
less powerful in dominating the policy arena and managing society. These 
constraints demanded the state seek new strategies to steer society. This also 
indicated that the state was more dependent on the support of societal actors and 
implied some degree of growing interdependence between the state and society in 
policy-making. 
Under such circumstances, the alliance was able to organise and manipulate 
resources to promote their idea of community empowerment and partnership to 
core policy-makers in the national planning agency. The alliance guided the 
planning agency towards a focus on empowering communities as an important 
means of alleviating poverty. Community disempowerment was interpreted by the 
alliance as a fundamental cause of poverty. In other words, the alliance developed 
solutions, advocated them, and then tried to take advantage of political receptivity 
to package solutions to the problem. 
Although the power to set priorities and define national development goals as well 
as to make the final policy decision was still in the hands of the NESDB, societal 
actors became actively involved and were able to manage the process of policy 
formulation. To some extent, they not only provided inputs but also shaped the 
content of policy though manipulating the consultation process. It seemed that the 
consultation process had some influence over the mindsets of NESDB senior 
officials. The consultation process guided them to favour pro-community 
governance. The alliance was able to grasp opportunities emerging from the crisis 
to propel its agenda. Through the NSPC, the alliance again proposed its agenda as 
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a solution to the consequences of the crisis, and especially attached it to issues of 
poverty alleviation. 
Further, the crisis drove international development agencies to promote the 
community-based scheme in response to consequences of the crisis. The alliance 
took this opportunity and pressed home their agenda, although this process 
involved some negotiation. Funds borrowed from the Bank by the Thai 
government were used to support community development through SIF. The 
alliance was also able to institutionalise the community empowerment agenda, 
which can be seen in the cases of SIF and CODI. Apart from these attempts, the 
alliance advocated a new cooperative structure to bridge the gap between state and 
societal actors and hopefully to bring them into a partnership-type working 
relationship. Cooperative arrangements fo r policy formulation and 
implementation at various levels involving different parties were developed under 
the rubrics ofpracharat and prachakom. 
However. ) the extent to which such a concept 
is practical in real political life is 
still in question. One academic gave an interesting critique: 
Prawase's idea is so idyllic and too idealistic. His idea is based on 
Buddhist philosophy emphasising harmony and non-violence. This 
might not be sensible in real political life, which is full of conflict. For 
those communities that received a negative impact ftom government 
projects such as a dam or those who lost their rights to access natural 
resources, would such people be able to easily sit down at the meeting 
table and cooperate with government officials in harmony? Their 
problems are different and need a different political approach. 
They 
have to negotiate, pressurise, and advocate, aiming to reframe power 
arrangements with the state. Merely dialogue under the rubric of 
pracharat would surely be insufficient. (Interview Ac3) 
Further,, the effectiveness of such a partnership structure was also questioned 
because of both successful and failed cases. Critics noted that although the state- 
civil partnership promoted by prachakom had achieved a certain 
level of success 
in terms of providing forums for a multiplicity of stakeholders, 
it was 
unsuccessful in terms of developing the processes of participatory planning. 
In 
many cases, the middle class, bureaucrats, and academics were predominant 
in the 
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prachakom and its process with a small number of NGOs and grassroots 
community organisations taking part (Ratana, 1999). Moreover, Ratana (1999) 
argues that the high expectations behind the formation of prachakorn had so far 
failed to make them genuinely participatory, with equal status for each participant. 
Many prachakoin were dominated by state officials as many members did not 
represent any community organisation. Prachakom initiated by the government 
tended to result in government officials being engaged in co-optation and setting 
the agenda for civil society. The adoption of the prachakom structure and 
community empowerment agenda by the state, while it might be seen as a victory 
for communitarian advocates, was more likely to end up as state manipulation. 
The observation of this criticism could be interpreted to mean that the new 
configuration of state-society partnership led to an emergence of a new state fon-n 
in Thailand. The community empowerment movement enabled this change and 
triggered a transformed state apparatus to maintain its control and indeed to 
facilitate a new form of society penetration in the name of partnership. The next 
chapter examines cases of the VURF and the Poverty Registration Scheme 
adopted by the new TRT government, which took power in 200 1. It also examines 
if these cases can be criticised on this basis. 
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I. Introduction 
From mid 1998 onwards, the impact of the crisis spread through Thailand's rural 
areas. Poverty incidence in rural areas increased sharply from 14.9 percent of the 
total population in 1996 to 17.2 in 1998, and reached 21.5 in 1999 (Table 5). A 
sharp increase in poverty incidence could also be observed in all regions of 
Thailand (Table 6). The government was blamed for helping business and the rich 
too much rather than the poor (Pasuk and Baker, 2002; Phitthaya, 1998; Yuk, 
1998). Against this backdrop, the TRT party was established and positioned itself 
as an alternative to the ruling conservative government of that time. During the 
electioneering, the TRT declared its principal policies as those based on a pro- 
poor, pro-rural platform. Some of these policies became a means that not only 
helped the TRT to win the election but also, as this research found out, a strategy 
that the state utilised to recover its power over other actors in the anti-poverty 
policy-making and to reframe the way society was governed. It also reshaped the 
nature of the relationship between state and societal actors to some extent. 
Furthermore, the government later developed a new initiative, called the Poverty 
Registration Scheme, which allowed the state to monopolise the policy-making 
process and exercise a greater degree of influence over other societal policy 
actors. Partnership governance as promoted by the state was used as a strategy to 
co-opt other actors into supporting its development agenda. 
This chapter examines the above issues by looking at the main poverty alleviation 
projects under the TRT government with a focus on the VURF and Poverty 
Registration Scheme. Key findings are organised alone, the themes of policy 
agenda setting and execution. The first two sections consider the way that the 
policy agenda was reframed and resultant implications for the state-society 
relations. The first section discusses the adoption of the poverty alleviation agenda 
that the TRT government took and its implications. The second section addresses Z-: ) 
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recent developments in the anti-poverty scheme and the way the poor have been 
redefined. The next two sections examine the way these policies were executed 
and governed. Governing by partnership was acclaimed as being fully supported 
by all concerned parties, but this chapter examines how it has actually been 
practised. The examination is placed in the context of the VURF and the 
execution of the NCPE. 





y incidence by region 
Central South Bangkok and 
vicinity 
1988 32.0 48.4 26.6 32.5 6.1 
1990 23.2 43.1 22.3 27.6 3.5 
1992 22.6 39.9 13.3 19.7 3.5 
1994 13.2 28.6 9.2 17.3 0.9 
1996 11.2 19.4 6.3 1 1.5 0.6 
1998 9.1 23.2 7.0 _ 14.8 0.6 
1999 10.6 30.8 6.8 15.7 0.2 
2000 12.2 28.1 5.4 11.0 0.4 
2001 10.6 24.5 4.6 13.5 0.8 
'1002 2 9.8 18.9 4.3 8.7 1.4 
Poverty share (2000) 











Source: Development Evaluation Division, NESDB'; data from 1962-1986 are summarised in 
Medhi (1993); and the last two rows are calculated by Warr (2005). 
2. Internalising the agenda, reinterpreting poverty 
With the TRT's landslide victory in the 2001 election, a special credit went to 
pro-poor, rural-based policies mainly aimed at attacking poverty in rural areas. 
Although the TRT espoused the principle of rural uplift as one pillar of its later 
acclaimed dual trackplus policy, it initially had no concrete pro-poor programme. 
Therefore, the party set up a team to formulate a comprehensive anti-poverty 
policy paper for the party 
2 by a process of extensive consultation with grassroots 
1 NESDB calculated the figures based upon household incomes 
data collected in the SES. SES is 
the only data available covering an extended time period, since 
1962. 
21 have read the official draft of this policy paper (TRT, no 
date). It was a very comprehensive one 
covering all major aspects of agricultural policy with a 
focus on rural areas. The policy addressed 
issues related to the poor in rural areas and proposed ways to solve the problems comprehensively. 
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people in rural areas. This was also a response to the demand raised by the pro- 
community alliance for making anti-poverty policy a priority. A senior member of 
the TRT recalled: 
During the years 1998 and 1999, the team travelled across the country. We organised numerous meetings and seminars, and met many key 
community leaders, local NGOs, academics, and government officials. 
We wanted to hear their voices to form the party's policy... Some pro- 
communiti, NGO leaders contributed their ideas. We also consulted 
with senior NGO People such as Prawase, Anek, and some peopleftom 
LDT (Interview 1-2) 
It seemed that societal actors provided some inputs into the party's policy 
formulation. However, what was actually executed was not as much as expected. 
When the TRT won the election, very few policies were selected from the paper 
for implementation. Some additional policies were hand-picked if they looked 
promising for winning popularity. The same informant continued: 
The TRT was not yet in government when we drafted the policy paper. 
So we included all policies we believed necessary to help the rural 
poor. But when the government was formed, the premier selected only 
the debt moratorium and one-tambon [sub-district] one-product 
policies for implementation... after the party won the election and the 
government was formed, no one was interested in our paper 
anymore ... the premier adopted some policies proposed 
by others if they 
could reach broader groups of the electorate such as one-million-baht 
fund [VURF] proposed by the Deputy Prime Minister. This policy had 
been modifiedftom his successful former party's policy in 19 75.3 Rural 
people highly javoured this policy and his party won the election that 
year. So it was very attractive and assured the party ofpopular support. 
(Interview L2) 
Such policies became a 'comerstone' of the party's pro-poor project. The 
government 'repackaged' the project and claimed it as a new solution to poverty 
alleviation by developing a new discourse to justify its policy position. It argued 
that poverty was all about the 'lack of capital' and 'lack of opportunity', which 
could be alleviated if the poor found ways to 'reduce their expenses, increase their 
3 This meant to be the 'tambon (sub-district) revolving fund scheme' 
launched by the Social 
Action Party government in 1975. Morell and Chai-Anan (1981) view this scheme as more about a 
political incentive than an economic one. The Social Action 
Party doubled its seats in the 
subsequent election after campaigning on a platform of extending the scheme. 
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incomes, and broaden more of their opportunities in life'. This became the motto 
of the government's anti-poverty project (Nichapha, 2003). Later this approach 
was acknowledged by government officials, as one NCPE senior official 
explained: 
Surely, there was logic behind these policies. First, the three-year debt 
moratorium aimed to relieve the debt burden of the farmers and gave 
them a certain grace period to improve their productivity and boost 
their incomes without an interest commitment. VURF provided one 
million baht to each village across the country as a loan facility 
available for individuals and households. People could borrow for 
investment orfor supplementary vocations. This aimed at helping them 
increase their incomes. Concurrentýy with VURF, the one-tambon-one- 
product scheme enabled communities to market products developed 
based on their traditional indigenous expertise and local know-how. 
This helped them raise their income level and gave them more 
opportun ities in life. All of these attempts aimed at strengthening 
communities and helping them to escape poverty. (Interview Go2) 
The above explanation seemingly suggested that the government employed a 
monetary approach to poverty alleviation. The language of pro-community is also 
reflected in the case of VURF, which claimed to directly strengthen the 
community for long-term poverty alleviation. In VURF's policy paper, it claimed 
that the revolving fund was intended to 'solve the problem of poverty of the 
majority in rural areas, to reduce the rural-urban gap, and encourage people to be 
more self-dependent', and it also aimed to *promote local community capacity in 
fund management, stimulate the grassroots economy, and empower rural and 
urban communities' (VURFO, 2001: 11). The revolving fund was believed to be a 
key mechanism to empower communities in a sustainable fashion, as argued by a 
VURF executive: 
The fund should be used as a key mechanism to rebuild the community. 
Community has been broken off because the adults leave their 
hometown to work in the citiesfor more money. When the community 
has a fund, it can be usedfor job creation activities, and these people 
can now stay to work in their hometown, with no need to leave their 
community anymore. The fund will allow them to discuss with each 
other how to manage the money. They will have to set up their own 
committee and come up with their own solutions. We will not intervene. 
This should make them more seýfldependent and strengthen the social 
bonds of the community ... Because it is a revolvingfund, 
they have to 
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repay the loan with little interest, so the money will not be lost but will 
stay within the community. The 
-v own 
the fund, not us. You see that we 
expect the fund to be with them permanently. (interview Go7) 
Up to this point, it seemed that the TRT government had adopted poverty 
alleviation and community empowerment into its main policy agenda. 
Nonetheless, this should not be seen as a celebration for communitarian advocacy. 
The above quotes reflected how the government might try to reinterpret poverty 
and offer different solutions to the problem, including an attempt to promote 
community empowerment. These policy measures still reflect very old-fashioned 
thinking - giving the poor some money and the state remains their patron - 
though in different forms. VURF was evidence of this framework. The 
explanation could be simply read in a way that the poor had the capacity but 
lacked the opportunity because they had inadequate funds. Thus, government was 
seen as a patron that was constrained to help them by providing monies such as 
VURF. This type of relationship arrangement assumed that once the poor could 
access a source of capital, they would know how to make use of it to increase 
their income. This was a new explanation for a very old-aged approach or like 
-old wine in new bottles'. This criticism is echoed in the concerns of some 
academics: 
Government still held the same answer; it made the poor richer so 
poverty would be eliminated. Instead of claiming that the government 
gave monies, it claimed to give opportunities, not monies ... I think this is 
just some new discourse, a new interpretation to explain an old 
framework, an old approach. (interview Ac4) 
Poverty is not only about a lack of money but about a lack of 
knowledge, rights, power, lands, and so on, but government did not do 
anything about such issues. The poor generally do not realise this; they 
just feel comfortable when the government gives them some money 
without requiring any effortftom them. Some even think that it is ftee 
money given by the premier! (Interview Ac 1) 
Upon a more extended analysis, this reinterpretation of the anti-poverty approach 
had some political implications. Interpreting the poverty problem 
in this way 
provided the opportunity for the state's involvement under 
its claim of helping the 
poor and capacitating the community. The process of 
internalising the agenda - 
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transferring the agenda of societal actors to become that of the government - gave 
opportunity for the state to recover its influence over the management of resource 
allocation and, to some extent, over society. Instead of using SIF (which was 
managed by NGOs) to channel the fund, the government decided to established a 
new agency in parallel to SIF to manage the fund by itself. Later the government 
decided to terminate loans on SIF borrowed from the World Bank. This meant 
that now the state began to pull resources back into its own hands rather than 
channel them through civil society agencies as had happened previously. The state 
now solidified its resources through this consolidation process. This attempt could 
also be viewed as the state beginning to make the role of an agent that served as 
an intermediary between the state and the grassroots to be less important or even 
irrelevant. This, in essence, demoted the role of NGOs a position of lesser 
importance or lesser relevance, allowing the government to bypass them. In order 
to fully achieve this, the state successfully assimilated key personnel of societal 
actors through VURF. When the VURF Office was set up, some key NGO people 
were invited to help with management (including Poldej from LDI). In this way, 
one prominent NGO leader commented that the policy internalisation strategy of 
the government jeopardised the bargaining power of societal actors: 
The government was able to acquire knowledge gained by SIF as well 
as its key NGO personnel who came to workfor VURF This strategy 
undermined our bargaining power because we now lost our prime 
agenda and initiatives in advocating poverty alleviation as well as our 
know-how and network. (Interview Ngl) 
Furthermore, as government directed money and programmes downward directly 
to villages, such kind of scheme did not truly strengthen communities but rather 
made them more dependent on state support. Some NGO leaders even argued that: 
The provision Of tQP-dOwn money could tear the community apart and 
initiate some conflict within the community when people fought' over 
the distribution of money. The practice of easy handouts by the 
government could jeopardise a community's financial seýf-discipline 
and its learning process, and thereby weaken the community's seýf- 
reliance. (interview Ng2) 
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Instead of weakening the state's power, the adoption of the anti-poverty and 
community empowerment agenda by the state allowed it to reinterpret the agenda 
and use it to recuperate its role and power in welfare provision to the grassroots. 
Later in 2003, the government initiated another anti-poverty project, and this also 
seemed even more to increase the state's power over policy-making instead of 
empowering society. 
I Reframing the agenda, redefining the poor 
The NESDB (2003) considered that one critical problem of approaching the poor 
in Thailand was the lack of a complete poverty database and poverty map. The 
NESBD proposed to the government that this was one of the reasons why the 
4 government was unable to address the poor effectively. Therefore, two national 4-: ) 
meetings on poverty alleviation were organised in October and November 2003. 
Following the last meeting, the government launched its nationwide Poverty 
Registration Scheme. The Scheme encouraged people who needed assistance from 
the government to report and identify their problems according to the categories 
pre-identified by the government, as shown in Table 7. It began with the pilot in 8 
provinces in late 2003 and executed the programme nationwide during the first 
4 quarter of 2004 . Communities took part 
in the review stage when the District 
Office passed on details of the registered people to the village where they were 
from and asked the village assembly to verify the details. The verified information 
was sent to NCPE, which then proceeded with assistance to those registered 
individually. At the end of September 2004,8,258,275 people had registered 
(13.15 percent of the total population) and 12,198,333 problem cases 
5 had been 
reported (Table 7). Information identified three major difficulties of the poor: 
personal debt, lack of agricultural land, and lack of housing. These three problems 
accounted for 86 percent of the total problems. 
4 Whereas this was the main registration period, people could still register after 
March, but the 
number of newly registered people was minimal. 
The number of cases exceeded the number of registered people 
because one registered person 
could report more than one problem. 
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Table 7: Numbers of cases classified by categorised problems 
Problems Numbers Percentage 
Personal indebtedness 4,680,832 38.37 
Lack of agricultural lands 3,968,119 32.53 
Lack of housing_ 1-992 131 15.51 
Student unemployment 240,345 1.97 
Frauds 82,720 0.68 
Illegal occupations 7,546 0.06 
Homelessness 5,064 0.04 
Other problems 1,321,576 10.83 
Total 12,198,333 100.00 
Source: National Centre for Poverty Eradication, minutes of executive committee meeting, 20th 
September, 2004 
Several key officials who were involved in the management of this Scheme 
argued that this was a remarkable initiative in approaching the poor and poverty in 
Thailand. First, it was considered the first time that people could advise the state 
on who were considered 'the poor' as opposed to previous approaches, when the 
poor were determined centrally by the bureaucracy. One senior official from the 
Ministry of Interior explained: 
We let people voice their problems and difficulties by telling us what 
their needs were. We directly received requests ftom the people and 
responded to them. This was what we should have done before: 
listening to their needs and helping to direct them to what they wanted. 
This was truly an 'outside-in' and people-centred approach to poverty 
eradication. This is opposition to the 'inside-out' approach in which 
government thought for people and imposed what the government 
deemed the people wanted (Interview Go4) 
Second, this approach helped the government know which individuals must be 
targeted for specific services as opposed to the previous community approach, 
which made the poor less distinct. Another official from the same ministry 
commented: 
This was a shiftfromfo"sing on geography, community, or household 
to concentrate on individual poverty. In this way, we knew exactly who 
were in need individually... This sounded reasonable to me 
because 
numerous difficulties that people faced were rather problems of 
personal circumstance. Attempting to empower the community would 
not be enough to solve their individual problems. (Interview 
Go6) 
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In spite of the above appreciation from government officials, the Scheme could be 
critically viewed by societal actors as a means to generate popular support from 
the poor and maintain a dependent structure between the state and the people. 
Some others commented that this individualistic approach would diminish the 
sense of collective effort of people in the community who were working together 
to solve their problems. This would threaten an attempt to capacitate the 
Community to be more self-reliant and independent from the domination of the 
state. Such concerns were expressed in several interviews. 
It was too simple to define the poor in terms of these 6- 7 problems. It's 
incomplete definitely... Government has not yet done anything with 
broader structural causes of poverty like the issues of rights or access 
to natural resources... it just offered another political promise to the 
electorate, blinded them with the false impression that the government 
is going to solve their indebtedness or housing problems and so on. Our 
[senate] committee believed it was just another political plot aimed at 
generating political support. (Interview LI) 
The government still views helping the poor as a type of charitable 
work. I meant the government is acting like a charity, in which someone 
who is in a higher authority [government] gives help to receivers at the 
bottom [the poor]... This contrasts the principal foundation of 
community empowerment, which is to build up ftom the bottom, to 
empowerftom the bottom upwards. (interview Ng 
One point that is worth addressing here was that this Poverty Registration Scheme 
could also be perceived as another project in which government aimed to bypass 
any intermediary between the state and people and to replace it with a direct 
linkage from the government down to the grassroots on an individual basis. It 
could make people become more dependent on state patronage rather than on 
community support, according to one academic's comment: 
The Scheme undermined the community effort where people helped 
each other to solve their problems. People are now focusing on 
help 
ftom the government as they have registered. It could make people 
think that their problems could be resolved by the 'helping-hands' of 
the government and prevent them ftom seeking support 
ftom the 
community. (Interview Acl) 
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The origin of the Scheme is worth considering. Instead of developing it by a 
rational and scientific policy analysis, it was initiated on an impulse of the 
premier's in one meeting. One officer of the Ministry of Interior who managed a 
unit of NCPE recalled: 
The Prime Minister assigned us to organise a workshop on P October 
2003 with ministers and senior officials from many ministries. We 
proposed the workshop focus on five problems. 6 The mainfbcus was on 
agricultural land and the registration initially aimed to get information 
on the demand-side of lands. During the discussion, the issue of 
personal debts and housing came up and the premier caught it, so it 
became seven problems... No, no analysis, just inspiration from the 
discussion... (Interview Go4) 
Two interesting points can be seen in this response. First, none of the 
representatives from the non-state sector participated in this meeting (OPSI, 
2003). The policy was developed solely by the state and was imposed upon 
society without any input from societal actors. Participation of non-state actors 
only came at the implementation stage. Second, the language of poverty was 
redefined again and was broadened to cover other problems concerning the poor 
apart from community empowerment and income poverty issues as earlier 
defined. In fact, it might not be right to define the poor as only those who had 
these seven problems and came to register because no one could ensure that the 
registration had covered all people in need, and certainly the notion of poverty 
was much broader than these seven aspects, as highlighted by several scholars 
(see Kakwani and Medhi, 1998; UNDP International Poverty Centre, 2006). 
These seven categories of poverty also established an entitlement for those who 
were eligible for help from government and allowed it to consider the non- 
registered as non-beneficiaries. This categorisation of the poor limited the number 
of issues that the government would target. It narrowed its focus to problems 
regarding the poor in several defined areas and in fact only three major problems 
- indebtedness, land, and housing. The government 
had no need to invest its 
6 These were: a lack of agriculture land, homelessness, illegal occupation, student unemployment, 
and frauds. 
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energy in other problems or other groups since the Scheme provided clearly 
targeted groups and problems to be tackled. Further, the language of definition 
and the naming of the policy problems played a significant part in defining who 
should take responsibility for resolving the problems. Once the problem shifted 
from collective solutions (as community empowerment did) to personal resolution 
(the registered poor), the role of community and non-state actors became less 
important, and the burden was transferred to the state and bureaucracy for 
deliverance. Categorising and naming policy problems became a critical means 
which the government used to shape and prioritise what it wanted to do, and this 
Scheme introduced evidence of when the government manoeuvred this strategy to 
impose its power over society by deten-nining the policy agenda for other actors to 
follow. Based on this perspective, the Scheme could be interpreted as a new 
strategy for social manipulation imposed by the state. 
The final observation was that this Scheme offered the TRT a means to manage 
society by focusing on the 8.2 million registered poor. Government promised to 
find and redistribute unused lands, to restructure debts through the state banking 
systems, and to provide low-cost housing (OPSI, 2003). Through these measures, 
government could exercise some manipulative influence over society and the 
registered poor in particular through the use of resources (budget and government 
officials) for remunerative sanctions in exchange for their political support (their 
votes). Once the process of solving the defined problems had been initiated, the 
government introduced an implicit condition for the poor to support the TRT in 
exchange for their needs of land, housing, and debt restructuring to be fulfilled. 
This could be viewed as a strategy to tie people to the party, as one NGO leader 
observed: 
8 million registeredPoor meant 8 million votes in the coming election. 
Registration allowed the government to know who they were, where 
they were, and what they needed If government could satisfy their 
needs and maintain their hope for help, no wonder it could win the 
election. It might be too difficult to search for the real poor who were 
sufferingfrom deprivation, but it was much easier to manage these 
8 
million people. (Interview Ng5) 
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The process should demand long-term commitment. A reliance on the promise of 
rewards as an instrument of influence could be effective only as long as there 
were regular pay-outs of such rewards, otherwise the conformity would not 
continue. Therefore a stable structure of implementation mechanisms needed to be 
established so the process of poverty problem solving could be pushed forward 
though institutional ising a new agency - the NCPE. Section 5 examines the 
operation o this agency in detail. 
4. Instituting hierarchical control, initiating a state-centred 
network 
By the end of June 2004, about 74,907 funds were established across the country, 
which was about 99.15 percent of the target (Table 8) (VURFO, 2004). The 
budget for this Project was targeted at 75,501 million baht, which surpassed any 
previous attempt to provide funding for local communities and no NGO could 
match this resource, so certainly it had the potential to have an enormous impact. 
Notably, all resources 'came only from the government budget, with no 
contribution from the private sector or civil society' (Interview Go7). 
Table 8: Number of village and urban revolving funds as of June 2004 
Categories Target Achievement Percentage of target 













Total 75,501 74,907 99.15 
Source: VURFO (2004) 
Even though the government claimed that the fund aimed to foster community 
strength and enhance the capacity to be self-reliant, in reality, it seemed to have 
had a negative impact on the community empowerment movement. It seemed that 
this policy did not genuinely strengthen community power but rather made 
communities more dependent on state provision and support. It deepened the role 
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of the state as a 'grand patron' over the people and founded a new structure of 
control over society. 
The government did not start VURF by gradually disbursing monies first to 
villages that had the capacity and experience to manage funds or micro credit 
before, which would ascertain that they were able to manage monies effectivelý'. 
Instead, the same amount of one million baht was distributed to each village 
equally, irrespective of size, need, and ability of the community to manage the 
fund. One academic commented insightfully that the government should 'have 
tried to pilot the scheme to see how it worked first, but the pledge was 
implemented across the board regardless of the capability of the community in 
order to win electoral popularity' (Interview Ac2). This kind of approach also had 
the potential to jeopardise the community empowering process as reflected in the 
experiences of some senior NGO leaders: 
A large sum of money given to the villages potentially tore the 
community apart and raised conflicts during the loan allocation 
process when not all members of the village received money... I have 
learned some families now do not talk to one another because one 
family gotfunding while anotherfailed to do so. They used to be good 
neighbours to one another. (interview Ac4) 
It commonly takes five years for a typical village credit fund to 
accumulate assets of one million baht with the members learning 
through the process. They learn to work together, to help each other, to 
change their lifestyles, and to save money for the benefit of the 
community. But this practice of easy handouts by the government has 
jeopardised the community's financial self-discipline and therefore 
weakened community self-reliance. Villagers feel it is easier to waitfor 
funding ftom the government than trying to build it themselves. 
(Interview Ng2) 
Although VURF was grounded on SIF's basic principle in the sense that the fund 
was managed by a village committee set up by members of that village rather than 
imposed by any government agency, there were some key differences. At the 
policy level, the fund was managed by the VURF Board, the majority of whose 
members were the executives from government departments and agencies. 
At 
least 15 of VURF's 26 Board members and 21 out of 31 members of its 
Operation 
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Support Subcommittee were government officials (VURFO, 200 1). This was just 
initial evidence showing that the fund management was dominated by state actors 
with little involvement from non-state actors. This also showed that it was used to 
instil some degree of hierarchical control from the centre. 
At the operational level, the community had a certain level of freedom in 
managing the fund, including the freedom to select village committee members, 
the freedom to deten-nine the rate of loan interest, the freedom to allocate funds to 
each borrower, the freedom to monitor and investigating repayment, and the 
freedom to utilise benefits gained from the interest and repayment. However. such 
freedom sti II needed to 'operate under a broadftamework and guidance defined 
by the VURF Board, 'confirmed by a VURF senior manager (Interview Go7). The 
VURF Ordinance defined strict and specific 'rules of the game' that each village 
committee needed to follow (VURFO, 2001). It outlined the procedures by which 
village committee members were selected and the composition of the committee, 
accounting and reporting system that would be monitored by the VURF Office, 
the period and procedure of loan repayment that each village must be complied 
with, and fund disbursement procedures that villages were to use. This meant the 
state exercised an extensive degree of hierarchical control over the operation of 
each village committee. 
Another key difference was based on the fact that VURF was a loan (revolving 
fund), not a grant like SIF. The fund needed to be repaid within a year by those 
who had borrowed it. The government came to monitor the repayment record 
strictly and used it as a key indicator of success while paying less attention to the 
process whereby the fund was allocated and used, or the results achieved. Such a 
monitoring system created a long-term financial commitment by the people to the 
state, which was the 'true creditor' of the money. 
Furthen-nore, the VURF Office had set up sub-committees at the provincial and 
district level to regulate and supervise the operation of village funds to ensure that 
they were all working consistent with the Ordinance. Notably, a provincial 
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committee consisted of 25 members, with at least 15 of those members coming 
from government departments and agencies, while only 5 were from NGOs 
operating in that province (VURFO, 2001). These 5 non-govemmental members 
were mandatory but selected and appointed as appropriate by the provincial 
governor. Under the rhetoric of empowering the poor and community, as one 
respondent commented, the state 'seemed to have shifted its role from operator to 
regulator and given communities more room to work on their own initiative, but 
in realitv, it still exercised a certain degree of control and regulation over society 
under this scheme' (Interview Ng3). 
Now we turn to consider the role of the pro-community alliance in this policy. 
Poldej was invited to help manage VURF because one senior executive of VURF 
was his university friend. Prawase and Paiboon were also involved as advisors 
after the establishment of VURF. In fact, the alliance intentionally aimed at using 
VURF as a key instrument to serve its purpose in reaching all communities across 
the country. One LDI officer disclosed this hidden agenda: 
We wanted to use VURF as another platform to propel our agenda 
because the scheme aimed to reach all villages across Thailand. This 
was a great opportunityfor us to disseminate our agenda andpromote 
local development by using the government's functionaries and 
resources as we did with SIF and in the Eighth Plan. (Interview Ng8) 
The alliance attempted to integrate the notion dubbed pracharat (see Chapter 5) 
into VURF and implement it by establishing a unit under VURF's office entitled 
Pracharat Network Coordination Unit (PNCU). Poldej was appointed as its first 
director. At the unit's inauguration, a workshop was held to raise the banner of the 
civil-state partnership approach of governance consisting of four parties: 
politicians, bureaucrats, community representatives, and civil society people 
(PNCU, 2001). The premier's speech given in that workshop reflected this theme 
of partnership: 
This government aims to reduce the expenses of the poor and to give 
them more opportunity in life to access funding and knowledge, so they 
can think together and work to build their communities... in 
doing so, I 
page 104 
6 State and Societal Actors after 2001 
urge all four parties to work together and to support one another... the 
government will retreat and let the people at the front work. We would 
only want to be a supporter, not the chief anymore... (PNCU, 200 1: 10- 
14). 
As the government seemed to accept his proposal, Poldej deployed a similar 
establishment at a lower level of governing arrangement by setting up the 
Prachakom Coordination Hub at the provincial level and linked his LDI network 
with these Hubs. The Hubs were actually created with the intention that 'non- 
governmental people would have a social space exchange dialogue with 
government officials at the local level. They could voice their concerns and if 
possible influence the development direction of their community' (I nterv iew Ng9). 
Poldej channelled VURFs budget to support the work of this Hub in each 
province (Interview Ng8). In other words, he was able to siphon financial 
resources from VURF to support LDI work at the provincial level. Although such 
a structure was laid down at the local level in many provinces across the country, 
the extent to which a 'true' partnership has been practised is yet to be 
systematically assessed. One academic who served on the Board of the NESDB 
and worked extensively with NGO commented that: 
In my experience, I think civil-state partnership is just lip-service from 
the government. Some officials might understand and be open to this 
idea, but most of the rest, the majority, particularly in rural areas, had 
not understood... even some members of national boards on which I 
served still think that participation from the bottom is unnecessary. If 
we had a good government, we should let it do what it saw as 
appropriate... they still view the state as 'daddy knows best'. (Interview 
Ac2) 
However,, Poldejs work did not last long, and he withdrew from this position 
after two years of service. The government appointed a new director, who was 
'working closely with Poldej when he directed the unit' (Interview Ng8) to take 
over the leadership. He was believed to be a person from the TRT who was 
commissioned to turn PNCU to serve the political purposes of the party. 
One LDI 
who used to work with this person commented: 
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I believe the TRT wanted to build up its network based on many village funds across the countr 
' v, so 
he came to develop and extend the network 
of those people who were involved and who supported the VURF 
scheme, something which could be used for political campaigns and 
electoral mobilisation. It was easyfor him to build on what Poldej had 
done before. (Interview Ng8) 
Interestingly, this comment is aligned with the direction that VURF recently 
announced. Networking among village funds within a sub-district recently began 
to become a key approach promoted by the VURFO. In 2003, the Handbook of 
Sub-district Level Networking for the Village and Urban Revolving Fund was 
launched, and the approach was claimed to be a key strategy to sustain VURF in 
the long-run (VURFO, 2003). A VURF manager explained: 
Networking should benefit members o each village. /und since they can )f 
exchange experience and knowledge, share resources, learn about good 
practices ftom other communities, and cooperate to initiate joint 
community enterprises. The joining-up of financial resources across 
villages in the same sub-district is aimed at initiating community 
financial institutions such as credit unions or community banking 
systems. This was intended to lay down a foundation to sustain 
communityfunds in the long-run. (Interview Go7) 
The VURYO aimed at establishing 8,550 networks during the 2005 fiscal year and 
provided seed funding of 113 million baht to support networking activities 
(VURFO, 2004a). This direction could be considered a new strategy whereby the 
state initiated state-centred networks via VURF to extend and deepen its patron- 
client relationship with communities. Up to this point, we might conclude that the 
partnership structure adopted by the state and societal actors was based on 
different motivations. Societal actors wanted a structure to give them an 
opportunity to influence policy and channel some government resources to serve 
their agenda. But from the government's perspective, one senior LDI officer 
admitted: 
We laterfound out that the TRT government wanted to co-opt key civil 
society figureheads and their local networks to VURF. 
The government 
wanted to reach communities but had no knowledge or networks to 
implement such types of cross-country local development schemes. 
Co- 
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opting the established NGO network would be a short-cut to acquiring 
such knowledge and networks. (Interview Ng9) 
With such dissimilar motives, how effective this structure was in building 
partnership should be questioned. The next section considers the Poverty 
Registration Scheme and examines if different or similar interactions are to be 
found. 
5. Remaking state-society partnership, reinstating state-directed 
governance 
NCPE was established in November 2003 as a national policy agency to 'oversee 
and manage the process of solving problems related to poverty' and to 'focus on 
the problems and registered poor identified in the Poverty Registration Scheme 
during its first four years' (NCPE, 2004: 5). This meant now that 'all business 
about poverty eradication had been movedfrom the NESDB to NCPE'(Interview 
Go8). The centre was directed by the Deputy Prime Minister and administrated 
under the Prime Minister's Office. NCPE aimed to promote cross-agency and 
cross-sector collaboration to tackle the poverty problem. A key management 
officer of the NCPE expressed a view of the collaboration: 
The concept ofJoined-up initiative was adopted here. Yes, it is aform of 
partnership. It was not only a joining of various related governmental 
agencies but also a joining of the public, private and civil society 
sectors. (Interview Go2) 
In fact, societal actors were involved in the Scheme since the beginning stage of 
NCPE's fori-nation and played an important role in its initiation. It began when 
Prawase, Paiboon, and Poldej held a meeting with the Deputy Prime Minister and 
the Secretary General of the Office of the Narcotics Control Commission (ONCC) 
to find ways to sustain the success of the government's anti-drug campaign. A 
senior executive of CODI recalled: 
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We think if people remained poor, the drug problem would never be 
eliminated. Building upon a successful collaboration between LDI and ONCC during the anti-drug campaign one year back Poldej proposed 
that the same approach should be applied to the anti-poverty scheme. They accepted it and agreed to apply the same implementing structure 
used by the ant7-drug campaign to the Poverty Registration Scheme. 
CODIjoined because Paiboon was the Chair of CODI at that time. 
(Interview Ng6) 
The result of the discussion was the formation of NCPE with a joint secretariat of 
five core agencies - the NESDB, ONCC, CODI, Office of the Permanent 
Secretary, and Department of Provincial Administration of the Ministry of the 
Interior. Several subcommittees were set up, and one of them was the 
Subcommittee of the Community Plan for Poverty Alleviation, which was 
managed by the alliance (see below). It seemed that the alliance had room to 
move again under the NCPE, particularly to propel the community empowerment 
agenda. It seemed that a partnership initiative between the state and society was zn 
established under this new rubric. Even NCPE's top executive claimed that 'this is 
the first time that public, private, and civil society sectors have worked together in 
unity, full collaboration, and equal status' (Interview Gol). But this research 
found this expectation to be too optimistic. 
The organisational arrangement of NCPE showed that the constituent members 
were skewed in favour of participants from government agencies. The core 
executive committee of NCPE consisted of ministers and permanent secretaries 
from a number of ministries and government agencies, with representatives from 
selected business and civil society organisations (see Appendix 4). The main 
responsibilities of this executive committee were to formulate policies, strategies, 
and measures for poverty alleviation, as well as to monitor and evaluate 
government policies on issues related to poverty reduction (NCPE, 2004). So the 
committee was the highest level policy-making body of the NCPE. However, 
members from government agencies outnumbered those from non-state sectors. 
Out of 54 members, only 5 were from business and 7 from civil society; the rest 
were from government agencies. When I asked how these non-state members 
were selected, one senior NCPE staff member responded: 
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We selected organisations that were accepted by the public and 
government agencies. These people had worked or had been working 
with various government agencies for several years. We worked with LDI in the anti-drug campaign. CODI was well-known as was its Chair [Paiboon]... we knew they could work well with us. We wanted to 
encourage sustained collaboration based on settled relationships. 
(Interview Go2) 
This meant non-state members in NCPE were hand-picked by the government 
based on past connections rather than other explicit criteria such as their capacity 
to reach communities. This thus 'automatically excluded many other NGOs that 
had not yet worked with these five core secretarial agencies but had been working 
extensively with communities across the country' (Interview Ng2). Participation of 
non-state sector members was far from genuinely open participation. A similar 
criticism could be made of the constituents of key subcommittees under NCPE. 
Eleven subcommittees were established to take charge of various issues related to 
the seven problems defined in the Scheme (Table 9). Amongst these eleven 
subcommittees, four of them had no member from the non-state sector but were 
all government officials, and the other four had government officials accounting 
for eighty percent of the members. Even in the Community Plan Subcommittee, a 
majority of whose members should have come from the civil society sector or 
community leaders so it could support and cooperate well with the community, 
government officials were double the number of members from civil society. 
Based on observations made in several meetings of NCPE's executive committee 
and subcommittees I attended, representatives from private business began to 
reduce their participation shortly after the first few months. The situation turned 
out to be that only representatives from government and civil society still 
participated in NCPE. This even weakened the proportion of non-state actors in 
committees. In many meetings, representatives from government agencies 
dominated the discussion as they constituted the majority of the members and left 
very little room for civil society participants to express their concerns. The 
minutes of several meetings indicate that issues concerning the work of civil 
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society were only occasionally addressed. One NCPE officer explained the reason 
to me: 
... 
for civil society people, we gave them full freedom to work in the 
Community Plan Subcommittee. It was more related to their interest 
than to other work. That was why you did not see their issues raised 
frequently... (Interview Go')) 
I now turn to consider this subcommittee. The Community Plan Subcommittee 
was the only subcommittee chaired and run by societal actors, in particular the 
pro-community alliance. Prawase was the Chair, Paiboon was the Vice-chair, and 
Poldej was the Secretary of the subcommittee. At first, this subcommittee seemed 
to maintain some degree of freedom in pursuing the community empowerment 
agenda via the promotion of community plans as a novel instrument. The 
committee organised several open workshops and forums to mobilise public 
support for their agenda within the framework of NCPE and finally drafted the 
subcommittee's plan for the years 2004-2006 budget approval from NCPE. The 
result was this: 
The plan was not approved, but the budget and our agenda was 
transferred to be under the management of another newly established 
committee, the Civil Society Coordination and Support Subcommittee 
(CSCS), without any notice or consultation with Prawase or Poldej. We 
have never been informed of the reason! (Interview Ng9) 
The establishment of CSCS was 'an attemptfrom CODI to findpolicy 'space'for 
civi .1 society to voice and influence the implementation process of the Poverty 
Registration Scheme' (Interview Ng5). Paiboon was officially appointed to chair 
this subcommittee but he assigned one of CODI's Deputy Directors to oversee the 
subcommittee's daily operations. The disapproval and transfer of the budget was 
interpreted as 'an attempt to break us [the alliance] up by creating corflict 
between LDI and CODF (Interview Ng9). Someone hinted that the government 
used the new PNCU director of VURF to instrumentally intervene and break up 
the alliance. This new director was involved in both subcommittees. He was 
believed to be a person who operated 'behind the scenes' to turn down the plan 
and budget of the Community Plan Subcommittee and negotiate 
for the budget to 
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be transferred to support CSCS, which 'he has been closely working with' 
(Interview Ng9). Now the work of CSCS was 'under close surveillance of the 
government though this person' (Interview Ng9). As a result, the work of the 
Community Plan Subcommittee was on hold while Prawase and Poldej decided to 
refuse their involvement in NCPE. One of their officers expressed their feelings: 
... the government was not sincere about working with this 
subcommittee. It seemed that the government still wanted to manage 
everything and retain its control over our operations. This could be 
viewed as state-guided partnership instead of true partnership... now 
we realised that the state had manipulated all things. We were invited 
to join justfor their credibility, to make it look as if they were working 
with other partners apartfrom government agencies... When we became 
stronger and could threaten their work, then we would be cut off 
(Interview Ng9) 
This message reflected a similar concern expressed by one academic who 
participated in NCPE from the beginning: 
Government was so smart to work with some senior NGO figures to 
give the impression that it was working with the grassroots. When such 
NGOs began to do something beyond the scope that government 
wanted, or were capable of challenging or counterbalancing its power, 
the government would try to rule them out. This was the meaning of 
partnershipfor the government. (Interview Ac I) 
This seemed to be in contrast to an objective defined in the NCPE policy paper 
which was to 'seek cooperation from the private, non-governmental and civil 
society sectors in participating and supporting the work of poverty alleviation' 
(NCPE, 2004: 7). Government agencies still remained the key executors of the 
Scheme while the non-state actors were left only to Participate, support, or 
cooperate with the government as requested or allowed to' (Interview Acl). It 
was not only at the subcommittee level that non-state actors appeared to have very 
little room to act; similar conditions seemed to apply with the implementation of 
this Scheme. 
The operations of the eleven subcommittees were also dependent on 
NCPE's 
executive arms at the provincial and district level. NCPE provincial and 
district 
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centres were established by using the provincial and district offices under the 
management of the Ministry of Interior. These provincial and district centres 
coordinated vertically and horizontally with related agencies. Vertical 
coordination worked along hierarchical lines of command from central ministries 
to provincial and down to district ministerial offices. Horizontal coordination 
meant coordinating different but related government and non-goverrimental 
agencies at the provincial and district level. CSCS was responsible for identifying 
civil society representatives to be involved in both NCPE provincial and district 
centres in each province and district. The implementation structure is illustrated in 
Figure 4. This multi-level partnership was statutorily instituted by the Prime 
Minister's Directive (NCPE, 2004). It was clarified by a senior NCPE officer: 
The emphasis here was on new forms of coordination at different tiers 
of governance - national, provincial and local authorities - linked to 
cross-cutting organisational structures and the participation of NGOs 
based on mutual goals and trust. This aimed to promote flexible forms 
of collaboration and more synergy. (interview Go2) 
However, one interesting point to address here is that the constituent of NCPE 
provincial and district centres reflected a similar structure to that of the NCPE 
executive committee, most of whose members were from provincial and district 
government agencies (NCPE, 2004: 17-21). Participation of representatives from 
civil society or community leaders was 'Subject to the discretion of each 
Provincial Governor and Chief District Officer; they would be invited tojoin only 
if needed' (Interview Go4). Such multi-level statutory partnerships were still 
impeded by bureaucratic hierarchical structures and the power struggle between 
state and non-govemmental actors remained. 
To find out how the Scheme really operated in practice, a visit was made to one 
District Office, which was recommended by one NCPE manager as the most 
successful case of implementing the Scheme at the district level. Although what 
happened in this district could not be generalised to others, it reflected what was 
happening on the ground when the Scheme was implemented. I found that the 
involvement of non-state actors such as banks, colleges, local business, and 
page 112 
Chapter 6 State and Societal Actors after 2001 
community leaders in this district centre was neither the result of horizontal 
coordinating structure as the central ministry had indicated nor the work of CSCS. 
The Chief District Officer told me that he 'had not ever heard or been informed 
about the work of CSCS or ever been contactedfrom this subcommittee before' 
(Interview Go5). Instead, the success of its implementation was due to his 
leadership and personal good relationships with local businesses in the district, 
which helped smooth the coordination among various governmental agencies and 
the participation of businesses in the district. I also found that community leaders 
and representatives did not have much of a role in the process of implementation, 
which could be due to the nature of the problems and hierarchical structure of the 
bureaucracy, as the Chief District Officer commented, 
The [top three] problems were too big and more complicated than the 
ability of the community to be involved and somewhat unrelated to the 
it 7 commun y ... 
I needed to get it done quickly, this is what the ministry 
wanted. Why should I consult the community if I already knew what I 
had to do and I could already connect to all concerned parties to solve 
the problems? (Interview Go5) 
This quotation highlights a possible tension between the statutory partnership and 
the more directive, hierarchical forms of governance. It also suggests tensions 
within the government's agenda. Although the government might have had 
ambitions towards governance systems based on partnerships and collaboration, 
they were more likely to develop at the top policy-decision level in the centre. At 
the operational level in the province or district, there was a political imperative to 
achieve 'quick delivery' results and to do so government officials turned to more 
familiar recipes to exert greater leverage by using hierarchical mechanisms of the 
bureaucratic machinery. This case shows that, at the operational level, 
government agencies became the leading agents in the implementation of the 
Scheme while the involvement of civil society was very limited. The partnership 
failed to be established in practice. 
' He gave an example: the related stakeholders in solving the 
indebtedness problem that are 
classified as government agencies would include the police, revenue officers, and 
government 
banks because they were related to the debt restructuring process. 
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6. Conclusion 
After the new government came to power in 2001, the landscape of state-society 
relations in anti-poverty policy governance changed considerably. The research 
found that the state began to recover its powerful position in policy-making 
through controlling the agenda and resources, realigning the network or 
partnership mode of governing to support its interest, and later attempting to 
exercise its power to dominate and penetrate society to some extent 
The research found that the pro-community alliance was still the only group of 
non-state actors that can access the anti-poverty policy arena. Their involvement 
was again at the discretion of the state as it gave preference to this group and 
excluded other interest groups. It seems that anti-poverty policy-making was 
never opened up to many organised groups competing to influence the agenda. 
This policy area seems to remain under the state's domination, either by the 
government or the bureaucracy (the NESDB). Only if the state allowed it could 
other interests then become involved. 
The motivation of societal actors (the alliance) to involve in the policy-making 
process remained similar to the pre-2001 period, which was to shape the policy 
agenda and use the state's resources to propel their interest. However, this time 
the interest was focused not on the bureaucracy but on the government. The TRT 
government had intemalised the poverty alleviation and community 
empowerment agenda advocated by societal actors into its anti-poverty policy 
platform. But the motive for accepting the agenda was different from the previous 
period. As has been examined in this chapter, the motivation was to bring the state 
back into a powerful position in policy-making process and, at a later stage, to 
undermine the role and influence of civil society in the policy process. 
The state came to hold a central and largely autonomous position (from other 
influences) in policy agenda selection although some inputs were provided by 
some societal actors. The decision to select any policy to implement was 
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principally in the government's hands. It seemed that societal actors had little 
bargaining power over decisions on framing the agenda. The policy problem was 
reinterpreted and redefined in a way to serve political purposes, and this allowed 
the state to exercise some degree of control and manipulation over society. The 
state was able to set the 'rules of the game' using its power to define poverty and 
redefine the poor, thereby setting the agenda for the rest of society to follow. 
Another reason the state was able to recuperate its power was that the state 
regained control over all resources in policy execution. Funding to communities 
was channelled by VURF, which was under the full control of the government, 
unlike the SIF where NGO people dominated its management. Execution of the 
Poverty Registration Scheme was mainly carried out by government officials and 
government budget. As the government disbursed money and programmes 
downward directly into villages through VURF, and as the problems of the poor 
and grassroots were undertaken individually by the Scheme, these moves 
undermined the role of NGOs that served as intermediaries between the state and 
the rural people. Government believed that it had more to offer in bridging the gap 
between the state and society. The Prime Minister once said: 
NGOs are social groups that help bridge the gap between the 
government and the people. If such a gap were to no longer exist, the 
role of NGOs would be automatically diminished and foreign donors 
would not need to fund them any more. (The Nation, 10 May, 2003) 
Although the state and societal actors both acclaimed state-society partnership as 
a governing mode in anti-poverty policy, the nature of policy governing turned 
out to be a process of state-led governance. The participants had different motives 
for engaging in the partnership. Societal actors attempted to use their version of 
the partnership structure to institutional ise a platform to influence policy and 
siphon resources to support their work. The government craftily employed the 
partnership strategy to co-opt societal actors and build on their network and 
knowledge to incorporate the grassroots into a newly formed state-centred 
network. The partnership approach as a mode of governance was used to 
complement the hierarchically based mode. Further, some 
difficulties in the 
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positioning of local partnerships within central government policy agendas were 
observed during field visits. Problems were created by the attempt to impose 
policy from above for quick solutions as opposed to encouraging diversity and 
allowing horizontal relationships to develop in the partnerships. 
The changes signalled a new era of state-led governance in social policy-making. 
The next chapter considers if a similar orientation could be observed in the 
relationship between the Thai state and globalised forces in anti-poverty policy- 
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Chapter 7 State and Globalised Forces 
1. Introduction 
One area of debate that this research examines is the nexus between globalisation 
and domestic governance in the policy-making process (see Chapter 2). This 
research is particularly concerned with the interaction between globalised forces 
and domestic institutions in the governing process. This chapter investigates the 
role that international policy actors play in domestic policy-making and evaluates 
the extent to which they might shape national policies. It also considers whether 
the Thai state has lost its autonomy over domestic policy-making due to the 
pressure of external global forces or if it still has the capacity to negotiate its place 
under the new conditions of governance. This chapter therefore investigates the 
dynamic relationship between international organisations and the Thai state by 
focusing on the anti-poverty policy process after the 1997 financial crisis. 
The first section introduces the involvement of international policy actors in anti- 
poverty policy initiatives since the crisis. The subsequent sections focus on the 
World Bank as an illustrative and specific example of how the interaction between 
the Thai state and international policy players evolved. It outlines the initial 
involvement of the Bank in alleviating the impact of crisis upon the poor and the 
Bank's reorientation to focus on a community empowerment approach. The 
following section considers how the Bank changed its engagement in Thailand by t) 
proclaiming a partnership approach and the subsequent response of the Thai state. 
Next, it examines one recent case of a partnership programme for poverty analysis 
and monitoring. The final section concludes with some discussions about these 
developments. 
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2. Involvement of international agencies after the crisis 
Although there are numerous international governmental and non-govemmental 
agencies involved in poverty alleviation activities in Thailand, by confining this 
research to anti-poverty policies formulated by the NESDB and those adopted by 
governments after the crisis, this research finds that international non- 
, governmental agencies have not played a significant role in national policy- 
making. As one NESDB official commented, 'International agencies were 
actively involved in the anti-poverty policy after the crisis, but most of them il, ere 
international governmental organisations while the role of international NGOs 
became very limited at the policy level' (Interview Go9). One academic who 
worked with some international NGOs observed: 'I think, not many international 
NGOs would position themselves strongly with the anti-poverty agenda because 
this agenda is rather broad and too vague somewhat... I think they wouldfocus on 
issues such as childcare, HIVIAIDS, or human rights, those issues which present 
obvious target beneficiaries and are easy for jundraising' (Interview Ac2). This 
assertion became quite clear when I interviewed several senior government 
officials and officers of the World Bank and UN. All of them confirmed that the 
international NGOs did not take a central part in the policy-making process. The 
reason could be that 'their resources, particularly finance, are so limited 
compared with international governmental agencies, so they have less power in 
advocacy' (Interview Go3). This research therefore focuses on international 
governmental agencies in order to better understand the role of globalised forces 
in the poverty alleviation policy process. 
In Thailand, international governmental organisations consist of the UN 
agencies'. the Bretton Woods institutions, the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), 
and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). 
However, the 
involvement of UN agencies in Thailand's national anti-poverty policy-making 
declined after the crisis began to subside, whereas the ADB and IOM 
did not 
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appear to have any significant influence from the beginning. The World Bank 
remains an active and influential player in the development of national anti- 
poverty policies. A senior official from the Poverty Reduction Policy Unit of the 
NESDB expressed his view: 
International agencies turned their emphasis to poverry reduction 
promptly when the crisis hit Thailand. For instance, the World Bank 
implemented the Social Investment Project (SIP) and later it, orked 
closeli, ii, ith us to develop CDP-PAM. ADB offered help, but nothing 
has achieved any considerable progress. For UN agencies... as I 
remembered, they took an active part at the beginning qf the crisis, but 
their involvement has become minimal over the past fe'w years. They 
are not having much influence over us in the development of the 
national anti-poverty policy. (Interview Go8) 
His observation about the engagement and decline of the UN's role in anti- 
poverty policy-making was reaffirmed by views of UN senior officials as noted 
here: 
At the onset of the crisis, all UN agencies undertook several short-term 
measures in response to the crisis. A number of studies and discussion 
sessions/meetings were conducted by several UN agencies such as the 
ILQ UNDP, UNICEF, and WHO, which provided analyses and 
technical inputs for the government. Apart from this, I think most UN 
agencies allocated their budget to support projects that responded to 
the crisis. The UNDP worked with the World Bank in the SIP. But since 
our funding was so minimal, we could contribute only our support to 
some project management aspects ... well, in recent years, we were 
under budget constraints, so the funding to support Thailand had been 
reduced so much. We even had to lay offsome staff.... (Interview Io4) 
... 
The Thailand-UNCAP launched in 1997 was another vehicle through 
which UN agencies provided collective response to the crisis. The 
Poverty Strategies Initiatives was created under the Thailand-UNCAP 
in collaboration with the FAO, ILO, UNDP, and NESDB to provide 
intermediate and long-term measures to alleviate impacts of the crisis. 
But this has slowed down and declined... (Interview Io5) 
The decline of UN involvement in anti-poverty policy was due to several reasons, 
as reflected in the views of former and current senior UN officers: 
1 The UN system in Thailand is large and complex. It consists of over 28 specialised 
UN agencies 
or affiliated projects and organisations of which the majority 
have an Asia-Pacific regional or sub- 
regional focus and are based in Bangkok (UNCT, 2005). 
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There was a change in the Resident Representative [RR] of UMDP, who 
was also the Resident Coordinator of the UN system in Thailand The 
new RR was interested in governance reform, not poverty... So for the 
UNDP, the poverty reduction focus was toned down ... Another thing, the UVDP was in a situation of identity crisis at the global level. We 
specialised in fund management, but when the fund began to be 
reduced, this role became less significant... We did not have any specific 
agenda like other UN agencies such as the UNICEF hadfor children, 
the UNIFEM hadfor women, or the ILO hadfor labour. At one point, 
we thought we shouldfocus on people-centred development, but later 
the World Bank moved to this area with a large chunk of funding 
backing it up. Wefinalli, found our way with afocus on MDGs. Poverty 
reduction was just one of the goals. So now we no longer focus on 
poverty but on MDGs. (interview lo'3) 
... All in all, the Thai government managed to recoverfrom the crisis on 
its own. Further, Thailand developed into a middle-income country 
status. The government desired to become a donor country assisting the 
poorer countries within and outside our region through its 'Forward 
Engagement'foreign policy, so Thailand is consolidating her position 
as an emerging donor... Thailand is no longer a poor countryftom the 
view of UN agencies. The relationship between Thailand and the UN 
must changefrom that of donor-receiver to partners in development. So 
now we cannot work on the poverty agenda directly as in the past 
because Thailand now can stand on her own without any help from the 
UN Thus, we must now find other approaches to working with the 
government. (Interview 1o4) 
These two interviews reflect the evolving relationship between Thailand and 
international agencies. While the involvement of UN agencies in the national anti- 
poverty policy with the NESDB has faded and the UN country programme for 
Thailand has become more financially modest (UNCT, 2002), the World Bank 
has remained actively engaged via the NESDB. The rest of this chapter will focus 
on the relationship between the Bank and the Thai state since the 1997 crisis. In 
order to trace the dynamic interaction between these two agents, it investigates 
how the Bank responded to the crisis, how it worked with the Thai government, 
which policies it employed, why it took such action, and how the Thai state acted 
in response. 
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3. Initial engagement: Promoting community governance 
During the early stages of the 1997 crisis, the IMF became the most influential 
international organisation in shaping Thailand's policy agenda. With foreign 
reserves exhausted by mid-1997, the Thai government inevitably had to call for 
help from the IMF. This situation allowed the IMF to take control of Thailand's 
economic policy-making through its negotiation of Thailand's Letters of Intent. 
The policy package consisted of a macro plan adapted from the IMF's long record 
of bailouts in Latin America 2. However, the underlying causes of the financial 
crises in Latin America were very different from those in Thailand which meant 
that, ultimately, the IMF plan for Thailand did not work. There were extensive 
social consequenceS3 as a result of this IMF package. 
Although the IMF took over an economic policy legacy laid down by the World tn 
Bank, the Bank was initially involved in the recovery process by promoting 
liberalisation and regulatory reform in Thailand's financial restructuring. The 
Bank's immediate policies and programmes after the crisis were driven by its 
economic liberal orthodoxy of pressing the Thai government to continue and 
extend its liberalisation process (Robinson et al., 2002). However, as the crisis 
deepened, there were rapidly increasing fears about the emergence of social 
conflict resulting from the negative impact of reform measures as were happening 
in Indonesia. Accordingly, the Bank recognised that it should assist the Thai 
government in alleviating negative social impacts of the crisis (Nabi and 
Shivakumar, 2001). The IMF then took a lead role in setting the reform agenda 
through the negotiation of Letters of Intent, whereas the Bank attended more to 
social impacts. As such, the Bank began to emphasise the idea of social safety 
I They were to raise taxes (value added tax from 7 to 10 percent); to cut government spending 
by 
20 percent; to implement tight monetary policy and high interest rates; to increase access 
for 
foreign investors, starting with banking sector; to privatise key sectors, including energy, 
transportation, utilities, and communications; to promote legal reforms on 
bankruptcy and 
foreclosure; and to enhance transparency in many ways. 
3 Discussions of the effects of the IMF's packages have been discussed elsewhere such as 
in 
Hewison (2005) and Robinson el al. (2002). For a full account of the aftermath of the policy 
package adopted by the Thai government during the period, see 
Pasuk and Baker (2000) in 
Chapter 3 and Pasuk and Baker (2002) in Chapter 5. 
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nets for those who had been disadvantaged by liberalised markets, especially the 
poor (Hewison, 2002) 
In 1998, the Bank developed a social safety net programme entitled the Social 
Investment Project (SIP) to help reduce the social consequences caused by the 
crisis and also to support the reform agenda of decentralisation and community- 
based development initiated by Thailand-UNCAP (World Bank, 1998). The Bank 
and other donor agencies 4 supported the project, estimated at a total cost of 
US$418.49 million, but the Bank was the main contributor. The project"s first 
priority was to 'respond to the social impacts of the crisis though the rapid 
generation of employment opportunities and the provision of essential social 
services to the unemployed and the poor. ' The second priority aimed to 'support 
bottom-up service delivery through financing local ly- identified and managed 
development initiatives... promoting decentralisation, local capacity building, and 
community development' (World Bank, 1998: 3). These priorities could be seen 
to reflect the Bank's important reorientation towards supporting local 
communities as a means of helping the poor in Thailand after several decades of 
macro economic growth focus. 
To achieve its dual objectives, SIP scheme had two channels of implementation 
(World Bank, 1998). The first channel was social investment through various 
ministerial programmes to support existing short-term government programmes 
over a period of approximately 28 months 5. This component aimed at providing 
jobs and basic social services to the unemployed and poor though short-term 
4 Other donors are the United Nations Development Programme, the Overseas Economic Co- 
operation Fund of Japan, and the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAid). 
5 The Channel I component constituting US$ 244.35 million included: (a) the development of a 
public assistance low income Health Card Scheme and a community-based AIDS programme by 
the Ministry of Public Health; (b) small-weirs construction and village road construction by the 
Ministry of Interior; (c) a programme for rural industrial development by the Ministry of Industry; 
(d) a small scale infrastructure programme, a occupational and vocational training programme, and 
a school renovation programme by the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration; (e) a 
training/interpretation programme, a tourism sites employment programme and a park and 
recreational sites improvement programme by the Tourism Authority of Thailand; (f) the 
rehabilitation of small-scale labour-intensive irrigation schemes by the Royal 
Irrigation 
Department of Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives; and (g) several job training programmes 
by the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. 
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interventions. It utilised existing government capacities, to deliver activities to the 
target population over a short timeframe. The second channel, allocated 
US$174.14 million, was a long-term component. It was geared towards social 
investment through community development funds, which provided grant and 
loan financing for locally generated projects through the Regional Urban 
Development Fund (RUDF) and Social Investment Fund (SIF). This second 
channel presented a preliminary step towards the promotion of community 
governance in which financial resources were channelled to support community- 
based projects directly rather than channelling the financial resources through the 
bureaucracy as usual. It was expected that the Fund would encourage 
communities to initiate and implement their own projects with support funded by 
SIF. A total of US$132.57 million was allocated to SIF. Details of SIT were 
discussed in Chapter 5, but it is important to note here that the Bank's 
reorientation towards a community-based focus was not initiated by the Bank 
alone but rather by its negotiation with domestic social forces. NGOs that pursued 
community empowerment initiatives used this opportunity to channel resources 
towards their agendas. A SIF manager, who was a senior NGO person reflected: 
At first, the Bank wanted to channel the whole lot of funds through 
government agencies. But we, some of the senior NGOs and academics, 
approached the Bank and 'sold' our idea of using this opportunity to 
strengthen the poor and local communities. We were a aid that the Or 
funds would not fully reach the poor due to corruption in the 
bureaucratic system, so we convinced the Bank to try a new approach... 
It was hard... the Bank seemed reluctant to try it... so it involved 
several discussions, butfinally the Bank accepted our proposal... But in 
the process of implementation, it was difficult to make the Bank fully 
accept our approach. The Bank still intervened and very often exercised 
strict control over the disbursement procedures. We needed about a 
year of negotiation and discussion to adjust our process and make the 
Bank understand our way. (Interview Ng 1) 
His reflection supports an observation that the Bank attempted to retain some 
control over the Fund, even though the major institutional and implementation 
arrangements of SIP, claimed by the Bank, were handed over to the 
Thai 
government. Executing agencies for the Channel I programme were government 
ministries or government agencies, while the GSB was an executing agency 
for 
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the Channel 2 programme. The Project Coordination Unit (PCU) was set up to 
carry out day-to-day coordination with the Project Implementation Units (PlUs) in 
each implementing agency. PCU also had to oversee the overall Project's finance. 
accounting, and procurement. PCU was attached to the Ministry of Finance. The 
PCU prepared monitoring reports on project implementation for the Project 
Director, who in turn reported to the Policy Steering Committee (PSC) and the 
Bank. The PSC set policies, approved any major changes in Project's objectives 
or components, and oversaw the Project's implementation process. 
However, when looking at these arrangements in detail, the Bank's intervention 
was still considerable in many ways (World Bank, 1998). First, the composition 
and staffing of the PSC, PCU, and PlUs was subject to the Bank's approval. 
Second, the roles, responsibilities, and skills of the Project Director. PIU 
Directors, and SIF and RUDF Assistant Executive Directors were specified by the 
Bank. Candidates selected for such positions were subject to the Bank*s approval. 
Further, no modification was made to their roles and responsibilities without the 
Bank's approval. Third, loan payments were separated into several instalments 
and were approved by the Bank if certain conditions and progress were 
satisfactorily achieved at each stage of the Project. The Bank and Thai 
government agreed to specific significant activities and progress, and the Thai 
government was bonded to achieve them. Even the Bank itself claimed later that, 
after the Project started, its supervision was 'continuous and intensive' (World 
Bank, 2005: 15). Supervision missions that included staff with social fund 
experience were conducted regularly. The Bank's field-based staff provided day- 
to-day procurement and financial management support to the PCU and PlUs. 
Therefore, the 1997 crisis gave an opportunity for the Bank to move forward into 
new national policy areas which would not have been politically 
feasible during 
the boom years. Although the Bank's engagement in domestic policy-making 
increased sharply during the crisis, especially through the SIP that 'came after a 
decade of very minimal Bank engagement in Thailand' (World Bank, 
2005: 3), 
the relationship between the Bank and Thailand began to readjust after the crisis. 
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4. Realigning towards a partnership mode of governance 
In 1998, the World Bank's Operations Evaluation Department (OED) assessed the 
assistance given to Thailand up to the 1997 crisis and reported its findings in 
Thailand-Country Assistance Evaluation (OED, 2000). The report was presented 
to the Committee on Development Effectiveness (CODE) as background 
information for the new Country Assistance Strategy (CA S)6 for 1999. The 
Bank"s view was that, after the economy had recovered from the second oil shock 
in early 1980s and private capital started pouring into the country, the Thai 
authorities 'felt that they could do without the Bank's policy advice' (OED, 2000: 
19). The Bank went on to argue that between 1994 and 1996, the share of private 
creditors rose to 88 percent while that of the Bank fell to 1.2 percent. In addition, 
the overall share of the Bank's budget allocated to Thailand was low. For the 
1997 fiscal year, it amounted to US$3 million against a norm of US$5.6 million. 
The report emphasised that during the pre-crisis period, the Bank 'had no policy 
leverage from its lending' (OED 2000: 16). The Bank asserted that Thailand had 
developed from a low-income to a middle-income country and that over time it 
had reduced its reliance on the Bank's assistance. This situation meant that its 
mode of engagement with Thailand needed to be changed as was echoed in a 
comment from a Bank officer in Thailand: 
Although the Bank's role increased sharply during the crisis, it did not 
mean our engagement would lastfor long. We thought that if the Bank 
wanted to maintain its involvement in Thailand, it needed to reconsider 
its relationship with Thailand... an important reason the Bank still 
wants to retain influence in Thailand is the Bangkok Country Office is a 
regional hub supporting the Bank's programmes in the Greater Mekong 
7 Sub-region ... 
(Interview Iol) 
6 The Bank prepares its CAS to delineate selective programmes for Bank Group's support in a 
country's development strategy for poverty reduction as based on the Bank Group's comparative 
advantage in the context of other donor activities (World Bank, 2005a). CAS 
includes a 
comprehensive diagnosis of the development challenges facing the country, key areas where the 
Bank Group's assistance can have the biggest impact on poverty reduction, support of the Bank to 
the country, and the framework of targets and indicators to monitor the implementation process. 
The Bank usually claims that CAS is developed in consultation with country authorities, civil 
society organizations, development partners, and other stakeholders. 
This includes Thailand, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, and Mongolia. 
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CODE's response was to recommend that the Bank should: 
... try to develop new products, and more carefully articulated strategies 
geared towards countries which are on the verge of graduation... the Bank should be selective and focus its interventions in areas where 
there was a strong support for reforms, and needed to work in close 
association with Thai counterparts... (OED, 2000: 37) 
The OED's report then closed with a very interesting paragraph: 
Thailand may need considerable assistance from the Bank now. But it 
requested limited assistance during the ten years preceding the crisis 
and the same situation may prevail when the crisis is over. The case of 
Thailand 
... applies to other countries that gain substantial access to international capital markets. How should the Bank deal with such 
countries? (OED, 2000: 25) 
In other words, the case of Thailand pushed the Bank to seek alternative strategies 
of engaging with middle-income countries. Following this report, the 
Development Committee reviewed the Bank's role and instruments in supporting 
country development in low- and middle-income countries. The Bank decided to 
continue its role in helping poverty reduction in middle-income countries. A task 
force was created to consider how the Bank could best respond to the needs of 
those middle-income countries. Because of the diversity in middle-income 
countries, the task force recommended the use of the CAS process to customise 
the Bank support programme for each country (Development Committee, 2001). 
This sign of change again became evident in 2002. The Bank's internal Quality 
Assurance Group reviewed the Bank's analytical and advisory services in 
Thailand for its 1999-2001 CAS8 and identified some important systemic lessons 
' This CAS, developed at the height of the crisis, was built around three critical elements: 
renewing the country's competitiveness, improving governance, and ensuring a more equitable 
distribution of the benefits of growth. In line with Thailand's Eighth Plan, this CAS pursued 
several objectives (World Bank, 1999). First, to renew Thailand's competitiveness, the 
Bank 
supported the building of a sound financial sector and the enhancement of effective government 
capacity to set rules for the market. The aim of these policies was to further 
improve Thailand's 
economic interests, improve the quality of its workforce, remove export 
infrastructure bottlenecks, 
and to provide an effective framework for corporate restructuring. Second, to 
improve governance, 
the Bank supported efforts to improve macroeconomic management to achieve economic stability 
and strengthen public administrative, legal, and regulatory frameworks, which would 
in turn 
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for future engagement of the Bank. One example of a lesson learned was that the 
analytical and advisory programme must be 'selective, well-focused, and driven 
by client ownership with medium-term engagement' (World Bank 2002: 13). The 
change was instituted in the process of formulating the new CAS in 2003 when 
the partnership approach was implemented. However, before the new CAS was 
formed and in addition to an internal awareness of the need for change within the 
Bank, there was a change in the Thai government in 2001. The new Government 
came to power with a new policy agenda and measures. The Thai state under the 
new government seemed to reorient its relationship with external actors and tried 
to minimise their engagement (see interviews with the Prime Minister in Pran, 
2004; Bangkok Post, 28 August 2003; The Nation, 29 May 2003). 
The TRT government made the state central to poverty alleviation programmes 
which was an approach fundamentally rejected by the Bank. The new government 
not only presented a new anti-poverty policy approach as a specific countermove 
to the Bank's approach but also announced a new policy toward its relationship 
with external assistance. The government explicitly stated its decision to reduce 
its reliance on external assistance. During the last CAS, the Bank's lending to 
Thailand between 1998 and 2000 was planned at US$3.4 billion but actual 
lending amounted US$ 2.1 billion, even less than the Bank's projection in the 
worst case scenario. The Bank delivered no new projects between October 1999 
and 2002. This decline in demand for Bank's lending was due largely to the 
government's emphasis on managing public debt and reducing external financing 
(World Bank, 2002). This direction was further emphasised when the TRT 
government came to power in 2001. The new government appeared uninterested 
in the economic policies of the former government and equally uninterested in the 
IMF's and the Bank's advice. Following the 2001 election, the Bank 
representatives met with the Prime Minister and other leading party executives 
in 
March 2001. The result was not entirely satisfactory, with the Bank indicating no 
more than a broad agreement with the government's policies (World Bank, 
2001). 
ensure a fair competition. Third, to share growth and ensure a 
better quality of life, the Bank 
supported efforts to mitigate social costs of adjustment, to empower 
local communities, to reform 
social security system, and to preserve the natural environment. 
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In 2002, there was a major turning point when the government started to 
reconsider its policy towards external assistance. The Bank's SIF was ten-ninated 
in late 2002 when the government decided not to seek additional Bank finances 
for this kind of programme because local development initiatives across the 
country were supported through the VURF policy. In early 2003, the Prime 
Minister declared that Thailand was becoming a non aid-recipient country and 
that it would pursue a Forward Engagement foreign policy, which essentially 
meant that Thailand was aiming to become an emerging donor country (Thaksin, 
2003). In July 2003, the government managed to repay all debts owed to the IMF, 
which freed it from all conditions attached to loans borrowed since the beginning 
of the crisis. Following a cabinet meeting on 29th November 2003, the government 
came up with a resolution that Thailand would no longer receive any foreign aid 
and loans from other international organisations or countries except when there 
were no attached conditional ities that could disadvantage or treat Thailand as an 
unequal partner (SOC, 2003). One Bank officer commented on this change, 
stating: 
Not only was this a shift in Thailand's status towards a middle-income 
country status, this change in the governments position towards 
external assistance also forced us to find alternative means o engaging 
with Thailand if we were still to remain active in our involvement... in 
the old days we gave loans but because of the neit, approach we relied 
more on knowledge sharing and technical assistance... if the 
government would not 'buy' our proposals, our attempt would have 
become ineffective... we needed to do something that supports the 
government... (Interview Io I) 
An initial change in the Bank's approach was observed in the process of 
developing the new CAS. The Bank spent time from February 2001 to October 
2002 - nearly 18 months - on a consultation process seeking to establish what 
role the Bank should play in post-crisis Thailand (World Bank, 2003a). In 2001, 
the Bank organised consultative meetings with civil society representatives9 while 
9 They included (1) meeting with civil society representatives in the Southern region in February; 
(2) meeting with eight international NGO representatives in February; (3) meeting with civil 
society representatives in the Northern region in March; and (4) meeting 
between key civil society 
representatives and the Bank's Regional Vice President in March. 
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in 2002, the Bank conducted workshops and discussions with a wide range of 
stakeholders. 10 One emerging theme was the need for the Bank to place a greater 
emphasis on knowledge provision and transfer, catalysing and bridging the 
development process, as well as capacity building and learning. Added to this, the 
National Economic and Social Advisory Council was concerned with the unequal 
status in the relationship and suggested a change in the title of CAS from 
assistance to partnership. ' The Bank claimed that this process made the Bank 
reorient its outlook and position towards a partnership. The Bank noted that, in 
light of feedback from the government, the CAS for the fiscal year 2003-2005 was 
entitled Thailand-World Bank Group Partnership for Development, which 
reflected the changing nature of the Bank's engagement in Thailand. The Bank 
went on to claim that the relationship between Thailand and the Bank Group has 
progressed 'from primarily a borrower-lender relationship toward a true 
development partnership' (World Bank, 2002: 26). 
The Bank subsequently concluded that its engagement in Thailand should 
comprise of two complementary levels (World Bank, 2002). The first level would 
be to monitor and diagnose Thailand's performance and key development 
challenges across all areas of the national agenda. The Bank's four monitor series 
- Economic, Social, Environment, and Country Dialogue - were produced for this 
purpose. Here, the Bank tried to institute systematic means of influence though 
the 'dialogue' approach (Burden, 1998), which implicitly intended to foster a 
political climate conducive to its interest. One of the earliest Thailand Social 
Monitor Reports was entitled Poverty and Public Policy (World Bank, 200 1 a). 
10 They were (1) meeting with the Government Advisory Working Group, some 25 working-level 
representatives from various government agencies who interact regularly with the Bank, in April, 
June and September; (2) several meetings with the Minister of Finance and senior policy makers 
from key agencies such as the Fiscal Policy Office, the Public Debt Management Office, and the 
NESDB; (3) meeting with representatives of key donor agencies including the Japanese Bank for 
International Cooperation (JBIC), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), Gen-nan Technical 
Cooperation (GTZ), and AusAid in March; (4) several meetings and workshops with private sector 
representatives; (5) meeting with parliamentarians in October; (6) meeting with the 
National 
Economic and Social Advisory Council in July; (7) meeting with key leaders of national civil 
society organizations in March; and (8) meeting with local civil society organizations and 
community leaders in the Northeastern region in July. 
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The impact of such serial reports in providing inputs into anti-poverty policy 
formulation was questioned as one NESDB officer commented: 
These international organisations offered some study grants or 
provided international experts to support us in the areas where we 
needed help. But when we made policy, we did it on our own. The 
-y 
did 
not have authority over our policy. We used our database, and we set 
our own agendas. Some agendas werefrom the government, some were 
ftom our previous studies within the NESDB... OK, the Bank's reports 
offered some thoughts on current issues, but the policy-making was 
more of our own business ... (I ntervi ew Go 10) 
The second level was in-depth implementation support in a few critical areas, 
including poverty alleviation, as identified and agreed with the government. The 
Country Development Partnership (CDP), launched in 2000, was a new 
instrument developed to help the Bank remain engaged in Thailand's policy- 
making process. The Bank claimed that the CDP was 'a cornerstone of the Bank's 
implementation support to Thailand' (World Bank, 2002: 26). The criteria of 
engagement at this level were made explicit, as 'it engaged only in areas where 
there is an explicit request and upfront agreement with the government as 
evidenced by an exchange of letters of support and the scale of resources 
committed... and only if the government has developed a clear and specific 
programme linked to outcomes... ' (World Bank, 2002: 27). 
Such orientations exemplified a shift in the Bank's role in Thailand away from 
policy intervention and more towards diagnosing and monitoring Thailand's 
performance. Accordingly, implementation support was limited to only the 
selected critical issues of Thailand's overall national development agenda. The 
Bank believed that this kind of partnership was 'seen by all stakeholders in 
Thailand as the most effective means for the Bank Group to help accelerate 
growth and reduce poverty' (World Bank, 2002: 26). The next section 
investigates 
in detail the case of the CDP for Poverty Analysis and Monitoring (CDP-PAM) to 
assess how the new instrument helped the Bank to remain engaged with 
Thailand. 
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5. Investigating partnership: The case of CDP-PAM 
CDP is a three-year integrated framework for action in key areas of the country's 
development agenda (World Bank, 2004). It specifies objectives and action 
programmes and also identifies the technical assistance needed to support the 
programme. It is an agreement between the government, the Bank, and other 
partners to work together on specific challenges identified by the government in 
its development agenda. As a CDP project officer explained: 
Generally, each CDP is developed by the government, with support 
ftom other partners [including the Bank] as requested CDP is executed 
in partnership with local stakeholders. Some might need technical 
assistance and capacity building support from external partners ... the Bank is only one partner among many and may take the lead on a 
limited number of issues as requestedfrom the government in an area 
where the Bank has comparative advantage in being a partner. The 
Bank's engagement in each CDP can be different. It can take the form 
of analytical and advisory activities, technical assistance, donor 
coordination, or investment projects. At the moment there is no other 
countri, that works with the Bank through the CDP except Thailand. 
The Bank developed this instrumentfor the work between the Bank and 
Thailand specifically. The Bank has a plan to apply the CDP instrument 
to work with the Malaysian government as well. (interview Jo2) 
This in-depth investigation of CDP-PAM focuses on two critical aspects: project 
formulation and governing structure. The project was initiated by the Bank as the 
same officer recalled: 
When the crisis hit Thailand, the poverty problem was highlighted and 
brought to the top of the national policy agenda. Poverty alleviation 
was emphasised as the prime national agenda. This issue reached our 
attention while we were seekingfor an area of collaboration after SIF, - 
plus this area fall into our expertise... so based on a long-standing 
relationship with the NESDB, we then a roached the NESDB to 
initiate theproject. (Interview Io2) 
The development of CDP-PAM took place in October 2001 when the first 
preparatory mission with experts from the Bank was conducted to establish a 
partnership with the NESDB, some other government agencies, and 
local 
academic institutes (PCU, 2003). CDP-PAM was developed at the time when 
the 
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NESDB was formulating the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) aimed at 
operational ising the poverty alleviation strategy defined in the Ninth NESDP 
(NESDB, 2002a). One Bank project officer noted that: 
The Bank decided to support this PRS, which was formulated by the NESDB, and to use it as a basisfior developing CDP-PAM... in some 
countries we have supported the government in drafting the PRS as a 
condition for loans. But in Thailand's case, the NESDB had developed 
its own PRS already, so we used it as a basisforfuture collaboration... (Interview Iol) 
During the preparation stage, the NESDB and the Bank collaborated closely and 
finally launched CDP-PAM in May 2002. Following that, the NESDB discussed 
with the Bank to establish the framework for collaboration with CDP-PAM. The 
framework determined the scope. area, and activities being pursued by all 
participating agencies in CDP-PAM. It was finally concluded that activities to be 
supported under CDP-PAM would be approved if they met two criteria (NESDB, 
2004: 4). First, they had to be identified by the government as priority areas with a 
reform agenda in the poverty reduction area, and second, they must complement 
the expertise and ongoing work programmes of other development partners. The 
activities of the CDP-PAM in the first phase are listed in Table 10. A NESDB 
official commented on the development of the project priorities: 'Four themes 
were defined by us, based on the expertise of the NESDB and with some 
consultation with the Bank, to support the poverty alleviation agenda. Therefore, 
most of the themesfocused on analytical work instead of operations at the ground 
level' (Interview Go9). This statement again shows that the NESDB was able to 
set and control the agenda it wanted to pursue, not only in its broad agenda but 
also in its framework for collaboration. 
Although CDP was believed to function as 'a vehicle for engaging civil society, 
private sector, and other partners in policy design, implementation, and 
monitoring process' (World Bank, 2003: 3), no evidence confirmed that either 
civil society or the private sector was involved in the project design. Instead, 
given that CDP-PAM was meant to operationalise the PRS drafted by the 
NESDB, this statement seems to suggest that the Bank has followed a policy 
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agenda defined by the Thai government and that the NESDB appeared to be a 
core decision-maker in the project formulation. However, its governing structure 
requires further investigation. CDP-PAM employed a relatively complex 
governing structure with at least three levels of governance: the Steering 
Committee (SC), the Project Coordination Unit (PCU), and operating agencies 
(NESDB, 2004). 
Table 10: Activities under CDP-PAM 
Themes Activities Agencies* 
Poverty database 1. Poverty mapping TDRI, NESDB, 
development NSO, WB 
2. Panel data for Socio-economic Survey NSO, WB, NESDB 
3. Poverty database development for poverty NESDB, MOI, 
research phase 11 KKU, NSO 
4. Factor analysis NESDB 
Measurement and 
analysis of poverty, 
inequality. and 
vulnerability 
5. Review of poverty line methodology NESDB, UNESCAP, 
UNDP 
6. Income distribution in Thailand 
7. Gender and poverty 
NESDB 
NESDB 
Development of poverty 8. Empirical study on poverty TDRI, NESDB 
reduction strategies 
9. Preparation for community plan development NESDB 
10. Piloting one stop services in communities NESDB 
Poverty monitoring and 11. National Millennium Development Goals 
NESDB, UNDP, WB 
evaluation Report 
*The first name was meant to be the lead agency in each activity. 
Source: NESDB (2003) 
KKU: Khon Kaen University 
MOL Ministry of Interior 
NSO: National Statistical Office 
TDRI: Thailand Development Research Institute 
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme 
UNESCAP: United Nations for Economic and Social Cooperation 
for Asia Pacific 
WB: World Bank 
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At the policy level, the SC was established to ensure successful implementation of 
CDP-PAM and its consistency with the government's overall poverty reduction 
framework. During the first phase of its operation, the committee consisted of 
twelve representatives. All members of the SC were from relevant departments 
within the NESDB with no representatives from the Bank, other donors, or civil 
society (PCU, 2003). During the second phase, some other related government 
agencies were included. However, the NESDB retained its share of 
representatives, as did donors and civil society who continued to have no 
representatives at all. There are now eight members on the committee: 
1) The Deputy General- Secretary of the NESDB as the Chair; 
2) Director, the Macro Economic Planning Office, the NESDB; 
3) Director, the Quality of Life and Social Development Office, the 
NESDB; 
4) Director, the Community Economic Development and Income 
Distribution Office, the NESDB; 
5) Director, the Social and Economic Statistics Office, the National 
Statistical Office; 
6) Director, the Planning and Strategy Office, Ministry of Social 
Development and Human Security; 
7) CDP-PAM Project Director; and 
8) CDP-PAM Project Manager. 
The committee had a mandate for the following specific tasks 
(NESDB, 2004): 
Reviewing the objectives and activities under CDP-PAM to ensure its 
consistency with the governmenVs overall poverty alleviation policies; 
Providing guidance and suggestions regarding the implementation of 
CDP-PAM; and 
0 Approving terms of reference 
for all activities under CDP-PAM as 
proposed by the PCU. 
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The SC played a dominant role in approving activities, and this mandate validated 
that CDP-PAM was endorsed as a NESDB-driven agenda. The function of the SC 
showed that the NESDB exercised full authority over decision-making with little 
input from the Bank. One employee of the Bank said that 'the composition of the 
committee both in the first and second phase was determined by the NESDB 
ii, ithout the Bank's involvement' (Interview Io2) while another officer explained: 
The committee meets monthly or bi-monthly, subject to meeting 
agendas, I, as a representative ftom the World Bank, have been invited 
to attend every meeting but as an observer who has no legitimate 
mandate in making any decision, although the Chair asks my opinion 
sometimes. (Interview Iol) 
At the management level, PCU was set up to support and be responsible for all 
CDP-PAM management and finance issues (PCU, 2003). The PCU was under the 
close supervision of the SC to ensure transparency of CDP-PAM management. 
The PCU consisted of 5 members: Project Director, Project Manager, Project 
Advisor, Project Coordinator, and Finance Officer. A member of the PCU said 
that 'only the Director and Advisor were ftom the NESDB; the rest were recruited 
ftom the outside' (Interview lo2). The PCU managed logistical work for the 
NESDB in implementing and overseeing day-to-day progress of the project. 
Specific roles of PCU were as follows (PCU, 2003): 
0 Providing technical assistance to all partners under CDP-PAM, in 
collaboration with the Bank and the NESDB, in the project 
development process ranging from setting objectives, approaches, 
outputs, and action plans; 
Serving as a core centre for coordinating between the NESDB, the 
Bank, and all partners to strengthen the cooperation and smooth the 
process of implementation; 
Assisting the NESDB in managing all financial issues; 
Assisting partners in drafting the terms of reference of each activity to 
assure that they were consistent with the framework of CDP-PAM; and 
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Organising necessary discussion forums, workshops, and a series of 
Steering Committee meetings to ensure smoothness and transparenc', ", 
in CDP-PAM implementation. 
The PCU coordinated with each sub-project manager, who in turn was responsible 
for executing each activity under CDP-PAM. Each activity was accountable to the 
PCU in that its executing agency had to submit a progress report every month. 
The PCU used the reports as an instrument to monitor the progress and financial 
disbursements for each activity. In addition, the PCU organised a mid-term review 
every six months and produced a CDP-PAM annual report as an additional 
monitoring system. 
At the operational level, CDP-PAM claimed that it 'encouraged partnership with 
all stakeholders to enhance the implementation of poverty alleviation' (NESDB, 
2004: 5). A list of partners in the project is presented in Table 10. While other 
agencies were involved in some activities, the NESDB retained its role as a focal 
agency and maintained some level of control over other participating agencies. 
The role of the Bank in some activities was about supporting experts as external 
consultants. According to one of the PCU members: 
Each partner needed to submit a proposal of what it planned to do and 
get it approvedfrom the SC. This was to ensure that all activities met 
the grandftamework.. most of these partners were in the circle of the 
NESDB's network... those who used to work with the NESDB before... 
and were approached purposively at the early stage when CDP-PAM 
requested proposal submission. The process was not open for public 
consultation or in a competitive fashion as it was in SIF.. (Interview 
Io2) 
From the analysis of CDP-PAM's governing structure, it could be suggested that 
the government agencies, the NESDB in particular, have played a significant role 
in the governing process of CDP-PAM since the beginning of the project and 
in 
its implementation through all three levels of governance. International agencies, 
or the Bank in particular, maintained involvement but with only marginal 
page 138 
Chapter 7 State and Globalised Forces 
influence on the project development and day-to-day activities. Other domestic 
non-state actors, especially civil society, had no involvement in the CDP-PAM. 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the debate concerning the nexus between 
globalisation and domestic policy-making process. It has focused on the dynamic 
interactions between the Thai state and international agencies in domestic policy 
governance. The work and role of the World Bank in relation to the Thai state in 
anti-poverty policy was used as a case for investigation. It is clear that the Bank's 
mode of engagement with Thailand changed after the crisis, yet the partnership 
governance was the Bank's strategy to maintain its influence in Thailand. 
Once Thailand became more engaged with the global market and was able to 
access trans-national capital, the influence of the Bank in domestic policy 
formulation began to decline although its legacy in national development planning 
remained to some extent. However, when the crisis hit Thailand, the Thai state 
lost its capacity to manage impacts of the crisis by itself alone and thus needed to 
request help from international organisations. The Bank"s role and intervention 
became much more prominent but nonetheless to some extent it reoriented its 
focus to give greater emphasis to a social policy agenda to address poverty and the 
poor (social safety net). SIP allowed the Bank to retain its active involvement 
during the crisis. At this stage, it might appear that the Bank promoted community 
governance in Thailand via SIF, but the idea had originally been proposed by 
societal actors, particularly communitarian advocates. SIF was delivered though a 
newly established executing agency instead of relying on the bureaucratic system 
as had been done previously. However, the Bank exercised its extensive control 
over the operation of these agencies. The Bank further maintained its supervision 
and control through its power to approve key decisions of SIF. The relationship 
between the Thai state and international players during this time could be viewed 
as a case of the state lacking the capacity to manage its domestic affairs 
(such as 
the crisis), with globalised forces in a position to exercise power over the 
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domestic policy agenda, thereby intervening in the country's internal matters via 
conditions attached to financial assistance. By providing the necessary financial 
resources during a time of crisis, globalised actors were in a strong bargaining 
position in negotiations with domestic players. Key policy decisions remained in 
the hands of international players with some inputs from other actors. 
Following the crisis, the Bank began to re-appraise its work in Thailand and 
realised that the way it worked with the Thai government needed to change. As 
Thailand moved in the direction of becoming a middle-income country requiring 
less external assistance, the Bank had to reframe the type of assistance it gave 
Thailand. Another factor was the new government that came to power in 2001. 
This new government was uncomfortable with international agencies' 
involvement in domestic affairs. The government later promulgated its non aid- 
recipient position and announced a policy oriented towards less dependence on 
external assistance. Such changes in the Thai state's policy position pressured the 
Bank to readjust its strategy in order to remain engaged with Thailand, as 
portrayed in the most recent CAS development process and the development of 
the CDP initiative. Two variables that help in explaining the nature of the 
relationship between domestic institutions and external globalised actors are the 
degree of state capacity and its policy towards external assistance. 
At this stage, it is observed that once Thailand began to recover from the crisis 
and was able to regain its capacity to manage its own state of affairs, it then 
started to negotiate its place and position against external intervention. This 
reorientation indicates that international actors do not always determine the shape 
or outcomes of domestic policy agenda or its content, and that states can still 
retain a considerable degree of control over their domestic affairs. The degree of 
intervention of globalised forces over domestic policy-making is contingent on the 
state's capacity to manage its own domestic affairs as well as its policy towards 
external involvement via instruments of loans and other types of assistance. 
The 
level of country development is another important factor. Once a country moves 
from low-income to middle-income, it naturally implies that a country begins to 
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be more dependent on its own financial capacity and needs less financial 
assistance from international agencies. With less dependence on financial support, 
the channels that international agencies can use to intervene in domestic situations 
become more limited. If the international agency needs to retain its involvement, 
new instruments have to be developed. In Thailand's case, partnership governance 
was employed as a new strategy that the Bank used to help remain engaged with 
Thailand. However,, its role in the partnership was not necessarily prominent. 
CDP-PAM is a case confirming that once the state has changed its position and 
has some confidence in its capacity to manage its own affairs; the state can 
manoeuvre, operate, and negotiate its place within the globalised milieu. The case 
reflects that the state still has the capacity to manage or even resist the influence 
of globalised forces. Although the origination of CDP-PAM was claimed to be 
initiated by the Bank instead of requested from the government, its early 
development stage was significantly influenced by the NESDB. CDP-PAM was 
formed to support the poverty reduction strategy of the Thai government. In fact, 
the NESD13 could control and make decisions regarding project objectives and 
frames of collaboration between the Bank and government agencies. Further, 
contrary to what happened in SIF, the governing structure and daily operation of 
CDP-PAM was under the full control of the NESDB through the establishment of 
the SC and the operation of PCU with very limited inputs from the Bank. 
Although the Bank attempted to initiate a 'policy dialogue' through a series of 
Social and Economic Monitor Reports to influence policy-making in Thailand, 
these efforts appeared to have minimal impact on decision-making of the NESDB. 
Notably, the way that CDP-PAM was delivered favoured hierarchical governing 
structures rather than partnership governance. The participating agencies were 
selected by the NESDB with no civil society involvement. 
In this case, 
bureaucracy was an executing agent of state policy and power appeared to 
be 
concentrated in its hands. 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the main findings of this research in light 
of some existing theories and debates about governance and policy-making 
reviewed in Chapter 2. This research aims to contribute to our understanding of 
Thailand's governance configuration and its implications for the formulation and 
delivery of anti-poverty policy since the 1997 financial crisis. It qualitatively 
explores issues and tensions that have arisen in the process of governing. 
This research contributes to at least three major areas of scholarly debate. First, it 
contributes to studies of Thailand's governance and policy-making after the 1997 
crisis, an area which remains under-explored. The research investigates the 
interplay between the Thai state, societal players and international actors at the 
policy-making level, something which has not yet been thoroughly examined. It 
focuses on social policy, which is less researched than economic policy. Therefore 
this research offers an important angle that helps in understanding Thailand's 
governance. The role and influence of external forces are also seriously examined 
in this study; this helps to capture the full ramifications of Thai governance in the 
anti-poverty policy process. Second, this research contributes to a growing body 
of empirical work on governance and policy studies literature by providing some 
evidence of governance change in the context of developing countries. Third, the 
research contributes to debates about the role of the state in the context of 
globalisation, and it illustrates how the state has responded to external forces. This 
chapter is structured along these three themes of contribution. 
2. Thailand's governance configuration since 1997 
Emerging themes from the research findings suggest some dynamic patterns in the t) 
relationship between various actors involved in the governance of anti-poverty 
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policy since the 1997 crisis. These changing relationships became more evident 
when observed over the extended duration between 1997 and 20059 with a change 
of government in 2001 appearing to be a turning point. The changes produced 
different effects on the process of policy-making. This section uses three key 
parameters mentioned in Chapter 2- actors, processes, and modes of governing - 
to exemplify the evolution of Thailand's governance configuration. 
2.1 Actors 
After the crisis, it was observed that the capacity of the Thai state to steer society 
was weakened. The government was subject to serious budget cuts due to effects 
of the crisis. Accessing Thailand's core policy-making agency became less 
competitive because the crisis had weakened some of the strong, influential 
business interests which used to dominate Thailand's development agendas. This 
situation offered a wider 'social space' for societal actors to gain more access and 
involvement in the anti-poverty policy-making process. However, the 
participation was not an open process, but was biased in favour of insider groups 
connected to key policy-makers in the central policy planning agency and 
government. Participation was entirely subject to the discretion of the state that 
decided who would be allowed to participate. Therefore, only a few societal actors 
were still able to achieve access. A major state actor was the NESDB, a planning 
agency in this policy area. The NESDB selected only those societal actors who 
were believed to have some expertise or resources to help the state alleviate 
impacts of the crisis, especially the problem of poverty emergencies. A network of 
communitarian advocates was selected to take part in the process of drafting the 
national development plan and in this way, the advocates could gain influence 
over policy decisions and implementation. When the state set up NSPC, the same 
group of advocates remained involved. As for globalised actors, only the 
World 
Bank managed to have a prominent role in this policy area. The Bank reoriented 
its role to a position of actively supporting the poor. This permitted the 
Bank to 
access this policy arena. International NGOs, trans-national corporations, and 
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media did not have any involvement in national policy-making, nor did other 
government agencies or state actors. 
After the government changed in 2001, the state, or the TRT government in 
particular, managed to attain a strong position in governing the process of anti- 
poverty policy-making. Since the TRT came with a strong pro-poor policy 
platform and the determination to implement it, the role of the NESDB in making 
poverty alleviation policy soon began to diminish and the TRT government took 
over the main role of governing anti-poverty policy. New executive agencies. 
including the VURFO and NCPE, were established under the Prime Minister"s 
Office to take charge of anti-poverty initiatives in collaboration with the Ministry 
of Interior. Given this change within state actors, the poverty alleviation policy 
arena was still far from fully open to a broader participation by societal actors. 
Instead, the change reflected the capacity of the government to mould this policy 
arena and play a decisive role in choosing societal actors. Government held the 
power to determine which appropriate societal actors would be involved in its 
policy initiatives and which would not be. As a result, no new actor entered into 
the policy-making process, but only the same group of societal actors involved in 
the policy prior to 2001 was selected because of their connections with some key 
policy-makers. This group was held up by the government as representatives of 
the civil society sector. Notably, the involvement of these societal actors was 
perceived to be an essential condition legitimising the state and allowing it to 
retain its strong arm governing practices. The state could thereby claim to have 
non-state players participating in policy decision-making. The Bank managed to 
retain its engagement in this policy arena, but its role became insignificant with 
very little leverage over policy negotiation. There was still no significant 
involvement of any international NGO, trans-national corporation, parliamentary, 
media or domestic business player. 
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2.2 Governing processes 
Prior to 2001, the Thai state primarily depended on support from societal and 
globalised actors to establish its policy agenda, to define its priorities, to mobilise 
resources, and to implement action. Decision-making was assumed to be 
contingent on support from non-state actors in both the formation and 
implementation of policy. The principal style of decision-making was based on a 
participatory approach when inputs from society were needed. 
State agenda setting decisions during this period reflected the interests of societal 
and globalised actors to a greater extent. Although the final decisions were laid 
upon policy-makers in the NESDB, societal actors offered much input to the 
formation process of the Eighth and Ninth NESDPs, and were able to influence 
the thinking of NESDP policy-makers. An alliance of communitarian advocates, 
based on its networks and expertise in the community empowerment approach to 
poverty alleviation, was able to mainstream its agenda into these NESDPs through 
manipulating the NESDPs drafting process. Later this alliance worked with the 
government in NSPC and instrumentally made use of this committee to support its 
purpose by connecting poverty alleviation measures with the community 
empowerment agenda. In this way the advocates raised their pro-community 
agenda as a top policy priority. They smartly captured the anti-poverty agenda and 
interpreted the policy problem in a way that served their community 
empowerment agenda. 
The globalised actors were in a strong bargaining position in negotiations with 
domestic players due to their position as a major source of financial support 
during the crisis. However, in the area of anti-poverty policy, they did not initially 
have their own particular policy platform. Once they had decided to readjust some 
of their agendas toward the mitigation of the crisis and its effects on the poor, as 
well as to find a means by which to remain engaged in Thailand, the 
idea of 
promoting grassroots development through the investment fund was 
introduced. 
This idea matched what societal actors had advocated, so the agenda of 
both 
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parties converged through the community empowerment approach, particularly in 
the case of the World Bank's SIF. In this way, the Bank used anti-poverty policy 
as a platform for engagement in Thailand. 
The Thai state was also dependent on the support of non-state actors to implement 
policy. The Thai state depended on financial resources from the Bank in the 
government's crisis relief programme, which was evident in Channel I of the SIP 
scheme. At the same time, the state also depended on the networks and capacity of 
societal actors in its implementation of community empowerment programmes for 
poverty alleviation at the street-level. The interdependency between societal and 
globalised actors in the case of SIF could also be observed. It also appeared that 
the Bank relied on societal actors to implement its crisis mitigation programme, 
while societal actors depended on financial support from the Bank. However, 
while the SIF project was implemented by NGO people with Bank funding, it was Z-) 
observed that the Bank attempted to exercise some degree of control over the 
project's resources and closely monitored its progress. It must be noted that 
societal actors achieved the institutionalisation of a permanent agency to ensure a 
continuity of financial support from the government"s budget. SIF and CODI were 
evidence of this achievement. In particular, CODI assured that societal actors 
could continuously use this agency to propel their community empowen-nent 
agenda. 
It was clear that the economic crisis forced the Thai state to be less self-reliant and 
more inclined to operate through non-state actors and other forms of public- 
private joint action. With its limited capacity to provide resources, particularly 
financial resources, the state sought to play a coordinating role, bringing together 
resources from non-state actors at little direct cost to the public budget. However, 
involving non-state actors in the poverty alleviation programme did not mean that 
the Thai state lost its ability to control the process of policy-making and service 
delivery activities. Instead the Thai state was able to maintain its services to the 
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When the new government came to power, the Thai state began to be strengthened 
and became a dominant player in the governing process. Although societal actors 
provided some inputs at the initial stage when TRT first began to develop its anti- 
poverty policy, later decisions appeared to be largely determined by the TRT 
government while the role of the bureaucracy in policy decision-making began to 
deteriorate. Later, in the case of the Poverty Registration Scheme, the Thai state 
managed to take full control of redefining the anti-poverty agenda in terms of the 
state's view on social needs. Then it imposed its agenda intrusively onto society 
without society being accorded an opportunity to participate. This decision- 
making process was relatively decisive and made entirely by the state with no 
significant input from non-state actors. The role and influence of globalised actors 
were sharply diminished, especially when the TRT government did not need 
financial assistance from them. This condition forced globalised actors to search 
for a new strategy to retain their engagement in the policy-making process. The 
World Bank found a way to cooperate with the NESDB by means of CDP-PAM, 
but it had to follow the agenda defined by the Thai state. Its leverage on policy- 
making became minimal. 
The Thai state took an active role in driving policy implementation. The new 
executive agencies, including the VURFO and NCPE, were established to serve 
this purpose. This situation provided little room for societal or globalised actors to 
influence or become involved in the policy implementation process. Instead of 
depending upon other actors to implement the anti-poverty scheme as was the 
case prior to 2001, the Thai state relied mostly on 
direct provision and policy 
instruments that allowed the state to independently implement policies 
itself. In 
the case of VURF, the TRT government decided to 
direct a significant proportion 
of its resources from the government budget straight 
to the poor. Any 
intermediary non-state agent was bypassed including those societal actors who 
had formerly dominated SIF. In the case of NCPE, through which an 
individualistic approach to poverty was implemented, the poor received 
direct 
support from the state. Although the state co-opted societal actors 
at the very early 
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stages of implementation, this research observed an attempt made by the state to 
undermine the role and involvement of societal actors at the later stages. The post- 
2001 era witnessed the capacity of the Thai state to exercise a considerable degree 
of control over society in this area of social policy. 
2.3 Modes of governing 
Prior to 2001. communitarian governance had become the main mode of 
governing, an approach that was strongly promoted by all actors who participated 
in poverty alleviation policy. The Thai state accepted this mode of governing 
because it perceived this mode as appropriate for mitigating poverty in the long 
run. In contrast, societal actors pursued this mode because they believed it was an 
alternative approach to the national development trajectory and this mode had the 
potential to reduce the state's power. They held this mode of governance as 
having the potential to allow communities to begin to lead their own development 
process at the grassroots level. Globalised actors pursued this governing mode 
because they viewed communitarian governance as a channel to access the social 
policy terrain and to remain engaged in Thailand's policy-making. 
Later, institutional ised cooperative arrangements for policy formulation and 
implementation between the state and society were promoted by societal actors 
under the rubric of state-civil partnerships. Societal actors wanted to use this type 
of institutionalised structure to influence policy-making at all levels of governance 
in Thailand: from the national to the local level. They attempted to reframe the 
relationship between the state and society as well as to equalise power disparity 
between both of them through this partnership initiative. Globalised actors, 
particularly the Bank, also advocated partnership governance through 
CDP-PAM. 
This instrument allowed the Bank to remain engaged in anti-poverty policy- 
making. The momentum of the partnership governance was carried 
forward to the 
time when the new government came to power, when again 
it was pursued by 
different actors with different rationales. 
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During the TRT administration, partnership was used by the state as a strategy to 
co-opt and assimilate the networks and knowledge of the communitarian 
advocates. Societal actors directed their efforts toward institutional i sing the state- 
civil partnership structure because this would allow them to have a formal channel 
through which to participate in policy decisions and implementation at different 
levels of governance. This partnership governance also gave societal actors an 
opportunity to access and legitimately use government resources to propel their 
agenda. This rationale was reflected in the cases of PNCU and CSCS. Globalised 
actors used partnership as a strategy only to help them retain their engagement in 
Thailand's policy-making and to conduct some activities with the Crovemment, 
although their role and influence eventually declined considerably. The CDP- 
PAM showed that the Thai state had become the key player in this partnership 
structure while the Bank had only to follow and support the implementation 
strategies defined by the Thai state. 
Notably, the recent attempt of government to institutional ise a state-society 
partnership in the Poverty Registration Scheme has highlighted that the 
partnership between the state and society in this Scheme was achieved only in 
form rather than in essence. The implementation of the Scheme emphasised a 
possible tension between a statutory partnership encouraged by the state under the 
NCPE organisation and a more directive, hierarchical form of governance under 
the bureaucratic structure. It is also doubtful if the government attempted to break 
up the communitarian alliance, and aimed to undermine the role and power of 
societal actors by co-opting them under this state- instituted partnership. In this 
way, state transformation in pursuing partnership governance could be 
interpreted 
as a state strategy to maintain its power. 









Key actors The NESDB in cooperation with Government and its new 
societal actors. agencies established to take 
charge of policy initiatives. 
State capacity Weak due to the impact of the Recovered its capacity by the 
crisis. process of 'regaining' resources 
under the guise of crisis 
recovery. 
Societal capacity Possessed networks and expertise 0 Undermined by the state 
of community empowerment to 0 Access to government resources 
poverty alleviation. was cut off. 
Agenda setting Remained as the state's decision State independently set priorities 
but more contingent on support and determined agendas. 
from non-state actors. Problems were reframed and 
Was influenced mostly by societal redefined by the state with little 
actors and globalised forces. involvement by other sectors. 
Implementation Dependent on support from non- State co-opted societal actors. 
state actors. State steered the process. 
Cooperation between state and State directly supported the poor 
non-state actors. and their communities. 
Operations left to non-state actors. 0 State-directed, state-initiated 
Globalised forces retained some partnerships. 
degree of control. 
Modes of governing Communitarian. 0 Hierarchy. 
Partnership. 0 Partnership. 
According to the above discussions, instead of the Thai state turning into a weak 
and less powerful actor in shaping policy and service delivery as indicated in 
recent studies (see Chapter 2), it was observed that the Thai state was able to use 
different governing approaches and strategies to maintain its power to steer 
society, to influence other actors, and ultimately to align all other non-state actors 
with its purposes, at least in the case of anti-poverty policy. The governance 
configuration of Thailand's anti-poverty policy appeared to shift from what could 
be called a society-guided, state-governed governance toward a state-guided, 
state-governedgovernance. In the former configuration, the role of societal actors 
and globalised actors was prominent in guiding and shaping the policy 
decision- 
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making process. The intervention of society in policy implementation was also 
noticeably essential. The state was very much dependent on the support of other 
non-state actors. However, this did not mean that the power of the state was 
diminished; instead, it readjusted itself to fit with new policy conditions. The 
state's adoption of the communitarian and partnership governance approach 
became its strategy to maintain its role in steering society, or in other words, to 
retain its power to govern. In the later configuration, the state was able to exercise 
its power over the policy agenda setting and to regain its control over resource 
distribution in order to manage policy implementation. In this configuration, the 
state attained its full capacity and power to govern. Since 2001, the state has had a 
substantial capacity to use government apparatus to steer society. It guided policy 
formation and directed policy execution with neither the direct support nor the 
significant involvement of other actors. 
3. Governance and policy-making 
3.1 Governance as a process 
This research found that a more dynamic perspective examining governance as a 
process to be very useful. Although institutional arrangements remain important 
when studying governance because they determine what roles the state can 
actually play in governance (Kato, 1996; Peter, 1999), thinking about governance 
from a process perspective is even more important because governance is not only 
about structures but more about the interactions among actors or institutions 
(Kooiman, 2003; Pierre and Peters, 2000). Investigating governance by focusing 
only on institutional arrangements tends to provide only snapshots of the relevant 
institutional structures and a partial view of the interactive nature of governance. 
It is likely to obscure the full manifestation of interactions among concerned 
institutions or actors in the production of governing outcomes. Therefore, an 
alternative assumption is that governance is a dynamic process of 
interactions 
amongst various domestic and external actors. Furthermore, examining 
governance through the lens of process could help to address changes occurring, 
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over time and in different degrees. Using this approach to investigate the case of 
Thai governance confirms the usefulness and importance of perceiving 
governance as a process whereby changes in state-society relationship can be 
identified and explained. 
The process of steering and coordinating are two dominant dynamic perspectives 
in the current literature (Pierre and Peters, 2000). The concept of governance as 
steering is at the heart of much of the current literature on governance (Pierre, 
2000). Some even argue that it is central to most theories of governance 
(Kooiman, 1993,2000). From this perspective, states are still capable to steer 
society, although now their authority is less based on legal power, and more on its 
control over critical resources. In another perspective, governance sometimes 
refers to the coordination of a sector in society such as the economy or industry 
(Hollingsworth et al., 1994; Gamble, 2000). It could also refer to a social 1=1 
coordination and interaction between both public and private institutions 
organised into networks to deliver and respond to social needs (Atkinson and 
Coleman, 1992; Marsh, 1998). In any of these perspectives, governance is 
considered in a dynamic manner. This process approach seeks to reveal how 
actors, both state and non-state, control governing activities and produce desired 
outcomes (Pierre and Peters, 2000). 
3.2 Politics in governance 
The concept of governance often relies upon the concept of *co-govemance' 
(Kooiman, 2003), which could be expressed in the forms of collaboration, co- 
operation, partnerships, or network modes of governing (Kooiman, 2003, Rhodes, 
2000). However, one could question how 'co-governance' would be achieved if 
the participants held different interests and motives in joining the various modes 
of 'co-govemance"? Do differences in interest and motives have the potential 
for 
raising conflict among them? What needs to be taken into account 
is the nature of 
politics in the governing process. Politics is all about contradictory and conflicting 
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interests, a reality which might seem to be based on a different assumption than 
the assumptions in the 'co-govemance' proposal. 
Based on findings of this research, power disparity between the Thai state, 
societal actors, and globalised actors could be observed. At different points in 
time, each one holds incompatible resources and thus has incompatible power to 
influence or shape policy. With different levels of leverage, the bargaining power 
of each actor would be unequal, and policy-decisions would tend to favour those 
with stronger power. In this manner, partnerships do not necessarily mean a 
balance of power amongst the different actors in the partnership arrangement. As 
well, multi-party involvement in partnership governance does not necessarily 
mean the power is equally distributed or shared among all players. Furthermore, 
this research found governance to be a political relationship, whereas the 
interactions of each actor were driven by its own interests. Each actor had 
different objectives or goals, and each one tended to pursue an achievement of its 
oroals. This nature of relationship caused any form of 'co-governance' to be 
difficult to achieve. This very nature of politics became a cause that prevented 
partnerships in the case of Thailand's anti-poverty policy from functioning 
successfully. 
Another related issue is that the emphasis on partnerships in governance theory 
tends to ignore the continuing role of bureaucratic hierarchy. Public-private 
partnership arrangements typically assume a limited role of the hierarchical 
structure in bureaucracy. This tends to lead to ignorance of the interplay and 
tension between hierarchical structure and partnership arrangement. As illustrated 
in this research, partnership governance might take place in the shadow of 
hierarchical organisation. In general, a partnership would include representatives 
from different government agencies and non-state sectors. If interactions among 
members across state-society sectors happen more frequently than interactions 
within the same sector in the process of conducting governance activities, the 
hierarchical structure may not have much influence. This condition often occurs 
when the state is weak. In the opposite way, if the governing process 
demands 
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more interactions among representatives from government agencies than 
interactions between state and non-state participants in the governing process, the 
hierarchy is likely to play a major role in the process, and partnership might not be 
effective in practice. Partnership structure in implementing the Povertý 
Registration Scheme via the government bureaucracy was a case which resulted in 
no collaboration between state and non-state actors at the street-level 
implementation stage. 
3.3 Policy as a platform of governing interactions 
Many leading scholars in the field of public policy conceptualise policy as a 
product of a rational process of searching and analysing information to achieve 
optimum solutions for social problems. The policy process is usually perceived as 
a sequence of various stages: problem identification and agenda formation, policy 
formulation, policy adoption, policy implementation, and policy evaluation 
(Anderson, 2000; Hogwood and Gunn, 1991; MacRae and Wilde, 1979; Quade, 
1989). What this research found was that policy was not a product of such a 
rational process; instead, policy could be viewed as an arena of governing 
arrangement whereby various actors used policy as a platform to pursue their own 
agendas and interests. 
In the case of pre-2001 Thailand, poverty alleviation policy was pursued by 
communitarian advocates to advance their community empowerment agenda as 
well as to offer them a 'social space' to participate in decision-making and to 
access government resources. For state actors, particularly the government and 
NESDB, anti-poverty policy was used to tackle the impacts of the crisis and to 
address the poor, a strategy which certainly yielded much meaning to their 
political future. But for the Bank, this policy area gave it a 'ticket' to engage 
in 
this social policy area as well as to propel its neo-liberal reform agendas 
by 
addressing the needs of those who had been disadvantaged by a 
liberalised 
market. After 2001, while societal actors still pursued the anti-poverty agenda to 




and to guarantee access to government resources, the government devised policý 
to serve its political purposes. The TRT government used this policy as an 
instrument to gain popular support and to reach out to a broader electorate, as well 
as to use it as a means for social intervention and manipulation. For globalised 
actors, the anti-poverty programme provided a platform for the Bank to remain 
engaged in Thailand's policy-making. 
The case of Thailand's anti-poverty policy shows that policy can become a 
platform for interactions, in which negotiations or competitions amongst different 
interests exist. These interactions produce policy that is biased towards powerful 
actors who hold a stronger bargaining position. In other words, policy has been a 
result of competition among different constellations of power in domestic politics, 
and it represents the interests of a dominant force who sets the agenda and 
manipulates the mode of policy delivery. Therefore, it is vital to examine 
governance arrangements within specific policy contexts since the pattern of 
interactions is likely to vary across policy areas. 
3.4 Governance in the context of developing countries 
The contemporary forms of governance advocated in the West promote a new 
process of governing arrangement through market, community, or self- 
organ i sing/inter-organ isational networks characterised by 'interdependence, 
resource exchange, and significant autonomy from the state' (Rhodes, 1997: 14). 
However, while this may provide an appropriate basis for theorising about change 
in western governance, it is doubtful how relevant this model is outside of the 
specific Anglo-centric context, particularly in the context of Asian developing 
countries, where the legacy of authoritarian or paternalistic, soft-authoritarian 
governments remains (Beeson, 2001; Polidano, 2001; Tan, 2000). This research 
suggests that the governing arrangement in developing countries could appear 
in a 
different manifestation from the Anglo-American realisation, at 
least in 
Thailand's case. Even where political reform has recently occurred, 
it does not 
necessarily lead to the expansion or consolidation of an 
independent non-state 
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sector (or civil societies particularly) of a sort associated with the forms of 
governance proposed by scholars in developed countries (cf Connors (1999) and 
Ji (2002) for Thailand's case). 
This research found that the Thai state deliberately readjusted its strategies of 
engagement in relation to other non-state actors to retain its power over society. It 
seems to be that the institutional ised legacy of the strong state in Thailand 
continues to place constraints on possible patterns of 'co-governance' that are 
predicated upon the existence of fully functioning and independent non-state 
actors. While not as coercive as it once was, the Thai state appears to be able to 
manoeuvre society. This strategic manipulation exercised upon non-state sectors 
is made possible under the post-2001 governance though partnership and 
community modes of governing. Societal actors are not only frequently co-opted 
by the state but may to some extent be controlled by it. Such a condition concurs 
with Clarke's argument (1998) claiming that the political effectiveness of NGOs 
in developing countries largely dependent positively or negatively upon a state- 
defined regulatory framework. Considering this issue in the broader context of 
East Asia, Cheung and Scott (2003) comment that the paternalistic and 
centralising traditions of Asian states denote that the state is reluctant to devolve 
power, particularly to non-state institutions or those institutions that the state fails 
to reach and control in some way. Power to govern remains predominantly in the 
hands of the state, its bureaucracy, and those institutions it patronises. Their 
studies report that public sector reforms in Asian societies have become 
instruments or tactics used by Asian governments to strengthen state capacity. 
Beeson and Jayasuriya (1998) also argue that the institutional infrastructure that 
might permit alternative modes of governance, particularly in the form of 
independent policy networks existing outside of state control, simply does not 
exist in Asia in the same way that it does in Western Europe. In other words, 
because states in Asia still generally guard their independence and seek to 
maintain control over political structures and processes that may impinge on their 
autonomy, they refuse to accept any notion of 'shared sovereignty' with other 
non-state actors, as advised in western literature (Beeson, 2001). 
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The differences in historical development experiences of developing countries in 
Asia suggest that different natures of the traditional state-society arrangement 
induce different state roles in the governing process. The form of governing 
arrangement undertaken in a country would reflect existent, contingent realities of 
that country. Moreover, the nature of competition among different constellations 
of power not only makes co-operation difficult, but makes the establishment of 
governance though independent networks of the sort that occurs in Europe 
unlikely. This implies that the role of the state in governance is a contextual 
phenomenon: it could take different forms in different political and institutional 
contexts, and a state could be either the key, co-ordinating actor or simply one of 
several powerful players in the process (Pierre, 2000a). 
If the governance configuration in each country is contextually sensitive, one 
might ask how useful the governance framework is when analysing governance in 
the context of developing countries. This research found that the governance 
framework as adopted in this research has potential to open up alternative ways of 
looking at the interactions and linkages between domestic and global actors, as 
well as the different forms of governing arrangements in the pursuit of collective 
interest fulfilment. One of the key benefits in employing the governance 
framework to analyse the case of Thailand's anti-poverty policy was that the 
framework captured the new emerging forms of 'steering' strategies. These 
strategies seemed to be replacing 'command and control' policy instruments used 
by the Thai state in the old days. The notion of governance and the framework 
it 
offered serves as a useful tool to better understand the changing roles, powers, 
functions, and activities of the state in both developed and developing societies. 
However, some propositions of the governance perspective suggested 
by scholars 
such as Peters (1998a) or Stoker (1998) could be considered when analysing 
governance configuration in different- contexts while other propositions might 
be 
improper. For example, one key proposition of governance promoted 
in the West 
is that of governing through networks rather than hierarchy, through partnership 




however, most countries started from either a traditional autocratic-patemalistic 
ruling system or a corporative developmental state, and the legacies of these 
systems remain in present governing configurations, for example the notion of 
Javanese kingship authority in Indonesian political culture or the idea of 
corporatism in Korea, Japan, and Taiwan (Cheung and Scott, 2003). This means 
that some propositions need close attention and critical examination when used to 
analyse governance in developing countries. 
4. Governance and globalisation 
Some scholars conceived globalisation as an external phenomenon that has been 
passively received by states, and adopted the logic of the convergence approach 
into their analysis (Ohmae, 1990; Reich, 1992; Strange, 1996). They argue that 
states are gradually 'hollowing out' of their locus through the globalisation 
process, where networks of production, trade, finance, and market bypass the 
state"s ability to control trans-border movement of these things. National 
governments have become simple intermediate institutions sandwiched between 
increasingly powerful local, regional, and global economic mechanisms. States 
are depicted as being under siege by global capitalism and its institutional allies 
and inevitably forced to pursue social and economic policies compatible with 
globalised forces. Some authors argue for the powerful supranational government 
and non-governmental agencies that can play critical roles in shaping social policy 
of a country via instruments such as structural adjustment funds, social 
development assistant programmes, or standard setting (Deacon et al., 1997; 
Yeates, 2001). In sum, globalisation has been perceived by these scholars as an 
inevitable force that has eroded the state's political power, policy autonomy, and 
its principal role in public policy-making. 
The findings of this research contribute to this debate. In Thailand's anti-poverty 
policy during the period of study, the capacity of government to manage society 
had not yet 'hollowed out. ' Although the intervention of globalised agencies 
in 
national anti-poverty policy was clearly observed after the financial crisis, 
it lasted 
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only until the new TRT government came into power. Two variables could 
explain changes in the relationship between domestic state and globalised forces: 
the degree of state capacity and its policy towards external assistance. Findings of 
this research indicate that, contrary to the arguments of strong globalists, 
globalisation and the influence of globalised forces might not necessarily diminish 
the state's capacity. Instead, globalisation could contribute to the reorientation of 
the state in the governing process and to the ways the state manages society. 
When the capacity of the Thai state to manage domestic affairs was weakened due 
to the consequences of the financial crisis, the state had to call for financial 
assistance from international agencies. This condition gave an opportunity for 
international agencies to shape and influence domestic social policy based on the 
idea of developing a social safety net for the poor. The Bank implemented SIP to 
reduce the social consequences caused by the crisis over the short-term. For the 
longer term, SIP aimed to empower people at the grassroots level through 
community-based development initiatives. However, soon after the Thai state 
managed to recover its capacity after the crisis and shortly after it could recuperate 
from budget constraints; it started to negotiate with international agencies and to 
realign its policy against external assistance. This reorientation of the Thai state to 
become not only a non-aid recipient but also an emerging donor pressured the 
Bank to search for a new strategy to retain its involvement in this policy area. The 
Thai state became an agenda setter and to some extent was able to pressure the 
Bank to follow and support its state-defined policies. Within the new partnership 
framework of CDP-PAM, the Thai state was able to manoeuvre and negotiate 
its 
position with the Bank. At this time, the state held the capacity to resist any 
influence exercised by globalised forces. Although the Bank attempted to 
initiate 
a policy dialogue instrument through its social monitor report series, 
the impact of 
this instrument was insignificant and yielded no influence on national policy. 
In 
this way, the state's capacity and policy reorientation against external 
forces were 
the key factors in determining the nature of the relationship 
between the state and 
globalised forces. 
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Furthermore, in the case of SIP, the Bank did not have its own local presence to 
implement the programme; therefore, it indeed depended on the cooperation and 
partnership of government agencies to implement its programmes or agreements. 
On the same basis, the Bank also relied on NGOs to implement the SIF scheme. 
This structural dependence of international organisations on state and domestic 
non-state agencies inevitably offered room for national politics to negotiate with tn 
globalised forces. This case supports the observation given by some scholars that 
the impact of globalisation was often greatly overestimated and that the 
'hollowed-out state' argument was somewhat flawed (Hirst and Thompson, 1996; 
Holton, 1998; Waters, 2001; Weiss, 1998). States yet have considerable autonomy 
in how they interpret constraints placed upon them by so-called globalised forces. 
This research argues that state adaptation, not state retreat, should be the hallmark 
of globalisation. 
Another point to be mentioned here is that public policy could be perceived as an 
instrument that states use to manage globalisation. Far from surrendering to 
globalisation, states can pursue a variety of strategies to steer the globalisation 
process or to manage any influence caused by globalisation at the domestic level 
(Rieger and Leibfried, 1998). In doing so, states can advance their interests. The 
case of anti-poverty policy in Thailand might be considered in accordance with 
this line of analysis. It could be argued that the TRT government's emphasis on 
anti-poverty policy served the purpose of not only internalising the agenda from 
societal actors, but also internalising the agenda from the globalised forces. Once 
the TRT government adopted an agenda which used to be pursued and promoted 
by the Bank, it narrowed down a range of policy agenda that the Bank could 
pursue to influence Thailand's domestic policy-making. It also lessened the 
channels through which international organisations could influence domestic 
affairs. In this way, adopting anti-poverty policy helped the Thai government to 
mitigate pressures imposed by international organisations. This strategy also 
offered political space for the government to manage its own affairs. 
This example 
recognised the centrality of state as a key mediator of globalisation. 
Public policy 
was used by the state to reinforce its position against globalisation. 
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The final point drawn from the findings of this research is that the influence of 
globalised processes is politically negotiated and mediated at the level of national 
politics through governance arrangements. Globalisation neither produces unitary 
outcomes nor does it erase local or national differences in public policy (Tickell 
and Peck, 2003). Specific institutional arrangements between state and non-state 
actors determine the very nature of policy-making in a country. In other words, 
the apparently universal imperatives of globalisation are mediated differently in 
specific national institutional contexts, producing significantly different outcomes 
(Beeson, 2001). This not only suggests that governments may retain more policy 
discretion and autonomy than some observers would claim, depending on their 
capacities, but also the studies about globalisation and public policy thus strongly 
need to broaden their inquiry by incorporating the dimensions of the governance 
configuration in their analysis. However, the institutional arrangements in the tn 
governing process and the relationships between government, societal actors, and 
, globalised agents vary from country to country depending on the country's social, 
political, cultural, and historical background. This means that the way which each 
country experiences globalisation and how each country responds to it can be 
expected to differ quite significantly. In other words, the study of the relationship 
between globalisation, governance, and public policy-making has to be concerned 
with the particular conditions within specific settings. 
5. Conclusion 
This research offers a contributory perspective of the nexus of governance, policy- 
making, and globalisation. The research supports a position arguing that the 
power of states is not yet diminished; on the contrary, the power 
is being, 
readjusted and restructured in response to the growing complexity of the 
contemporary governing process. The form and functions of the state 
have 
reconstituted as the state seeks coherent strategies for maintaining 
its influence 
over domestic policy-making and engaging itself with new policy conditions. 
Examining the recent development of governance in Thailand's anti-poverty 
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policy has produced an empirical contri I bution to the theoretical development and 
debates in this area of research. Furthermore, the new configuration of governance 
is uneven, given the socio-political condition of a country, and it is subject to 
results of the power relationship that the state and other domestic or international 
non-state policy actors have negotiated. The study of Thai governance has 
promoted this idea of understanding governance in a specific context by 
broadening our perspective of governance in a non-western context. It moves 
away from the Anglo-American governance paradierm by looking at a specific 
policy in the context of developing countries in the East. Contemporary patterns 
of governance in Asia tend to be different from those in the Euro-American 
context, as exemplified in the case of Thailand's anti-poverty policy with its 
specific contingencies. There is no universal model of governance that will be 
equally applicable or efficacious in all circumstances. 
Nonetheless, the notion of governance as an analytical tool has the merit of 
providing a conceptual framework within which diverse forms of political and 
economic organisation can be compared and contrasted (Beeson, 2001). This 
means there is still a need to look at the nexus of governance, policy-making, and 
globalisation issues in a comparative perspective by analysing different social 
policies in Thailand, such as health care and education policy. This approach 
would provide a better understanding of the manifestation of governance and 
social policy in Thailand. Moreover, comparative cross-country studies would 
yield a more comprehensive understanding of some of the differences in the 
nature of state organisations - such as the political system (presidential, 
parliamentary, or mixed systems), state structure (unitary versus federal), national 
administrative organisation (centralisation versus decentralisation), or the level of 
a country's development (developing versus developed) - which would 
in turn 
produce particular modes of governing and governance configurations. 
Cross- 
country studies would enable us to compare policy outcomes based on a test of a 
variety of theoretical assumptions about policy-making and governance. 
Hence 
these comparative studies should be fully developed in future research to enrich 
page 162 
Chapter 8 Conclusion 
the understanding of policies and politics in developing societies and how they 
benefit people's everyday lives. 
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Code Organisation Profiles Date of 
interview 
Gol The Strategy Unit, Office of the Co- Senior Executive 23 id A ug, Secretariat, the National Centre for 2004 
Poverty Eradication 
Go2 The Strategy Unit, Office of the Co- Senior Executive 33 0 "' Au 
Secretariat, the National Centre for 1004 
Poverty Eradication 
Go-3) The Strategy Unit, Office of the Co- Senior Policy 29"' Jul, 
Secretariat, the National Centre for Analyst 2004 
Poverty Eradication 
Go4 Office of the National Centre for Poverty Senior Executive 10' Sep, 
Eradication at the Ministry of Interior 2004 
Go5 District Office, Muang District, Nakom Senior District 2 33 d Sep, 
Pathom Province Officer 2004 
ý rd Go6 Community Development Department, Senior Executive -3 
Sep, 
Ministry of Interior 2004 
Go7 The Office of the National Village and Senior Executive 9"' Sep, 
Urban Revolving Fund 2004 
Go8 Poverty Reduction Policy Unit, Senior Executive 14"' Sep, 
Community Economic Development and 2004 
Income Distribution Office, NESDB 
Go9 Poverty Eradication and Income Senior Policy 27"' Jul, 
Distribution Section, Community Analyst 2004 
Economic Development and Income 
Distribution Office, NESDB 
GolO Community Economic Development and Senior Policy 28, n Dec, 
Income Distribution Office, NESDB Analyst who was 2004 
one of staff working 
with the National 
Centre for Poverty 
Eradication 
Gol I Community Economic Development and Senior Policy 28... Dec, 
Income Distribution Office, NESDB Analyst who was 2004 
one of staff 
responsible for a 
project under CDP- 
PAM 
...... ... . 
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Code Organisation Profiles Date of 
interview 
Go12 The Institute for Good Governance Senior Executive 29"' Jul Promotion, Office of the Public Sector , 2004 Development Commission 
Ll The Sanding Committee on Labour and Senior Executive 17 th Sep, Social Welfare of the Senate 2004 
L2 TRT party Founding executive 8 1h Feb, 
member 2005 
Acl Thailand Research Fund Senior Executive 20t" Aug , 2004 
Ac2 The Center for Philanthropy and Civil Faculty member 9th Aug, Society, National Institute of 2004 
Development Administration 
Ac') Faculty of Political Science, Faculty member 14 
th Feb, 
Chulalongkorn University 2005 
Ac4 Faculty of Social Work and Social Faculty member 233 rd Aug, 
Welfare, Hauchiew Chalermprakiet 2004 
University 
101 World Bank Office, Bangkok Project Economist 20th Aug, 
2004 
Io2 Project Coordination Unit, Country Senior Officer 9th Feb, 
Development Partnership for Poverty 2005 
Analysis and Monitoring (CDP-PAM) 
103 The United Nation Development Former officer but 24 
th Aug, 
Programme (UNDP) now a consultant 2004 
lo4 The United Nation Development Senior Executive 24 th Aug, 
Programme (UNDP) 2004 
Io5 The United Nation Development Programme 24 th Aug, 
Programme (UNDP) Associate 2004 
NgI The Institute for the Promotion of Local Senior Executive I 9th Aug, 
Knowledge Management 2004 
Ng2 The Villager Volunteer Association of Senior Executive 17 
th Sep, 
Thailand 2004 
Ng-3 The Community Resource Development Senior Executive oth 2 Jan, 
Institute 2005 
Ng4 The Community Organisations Senior Executive 25 
th Jan, 
Development Institute 2005 
Ng5 Knowledge and Information Senior Officer 7 
th Sep, 
Development Unit, Community 2004 
Organisation Development Institute 
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Code Organisation Profiles Date of 
interview 
n rd Ng6 The Community Organisations Senior Officer at the 3 Aug, 
Development Institute management level 2004 
Ng7 Civil Society Coordination and Support Senior Executive 
Subcommittee 
10 in Feb, 
2005 
Ng8 The Local Development Institute Senior Officer 21" Dec, 
2004 







School for PollicY Studies 
Mr Amornsak Kitthananan 
University of Bristol 
School for Policy Studies 
8 Priory Road, 
Bristol BS8 ITZ England 
Tel: +44 (0)117 954 6755 (UK) 
Fax: +44 (0)117 954 6756 (UK) 
Tel: +66 (0)] 206 2635 (Thailand) 
You are being invited to participate in a doctoral research project being 
undertaken by Mr Amornsak Kitthananan, entitled *Governance and policy- 
making process in Thailand: A study of poverty alleviation policy since 1997'. 
This document provides you, with the scope and significance of the research, the 
reason why you have been chosen to participate, and how the study will be used. 
Please take time to read the following information and do not hesitate to ask the 
researcher if you have any queries. After reading this document, and if you are 
willing to participate, please kindly complete the attached reply form and fax to 
the number given. 
What is the scope and significance of the research? 
This research is about governance and policy-making in Thailand with a particular 4: ) focus on a case study of poverty alleviation policy since 1997. The 1997 Asian 
crisis initiated significant challenges to the Thai socio-political milieu, 
governance, and policy-making. The issues of governance reform and building 
better governance have become the prime reform agendas in Thailand since then. 
Changes continue to transform Thai Govemance and policy-making, but the 1-1) 
changes that have occurred in Thailand since the 1997 crisis have left an 
ambiguity and confusion regarding the present nature of govemance in Thailand. 
This research is therefore concerned with exploring govemance and the policy : -71 
process with particular reference to Thailand, and is thus an emerging and highly 
relevant area of research particularly in the current context of globalisation and 
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international i sat ion and the increasing complexity of the policy arena. This research area is, as yet, underdeveloped. This research will take advantage of the very ambiguity and confusion discussed above, and will critically examine the configuration of the present Thai governance through an investigation of the whole range of institutions and actors involved in the process of governing, as well as the nature of relationships amongst them. It will then go on to consider how this new configuration of governance affects the policy-making, process. 
Although existing research on policy studies in Thailand has been carried out drawing on various theories and frameworks, it would see that the predominant explanations come from the political economy point of view, and almost all of them have employed theories derived from the contexts of developed countries. This may not apply to the case of developing countries like Thailand. Furthermore, this policy studies literature seems to place little attention on the trans- and supra-riational actors, such as the World Bank or multinational 
companies, who play an important role in the globalised world. Another important 
point is that almost none of them have comprehended the socio-political changes Z' in Thailand since the 1997 crisis. Thus, there is the need gain on understanding of 
the contemporary policy-making process in Thailand by employing the 
governance framework in order to understand the changing nature of state-society 
relations in policy-making process in Thailand. 
Poverty eradication policy is selected for a more specific examination for many 
reasons. The literature about policy-making in Thailand has been dominated with 
studies mainly in the area of economic policy-making. Social policy is under- 
researched and there is certainly a need for a more comprehensive literature to 
contribute of the field. Further, poverty policy is the prime agenda of government 
and this policy area reveals significant change in Thai governance in many ways. 
In pursuing this policy, the government has implemented a major public sector 
reform plan through which we can observe significant change in the public sector 
structure and the nature of governing. Finally, in this policy area, non-state actors 
(the non-governmental and international organisations) have played an important 
role in shaping policy content and policy-making process which reflects the 
change in governing nature of Thailand. 
What are the anticipated benefits of research? 
This research should make a critical contribution to the study of policy studies in 
general, as well as the progress of governance reform in Thailand in particular. In 
a practical sense, this research will reflect the contemporary inter-relationship 
between state and society in Thailand within the context of 1997 Constitution, and 
it could be seen as an important contribution in assessing the progress of 
Thailand's political and public sector reform process. In a theoretical sense, the 
research should develop an analytical framework that identifies the elements that 
contribute to governance theory. This is expected to be utilised to analyse policy- 
making processes in other countries. This research should also provide a critical 
contribution to academic debates in the area of globalisation and the role of the 
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state in policy-making; as well as the discussion of state-society relations in a globalised world. This research should further add a thoughtful contribution to the discussion about the role of institutions and power relations in the policy process. 
What methods will be employed? 
This research employs the analysis of reliable secondary data and archives, and in- depth interview with all relevant stakeholders. Secondary data will cover various 
sources available in both print and on-line. The interview will be conducted with 
around 20-30 people who were selected purposively. The interview should take 
about 30-45 minutes and will be tape-recorded for the reason of data analysis. The 
condition of anonymity and confidentiality will be strictly implemented. The 
information provided by respondents will be kept anonymous and the information 
will be collected in such a way that confidentiality can be guaranteed. Data ý\ ill be 
stored in such a way as to preclude any unauthorised access. Taped and transcripts 
will be labeled in ways which confirm anonymity. 
Why you are invited? 
Around 20-30 interviewees who are responsible or have actively participated in 
the poverty policy advocacy and development from each of the related 
organisations are invited to participate in this research. They are purposively 
chosen because their experiences, knowledge, expertise, and perspectives about 
the issue are expected to provide invaluable information which will help to 
contribute to the advancement of knowledge and policy development. 
Participation is voluntary, you are free to decide whether to be involved in this 
research. However, the researcher would be extremely grateful if you decide to be 
interviewed as mentioned above. The researcher guarantees the confidentiality 
and anonymity of the information provided by you. A list of topics questions that 
are likely to be covered in the interview is attached with this document. 
Research results 
The information from the research will be used in a dissertation to fulfil the 
requirement of Doctor of Social Science (Policy Studies) Degree, 
University of 
Bristol, England. Research findings will be prepared for publication in academic 
journals and reports. Summary of the research will be provided 
if requested. 





Objectives of research 
I) to examine the present nature of the governance configuration in Thailand; 2) to investigate the way this governance configuration effects the poverty 
eradication policy-making process 
33 ) to analyse the irnpacts/influences of globalisation upon the configuration of 
governance and policy process. 
Introduction 
0 Research information 
Tape-recorded 
Confidentiality 
Sign the informed consent form 
Background of participant 
How long have you been working for this organisation? 
How long have you been working for this job? 
What are your roles and responsibilities in relation to this policy? 
How have you been involved in the poverty policy? 
Situation of poverty 
" Situation of poverty in Thailand 
" How policy deals with poverty problem 
" Effect of government reform plan on poverty reduction plan 







Stakeholders/partners who get involved 
Formulating 
Delivering 
Why they were included 
Who has been left out 
Why 
How 
Nature of governance 
Roles and responsibilities of your organisation 
Formulation 
Implementation 
Roles and responsibilities of other organisations 
Formulation 
Implementation 
" Reliance on other stakeholders 
Resources 
Decision 








" Who is (are) the key actor(s) 
" Do you think the role of the state has changed in any way? If so, why and how? 
If not, why? 
Modes of governing 
Method government use to get policy delivered 
Different from NGOs' methods 
Different from International organisations' methods 
Key mechanism highlighted in poverty reduction policy 
How the mechanism effected your organisation 
Methods of cooperation with other actors 
Role of networks 
Forinulating 
Delivering 
Role of community 
Role of market mechanism 




- Major resources 
Role of idea/discourse 
Who define the problem 
How do you understand the poverty problem 
External actors 
Influence of international organisations on policy content 
Involvement of international organisations in policy implementation 
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Position Agency Sector 
1. Prawase Wasi N/A Ciý il society 
2. Thanin Jiarawanont Chareon Pokkapan Private business 
3 I Chairat Mapraneat N/A Private business 
4. Deputy Prime Minister 
Chawalit Yongjaiyoudh 
Government 
5. Deputy Prime Minister 
Somkid Jatosribhitak 
- Government 
6. Deputy Prime Minister 
Jaturon Chaisang 
- Government 
7. Minister Ministry of Defence Government 
8. Minister Ministry of Finance Government 
9. Minister Ministry of Social Development and 
Human Security 
Government 
10. Minister Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives 
Government 
11. Minister Ministry of Commerce Government 
12. Minister Ministry of Interior Government 
13. Minister Ministry of Labour Government 
14. Minister Ministry of Education Government 
15. Minister Ministry of Industry Government 
16. Supreme Commander Supreme Command Headquarters Government 
17. Army Commander-m- 
Chief 
Royal Thai Arrny Government 
18. Navy Commander-m- 
Chief 
Royal Thai Navy Government 
19. Air Force 
Commander- i n-Ch ief 
20. Secretary-General 
Royal Thai Air Force 







21. Permanent Secretary 
22. Pen-nanent Secretary 
233. Permanent Secretary 
24. Permanent Secretary 
Agency 
Prime Minister's Office 
Ministry of Finance 
Ministry of Tourism and Sports 







25. Permanent Secretary Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives 
Government 
26. Permanent Secretary Ministry of Commerce Government 
27. Permanent Secretary Ministry of Labour Government 
28. Permanent Secretary Ministry of Education Government 
29. Pen-nanent Secretary Ministry of Health Government 
30. Permanent Secretary Ministry of Industry Government 
_3 
1. Budget Director Bureau of the Budget Government 
32. Secretary-General National Security Council Government 
. -% 11. -General _33 
Secretary National Economic and Social 
Development Board 
Government 
3 34. Deputy Director- 
General 
Community Development Department, 
Ministry of Interior 
Government 
335. Deputy Director- 
General 
Department of Lands, Ministry of 
Interior 
Government 
336. Deputy Director- 
General 
Department of Local Administration, 
Ministry of Interior 
Government 
37. Bangkok Governor Bangkok Metropolitan Admnistration Government 
38. Director General The Government Saving Bank Government 
39. Managing Director 3 The Bank of Agriculture and 
Agricultural Co-operatives 
Government 
40. Director General Farmers Rehabilitation and 
Development Fund Office 
Government 
4 1. President The Thai Bankers' Association Private business 
42. President The Thai Chamber of Commerce Private business 
4-3. President The Federation of Thai Industries Private business 
44. Director National Village and Urban Revolving 
Fund Office 
Government 
45. Director Thailand Research Fund Quasi- government 
46. Director Civil Society Development Officer, 
Local Development Institute 
Civil society 
47. Director Thailand Health Fund Quasi-government 
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48. General Secretary National Health Security Office Government 
49. Representatives Four Regional and Bangkok 
Community Network 
Civil society 
50. Permanent Secretary Ministry of Interior Government 
5 1. Secretary General The Office of the Narcotics Control 
Commission 
Government 
52. Deputy Director- 
General 
Department of Provincial 
Administration, Ministry of Interior 
Government 
53. Deputy Secretary- 
General 
National Economic and Social 
Development Board 
Government 
54. Chair Community Organisations 
Development Institute 
Civil society 
Source: NCPE (2004) 
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